@article{Ganghof2019,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Designing Democratic Constitutions},
  series = {Politics and Governance},
  volume    = {7},
  journal   = {Politics and Governance},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {Cogitatio Press},
  address   = {Lisbon},
  issn      = {2183-2463},
  doi       = {10.17645/pag.v7i4.2239},
  pages     = {243 -- 253},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{TsebelisThiesCheibubetal.2023,
  author    = {Tsebelis, George and Thies, Michael and Cheibub, Jos{\´e} Antonio and Dixon, Rosalind and Bog{\´e}a, Daniel and Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Review symposium},
  series = {European political science},
  journal   = {European political science},
  publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
  address   = {Basingstoke},
  issn      = {1680-4333},
  doi       = {10.1057/s41304-023-00426-9},
  pages     = {20},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {Steffen Ganghof's Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: Democratic Design and the Separation of Powers (Oxford University Press, 2021) posits that "in a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not" (Ganghof, 2021). To consider, examine and theorise about this, Ganghof urges engagement with semi-parliamentarism. As explained by Ganghof, legislative power is shared between two democratically legitimate sections of parliament in a semi-parliamentary system, but only one of those sections selects the government and can remove it in a no-confidence vote. Consequently, power is dispersed and not concentrated in the hands of any one person, which, Ganghof argues, can lead to an enhanced form of parliamentary democracy. In this book review symposium, George Tsebelis, Michael Thies, Jos{\´e} Antonio Cheibub, Rosalind Dixon and Daniel Bog{\´e}a review Steffen Ganghof's book and engage with the author about aspects of research design, case selection and theoretical argument. This symposium arose from an engaging and constructive discussion of the book at a seminar hosted by Texas A\&M University in 2022. We thank Prof Jos{\´e} Cheibub (Texas A\&M) for organising that seminar and Dr Anna Fruhstorfer (University of Potsdam) for initiating this book review symposium.},
  language  = {en}
}