@article{GanghofEppnerPoerschke2018, author = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian and P{\"o}rschke, Alexander}, title = {Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism}, series = {Australian Journal of Political Science}, volume = {53}, journal = {Australian Journal of Political Science}, number = {2}, publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {Abingdon}, issn = {1036-1146}, doi = {10.1080/10361146.2018.1451487}, pages = {211 -- 233}, year = {2018}, abstract = {The article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system - a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government - which we call 'semi-parliamentary government'. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing models or visions of democracy. We specify theoretically how the semi-parliamentary separation of powers contributes to the balancing of democratic visions and propose a conceptual framework for comparing democratic visions. We use this framework to locate the Australian Commonwealth, all Australian states and 22 advanced democratic nation-states on a two-dimensional empirical map of democratic patterns for the period from 1995 to 2015.}, language = {en} } @article{GanghofEppnerPoerschke2018, author = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian and P{\"o}rschke, Alexander}, title = {Semi-parliamentary government in perspective}, series = {Australian Journal of Political Science}, volume = {53}, journal = {Australian Journal of Political Science}, number = {2}, publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {Abingdon}, issn = {1036-1146}, doi = {10.1080/10361146.2018.1451488}, pages = {264 -- 269}, year = {2018}, abstract = {The article responds to four commentaries on the concept of semi-parliamentary government and its application to Australian bicameralism. It highlights four main points: (1) Our preferred typology is not more 'normative' than existing approaches, but applies the criterion of 'direct election' equally to executive and legislature; (2) While the evolution of semi-parliamentary government had contingent elements, it plausibly also reflects the 'equilibrium' nature of certain institutional configurations; (3) The idea that a pure parliamentary system with pure proportional representation has absolute normative priority over 'instrumentalist' concerns about cabinet stability, identifiability and responsibility is questionable; and (4) The reforms we discuss may be unlikely to occur in Australia, but deserve consideration by scholars and institutional reformers in other democratic systems.}, language = {en} } @article{Ganghof2019, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Designing Democratic Constitutions}, series = {Politics and Governance}, volume = {7}, journal = {Politics and Governance}, number = {4}, publisher = {Cogitatio Press}, address = {Lisbon}, issn = {2183-2463}, doi = {10.17645/pag.v7i4.2239}, pages = {243 -- 253}, year = {2019}, abstract = {This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being.}, language = {en} } @book{Ganghof2021, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, address = {Oxford}, isbn = {978-0-19-289714-5}, doi = {10.1093/oso/9780192897145.001.0001}, pages = {1 -- 199}, year = {2021}, abstract = {In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores 'semi-parliamentary government' as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers.}, language = {en} } @article{TsebelisThiesCheibubetal.2023, author = {Tsebelis, George and Thies, Michael and Cheibub, Jos{\´e} Antonio and Dixon, Rosalind and Bog{\´e}a, Daniel and Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Review symposium}, series = {European political science}, journal = {European political science}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, address = {Basingstoke}, issn = {1680-4333}, doi = {10.1057/s41304-023-00426-9}, pages = {20}, year = {2023}, abstract = {Steffen Ganghof's Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: Democratic Design and the Separation of Powers (Oxford University Press, 2021) posits that "in a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not" (Ganghof, 2021). To consider, examine and theorise about this, Ganghof urges engagement with semi-parliamentarism. As explained by Ganghof, legislative power is shared between two democratically legitimate sections of parliament in a semi-parliamentary system, but only one of those sections selects the government and can remove it in a no-confidence vote. Consequently, power is dispersed and not concentrated in the hands of any one person, which, Ganghof argues, can lead to an enhanced form of parliamentary democracy. In this book review symposium, George Tsebelis, Michael Thies, Jos{\´e} Antonio Cheibub, Rosalind Dixon and Daniel Bog{\´e}a review Steffen Ganghof's book and engage with the author about aspects of research design, case selection and theoretical argument. This symposium arose from an engaging and constructive discussion of the book at a seminar hosted by Texas A\&M University in 2022. We thank Prof Jos{\´e} Cheibub (Texas A\&M) for organising that seminar and Dr Anna Fruhstorfer (University of Potsdam) for initiating this book review symposium.}, language = {en} }