@techreport{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2021, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friedrichsen, Jana}, title = {The Leniency Rule Revisited: Experiments on Cartel Formation with Open Communication}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {24}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-49169}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-491696}, pages = {62}, year = {2021}, abstract = {The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant in the role of the competition authority, who is properly incentivized to judge communication content and price setting behavior of the firms. Using this novel design, we revisit the question whether a leniency rule successfully destabilizes cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss potential explanations for this contrasting result.}, language = {en} } @techreport{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2020, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friedrichsen, Jana}, title = {Choosing between explicit cartel formation and tacit collusion - An experiment}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {19}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-47388}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-473885}, pages = {55}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning institutions on firms' communication. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are significantly less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication.}, language = {en} } @article{BruttelFriehe2014, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friehe, Tim}, title = {Can short-term incentives induce long-lasting cooperation? Results from a public-goods experiment}, series = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics}, volume = {53}, journal = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {New York}, issn = {2214-8043}, doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2014.09.001}, pages = {120 -- 130}, year = {2014}, abstract = {This paper investigates whether providing strong cooperation incentives only at the outset of a group interaction spills over to later periods to ensure cooperation in the long run. We study a repeated linear public-good game with punishment opportunities and a parameter change after the first ten (of twenty) rounds. Our data shows that cooperation among subjects who had experienced a higher marginal return on public-good contributions or low punishment costs in rounds 1-10 rapidly deteriorated in rounds 11-20 once these incentives were removed, eventually trending below the level of cooperation in the control group. This suggests the possibility of temporary incentives backfiring in the long run. This paper ties in with the literature highlighting the potentially adverse effects of the use of incentives. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.}, language = {en} } @article{BruttelFriehe2015, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friehe, Tim}, title = {A note on making humans randomize}, series = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics}, volume = {58}, journal = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {New York}, issn = {2214-8043}, doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2015.06.008}, pages = {40 -- 45}, year = {2015}, abstract = {This note presents results from an experiment studying a two person 4 4 pure coordination game. We explore different strategy labels in an attempt to implement the mixed strategy equilibrium that selects all four strategies with equal probability. Such strategy labels must be free from salient properties that might be used by participants to coordinate. Testing 23 different sets of strategy labels, we identify two sets that produce a distribution of subjects' choices which approximate the uniform distribution quite well. Our results are relevant for studies intending to compare the behavior of subjects who play against a random mechanism with that of participants who play against human counterparts.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BruttelGuethNithammeretal.2020, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Nithammer, Juri and Orland, Andreas}, title = {Inefficient Cooperation under Stochastic and Strategic Uncertainty}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {20}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-47550}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-475500}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods).}, language = {en} } @misc{BruttelStolley2018, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Stolley, Florian}, title = {Gender differences in the response to decision power and responsibility}, series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, journal = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, number = {135}, issn = {1867-5808}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-47306}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-473068}, pages = {18}, year = {2018}, abstract = {This paper studies the effects of two different frames on decisions in a dictator game. Before making their allocation decision, dictators read a short text. Depending on the treatment, the text either emphasizes their decision power and freedom of choice or it stresses their responsibility for the receiver's payoff. Including a control treatment without such a text, three treatments are conducted with a total of 207 dictators. Our results show a different reaction to these texts depending on the dictator's gender. We find that only men react positively to a text that stresses their responsibility for the receiver, while only women seem to react positively to a text that emphasizes their decision power and freedom of choice.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BruttelFelgendreherGuethetal.2019, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Felgendreher, Simon and G{\"u}th, Werner and Hertwig, Ralph}, title = {Strategic ignorance in repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments and its effects on the dynamics of voluntary cooperation}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {10}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-43188}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-431881}, pages = {30}, year = {2019}, abstract = {Being ignorant of key aspects of a strategic interaction can represent an advantage rather than a handicap. We study one particular context in which ignorance can be beneficial: iterated strategic interactions in which voluntary cooperation may be sustained into the final round if players voluntarily forego knowledge about the time horizon. We experimentally examine this option to remain ignorant about the time horizon in a finitely repeated two-person prisoners' dilemma game. We confirm that pairs without horizon knowledge avoid the drop in cooperation that otherwise occurs toward the end of the game. However, this effect is superposed by cooperation declining more rapidly in pairs without horizon knowledge during the middle phase of the game, especially if players do not know that the other player also wanted to remain ignorant of the time horizon.}, language = {en} } @article{Bruttel2018, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena}, title = {Is There a Loyalty-Enhancing Effect of Retroactive Price-Reduction Schemes?}, series = {Review of industrial organization}, volume = {54}, journal = {Review of industrial organization}, number = {3}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, issn = {0889-938X}, doi = {10.1007/s11151-018-9653-9}, pages = {575 -- 593}, year = {2018}, abstract = {This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers' repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction.}, language = {en} } @article{BruttelGueth2018, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Gueth, Werner}, title = {Asymmetric voluntary cooperation}, series = {International Journal of Game Theory}, volume = {47}, journal = {International Journal of Game Theory}, number = {3}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Heidelberg}, issn = {0020-7276}, doi = {10.1007/s00182-018-0633-y}, pages = {873 -- 891}, year = {2018}, abstract = {This paper tests the robustness of voluntary cooperation in a sequential best shot game, a public good game in which the maximal contribution determines the level of public good provision. Thus, efficiency enhancing voluntary cooperation requires asymmetric behavior whose coordination is more difficult. Nevertheless, we find robust cooperation irrespective of treatment-specific institutional obstacles. To explain this finding, we distinguish three behavioral patterns aiming at both, voluntary cooperation and (immediate) payoff equality.}, language = {en} } @article{Bruttel2018, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena}, title = {The effects of recommended retail prices on consumer and retailer behaviour}, series = {Economica}, volume = {85}, journal = {Economica}, number = {339}, publisher = {Wiley}, address = {Hoboken}, issn = {0013-0427}, doi = {10.1111/ecca.12218}, pages = {649 -- 668}, year = {2018}, abstract = {This paper presents results from an experiment on the effects of recommended retail prices on consumer and retailer behaviour. We present evidence that recommended retail prices, despite their non-binding nature, influence consumers' willingness to pay by setting a reference point. At a given price, consumers buy more the higher the recommended retail price is, and their demand drops at prices above the recommended retail price, even when it is entirely uninformative about the value of the product. Retailers in this study are subject to similar anchoring effects, but they do not anticipate consumers' behaviour well and are thus not able to exploit their behavioural biases.}, language = {en} }