@misc{WolffSchindlerEnglertetal.2016, author = {Wolff, Wanja and Schindler, Sebastian and Englert, Christoph and Brand, Ralf and Kissler, Johanna}, title = {Uninstructed BIAT faking when ego depleted or in normal state}, series = {BMC neuroscience}, journal = {BMC neuroscience}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-407342}, pages = {12}, year = {2016}, abstract = {Background: Deception can distort psychological tests on socially sensitive topics. Understanding the cerebral processes that are involved in such faking can be useful in detection and prevention of deception. Previous research shows that faking a brief implicit association test (BIAT ) evokes a characteristic ERP response. It is not yet known whether temporarily available self-control resources moderate this response. We randomly assigned 22 participants (15 females, 24.23 ± 2.91 years old) to a counterbalanced repeated-measurements design. Participants first com- pleted a Brief-IAT (BIAT ) on doping attitudes as a baseline measure and were then instructed to fake a negative dop - ing attitude both when self-control resources were depleted and non-depleted. Cerebral activity during BIAT perfor - mance was assessed using high-density EEG. Results: Compared to the baseline BIAT, event-related potentials showed a first interaction at the parietal P1, while significant post hoc differences were found only at the later occurring late positive potential. Here, signifi- cantly decreased amplitudes were recorded for 'normal' faking, but not in the depletion condition. In source space, enhanced activity was found for 'normal' faking in the bilateral temporoparietal junction. Behaviorally, participants were successful in faking the BIAT successfully in both conditions. Conclusions: Results indicate that temporarily available self-control resources do not affect overt faking success on a BIAT. However, differences were found on an electrophysiological level. This indicates that while on a phenotypical level self-control resources play a negligible role in deliberate test faking the underlying cerebral processes are markedly different.}, language = {en} } @misc{SchindlerWolffKissleretal.2015, author = {Schindler, Sebastian and Wolff, Wanja and Kissler, Johanna M. and Brand, Ralf}, title = {Cerebral correlates of faking}, series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Humanwissenschaftliche Reihe}, journal = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Humanwissenschaftliche Reihe}, number = {419}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-406251}, pages = {13}, year = {2015}, abstract = {Direct assessment of attitudes toward socially sensitive topics can be affected by deception attempts. Reaction-time based indirect measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT), are less susceptible to such biases. Neuroscientific evidence shows that deception can evoke characteristic ERP differences. However, the cerebral processes involved in faking an IAT are still unknown. We randomly assigned 20 university students (15 females, 24.65 +/- 3.50 years of age) to a counterbalanced repeated-measurements design, requesting them to complete a Brief-IAT (BIAT) on attitudes toward doping without deception instruction, and with the instruction to fake positive and negative doping attitudes. Cerebral activity during BIAT completion was assessed using high-density EEG. Event-related potentials during faking revealed enhanced frontal and reduced occipital negativity, starting around 150 ms after stimulus presentation. Further, a decrease in the P300 and LPP components was observed. Source analyses showed enhanced activity in the right inferior frontal gyrus between 150 and 200 ms during faking, thought to reflect the suppression of automatic responses. Further, more activity was found for faking in the bilateral middle occipital gyri and the bilateral temporoparietal junction. Results indicate that faking reaction-time based tests alter brain processes from early stages of processing and reveal the cortical sources of the effects. Analyzing the EEG helps to uncover response patterns in indirect attitude tests and broadens our understanding of the neural processes involved in such faking. This knowledge might be useful for uncovering faking in socially sensitive contexts, where attitudes are likely to be concealed.}, language = {en} } @article{SchindlerWolffKissleretal.2015, author = {Schindler, Sebastian and Wolff, Wanja and Kissler, Johanna M. and Brand, Ralf}, title = {Cerebral correlates of faking}, series = {Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience}, volume = {9}, journal = {Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience}, publisher = {Frontiers Research Foundation}, address = {Lausanne}, issn = {1662-5153}, doi = {10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00139}, pages = {1 -- 13}, year = {2015}, abstract = {Direct assessment of attitudes toward socially sensitive topics can be affected by deception attempts. Reaction-time based indirect measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT), are less susceptible to such biases. Neuroscientific evidence shows that deception can evoke characteristic ERP differences. However, the cerebral processes involved in faking an IAT are still unknown. We randomly assigned 20 university students (15 females, 24.65 +/- 3.50 years of age) to a counterbalanced repeated-measurements design, requesting them to complete a Brief-IAT (BIAT) on attitudes toward doping without deception instruction, and with the instruction to fake positive and negative doping attitudes. Cerebral activity during BIAT completion was assessed using high-density EEG. Event-related potentials during faking revealed enhanced frontal and reduced occipital negativity, starting around 150 ms after stimulus presentation. Further, a decrease in the P300 and LPP components was observed. Source analyses showed enhanced activity in the right inferior frontal gyrus between 150 and 200 ms during faking, thought to reflect the suppression of automatic responses. Further, more activity was found for faking in the bilateral middle occipital gyri and the bilateral temporoparietal junction. Results indicate that faking reaction-time based tests alter brain processes from early stages of processing and reveal the cortical sources of the effects. Analyzing the EEG helps to uncover response patterns in indirect attitude tests and broadens our understanding of the neural processes involved in such faking. This knowledge might be useful for uncovering faking in socially sensitive contexts, where attitudes are likely to be concealed.}, language = {en} }