@article{BruttelStolley2020, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Stolley, Florian}, title = {Getting a yes}, series = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics}, volume = {86}, journal = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {New York}, issn = {2214-8043}, doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2020.101550}, pages = {10}, year = {2020}, abstract = {This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game, in which the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter decides. We find that putting effort into the message, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictators power and responsibility.}, language = {en} } @article{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2022, author = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa and Friedrichsen, Jana}, title = {How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion}, series = {European economic review}, volume = {152}, journal = {European economic review}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {Amsterdam}, issn = {0014-2921}, doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104331}, pages = {1 -- 18}, year = {2022}, abstract = {This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.}, language = {en} } @unpublished{HippLeumannSchober2024, author = {Hipp, Lena and Leumann, Sandra and Schober, Pia S.}, title = {Partnership penalties for working in gender-atypical occupations?}, doi = {10.31235/osf.io/ydurp}, pages = {35}, year = {2024}, abstract = {Does working in a gender-atypical occupation reduce individuals' likelihood of finding a different-sex romantic partner, and do such occupational partnership penalties contribute to occupational gender segregation? To answer this question, we theorized partnership penalties for working in gender-atypical occupations by drawing on insights from evolutionary psychology, social constructivism, and rational choice theory and exploited the stability of occupational pathways in Germany. In Study 1, we analyzed observational data from a national probability sample (N= 1,634,944) to assess whether individuals in gender-atypical occupations were less likely to be partnered than individuals who worked in gender typical occupations. To assess whether the observed partnership gaps found in Study 1 were causally related to the gender typicality of men's and women's occupations, we conducted a field experiment on a dating app (N = 6,778). Because the findings from Study 2 suggested that young women and men indeed experienced penalties for working in a gender-atypical occupation (at least when they were not highly attractive), we employed a choice-experimental design in Study 3 (N = 1,250) to assess whether women and men were aware of occupational partnership penalties and showed that anticipating occupational partnership penalties may keep young and highly educated women from working in gender-atypical occupations. Our main conclusion therefore is that that observed penalties and their anticipation seem to be driven by unconscious rather than conscious processes.}, language = {en} }