@misc{GanghofEppnerPoerschke2018, author = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian and P{\"o}rschke, Alexander}, title = {Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism}, series = {Australian Journal of Political Science}, journal = {Australian Journal of Political Science}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-412984}, pages = {24}, year = {2018}, abstract = {The article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system - a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government - which we call 'semi- parliamentary government'. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing models or visions of democracy. We specify theoretically how the semi-parliamentary separation of powers contributes to the balancing of democratic visions and propose a conceptual framework for comparing democratic visions. We use this framework to locate the Australian Commonwealth, all Australian states and 22 advanced democratic nation-states on a two- dimensional empirical map of democratic patterns for the period from 1995 to 2015.}, language = {en} } @misc{Ganghof2021, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism}, series = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, journal = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, isbn = {978-0-19-289714-5}, issn = {1867-5808}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-53783}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-537839}, pages = {199}, year = {2021}, abstract = {In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores 'semi-parliamentary government' as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers.}, language = {en} } @misc{Ganghof2019, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Designing Democratic Constitutions}, series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, journal = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, number = {120}, issn = {1867-5808}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-44540}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-445408}, pages = {13}, year = {2019}, abstract = {This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being.}, language = {en} } @misc{GanghofEppnerSteckeretal.2019, author = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian and Stecker, Christian and Heeß, Katja and Schukraft, Stefan}, title = {Do minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively?}, series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, journal = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, number = {114}, issn = {1867-5808}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-43417}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-434175}, pages = {541 -- 561}, year = {2019}, abstract = {A widespread view in political science is that minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively, more in line with a median-oriented and 'consensual' vision of democracy. Yet there is only little empirical evidence for it. We study legislative coalition-building in the German state of North-Rhine-Westphalia, which was ruled by a minority government between 2010 and 2012. We compare the inclusiveness of legislative coalitions under minority and majority cabinets, based on 1028 laws passed in the 1985-2017 period, and analyze in detail the flexibility of legislative coalition formation under the minority government. Both quantitative analyses are complemented with brief case studies of specific legislation. We find, first, that the minority cabinet did not rule more inclusively. Second, the minority cabinet's legislative flexibility was fairly limited; to the extent that it existed, it follows a pattern that cannot be explained on the basis of the standard spatial model with policy-seeking parties.}, language = {en} } @misc{Ganghof2012, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Does public reason require super-majoritarian democracy?}, series = {Politics, philosophy \& economics}, volume = {12}, journal = {Politics, philosophy \& economics}, number = {2}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-477860}, pages = {18}, year = {2012}, abstract = {The project of public-reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member from the eligible set of inconclusively justified proposals. Yet if liberal principles are too vague to select sufficiently specific legislative proposals, can they, nevertheless, select specific legislative procedures? Based on the work of Gerald Gaus, this article argues that the only candidate for a conclusively justified decision procedure is a majoritarian or otherwise 'neutral' democracy. If the justification of democracy requires an equality baseline in the design of political regimes and if justifications for departure from this baseline are subject to reasonable disagreement, a majoritarian design is justified by default. Gaus's own preference for super-majoritarian procedures is based on disputable specifications of justified liberal principles. These procedures can only be defended as a sectarian preference if the equality baseline is rejected, but then it is not clear how the set of justifiable political regimes can be restricted to full democracies.}, language = {en} } @misc{Ganghof2016, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Reconciling representation and accountability}, series = {Government and Opposition}, journal = {Government and Opposition}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-413456}, pages = {25}, year = {2016}, abstract = {An egalitarian approach to the fair representation of voters specifies three main institutional requirements: proportional representation, legislative majority rule and a parliamentary system of government. This approach faces two challenges: the under-determination of the resulting democratic process and the idea of a trade-off between equal voter representation and government accountability. Linking conceptual with comparative analysis, the article argues that we can distinguish three ideal-typical varieties of the egalitarian vision of democracy, based on the stages at which majorities are formed. These varieties do not put different relative normative weight onto equality and accountability, but have different conceptions of both values and their reconciliation. The view that accountability is necessarily linked to clarity of responsibility', widespread in the comparative literature, is questioned - as is the idea of a general trade-off between representation and accountability. Depending on the vision of democracy, the two values need not be in conflict.}, language = {en} }