@article{GanghofEppner2017,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian},
  title     = {Patterns of accountability and representation},
  series = {Politics},
  volume    = {39},
  journal   = {Politics},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {0263-3957},
  doi       = {10.1177/0263395717710566},
  pages     = {113 -- 130},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {Arend Lijphart uses an average of five standardized variables - the executive-parties dimension (EPD) - to describe patterns of democracy and explain differences in democracies' performance. The article suggests ways to improve the descriptive part of the project. It argues that the EPD maps different approaches to achieving accountability and representation, rather than differences in consensus. This re-conceptualization leads to a more coherent and valid measurement. It is also argued that more systematic adjustments are needed for differences in constitutional structures (presidentialism and bicameralism). The article presents data on a revised EPD and its components for 36 democracies in the period from 1981 to 2010. As to the explanatory part of the project, we contend that the EPD often hinders adequate causal analysis rather than facilitating it. We show this by re-analysing democracies' performance with respect to turnout and capital punishment.},
  language  = {en}
}
@book{Ganghof2021,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  address   = {Oxford},
  isbn      = {978-0-19-289714-5},
  doi       = {10.1093/oso/9780192897145.001.0001},
  pages     = {1 -- 199},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores 'semi-parliamentary government' as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Ganghof2021,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism},
  series = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  journal   = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  isbn      = {978-0-19-289714-5},
  issn      = {1867-5808},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-53783},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-537839},
  pages     = {199},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores 'semi-parliamentary government' as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers.},
  language  = {en}
}