@misc{HeinzelRichterBuschetal.2020,
  author    = {Heinzel, Mirko Noa and Richter, Jonas and Busch, Per-Olof and Feil, Hauke and Herold, Jana and Liese, Andrea Margit},
  title     = {Birds of a feather?},
  series = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  journal   = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  number    = {5},
  issn      = {1867-5808},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-52169},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-521690},
  pages     = {27},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank ascribe to impartiality in their mandates. At the same time, scholarship indicates that their decisions are disproportionately influenced by powerful member states. Impartiality is seen as crucial in determining International Organizations' (IOs) effectiveness and legitimacy in the literature. However, we know little about whether key interlocutors in national governments perceive the International Financial Institutions as biased actors who do the bidding for powerful member states or as impartial executors of policy. In order to better understand these perceptions, we surveyed high-level civil servants who are chiefly responsible for four policy areas from more than 100 countries. We found substantial variations in impartiality perceptions. What explains these variations? By developing an argument of selective awareness, we extend rationalist and ideational perspectives on IO impartiality to explain domestic perceptions. Using novel survey data, we test whether staffing underrepresentation, voting underrepresentation, alignment to the major shareholders and overlapping economic policy paradigms are associated with impartiality perceptions. We find substantial evidence that shared economic policy paradigms influence impartiality perceptions. The findings imply that by diversifying their ideational culture, IOs can increase the likelihood that domestic stakeholders view them as impartial.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Ganghof2021,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism},
  series = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  journal   = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  isbn      = {978-0-19-289714-5},
  issn      = {1867-5808},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-53783},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-537839},
  pages     = {199},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores 'semi-parliamentary government' as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers.},
  language  = {en}
}