@techreport{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2021,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friedrichsen, Jana},
  title     = {The Leniency Rule Revisited: Experiments on Cartel Formation with Open Communication},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {24},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-49169},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-491696},
  pages     = {62},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant in the role of the competition authority, who is properly incentivized to judge communication content and price setting behavior of the firms. Using this novel design, we revisit the question whether a leniency rule successfully destabilizes cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss potential explanations for this contrasting result.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2020,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friedrichsen, Jana},
  title     = {Choosing between explicit cartel formation and tacit collusion - An experiment},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {19},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-47388},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-473885},
  pages     = {55},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning institutions on firms' communication. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are significantly less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelFriehe2014,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friehe, Tim},
  title     = {Can short-term incentives induce long-lasting cooperation? Results from a public-goods experiment},
  series = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  volume    = {53},
  journal   = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {2214-8043},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.socec.2014.09.001},
  pages     = {120 -- 130},
  year      = {2014},
  abstract  = {This paper investigates whether providing strong cooperation incentives only at the outset of a group interaction spills over to later periods to ensure cooperation in the long run. We study a repeated linear public-good game with punishment opportunities and a parameter change after the first ten (of twenty) rounds. Our data shows that cooperation among subjects who had experienced a higher marginal return on public-good contributions or low punishment costs in rounds 1-10 rapidly deteriorated in rounds 11-20 once these incentives were removed, eventually trending below the level of cooperation in the control group. This suggests the possibility of temporary incentives backfiring in the long run. This paper ties in with the literature highlighting the potentially adverse effects of the use of incentives. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelFriehe2015,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friehe, Tim},
  title     = {A note on making humans randomize},
  series = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  volume    = {58},
  journal   = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {2214-8043},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.socec.2015.06.008},
  pages     = {40 -- 45},
  year      = {2015},
  abstract  = {This note presents results from an experiment studying a two person 4 4 pure coordination game. We explore different strategy labels in an attempt to implement the mixed strategy equilibrium that selects all four strategies with equal probability. Such strategy labels must be free from salient properties that might be used by participants to coordinate. Testing 23 different sets of strategy labels, we identify two sets that produce a distribution of subjects' choices which approximate the uniform distribution quite well. Our results are relevant for studies intending to compare the behavior of subjects who play against a random mechanism with that of participants who play against human counterparts.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{BruttelGuethNithammeretal.2020,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Nithammer, Juri and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Inefficient Cooperation under Stochastic and Strategic Uncertainty},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {20},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-47550},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-475500},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods).},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{BruttelStolley2018,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Stolley, Florian},
  title     = {Gender differences in the response to decision power and responsibility},
  series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  journal   = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  number    = {135},
  issn      = {1867-5808},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-47306},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-473068},
  pages     = {18},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {This paper studies the effects of two different frames on decisions in a dictator game. Before making their allocation decision, dictators read a short text. Depending on the treatment, the text either emphasizes their decision power and freedom of choice or it stresses their responsibility for the receiver's payoff. Including a control treatment without such a text, three treatments are conducted with a total of 207 dictators. Our results show a different reaction to these texts depending on the dictator's gender. We find that only men react positively to a text that stresses their responsibility for the receiver, while only women seem to react positively to a text that emphasizes their decision power and freedom of choice.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{BruttelFelgendreherGuethetal.2019,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Felgendreher, Simon and G{\"u}th, Werner and Hertwig, Ralph},
  title     = {Strategic ignorance in repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments and its effects on the dynamics of voluntary cooperation},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {10},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-43188},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-431881},
  pages     = {30},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Being ignorant of key aspects of a strategic interaction can represent an advantage rather than a handicap. We study one particular context in which ignorance can be beneficial: iterated strategic interactions in which voluntary cooperation may be sustained into the final round if players voluntarily forego knowledge about the time horizon. We experimentally examine this option to remain ignorant about the time horizon in a finitely repeated two-person prisoners' dilemma game. We confirm that pairs without horizon knowledge avoid the drop in cooperation that otherwise occurs toward the end of the game. However, this effect is superposed by cooperation declining more rapidly in pairs without horizon knowledge during the middle phase of the game, especially if players do not know that the other player also wanted to remain ignorant of the time horizon.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bruttel2018,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena},
  title     = {Is There a Loyalty-Enhancing Effect of Retroactive Price-Reduction Schemes?},
  series = {Review of industrial organization},
  volume    = {54},
  journal   = {Review of industrial organization},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {0889-938X},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11151-018-9653-9},
  pages     = {575 -- 593},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers' repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelGueth2018,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Gueth, Werner},
  title     = {Asymmetric voluntary cooperation},
  series = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  volume    = {47},
  journal   = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Heidelberg},
  issn      = {0020-7276},
  doi       = {10.1007/s00182-018-0633-y},
  pages     = {873 -- 891},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {This paper tests the robustness of voluntary cooperation in a sequential best shot game, a public good game in which the maximal contribution determines the level of public good provision. Thus, efficiency enhancing voluntary cooperation requires asymmetric behavior whose coordination is more difficult. Nevertheless, we find robust cooperation irrespective of treatment-specific institutional obstacles. To explain this finding, we distinguish three behavioral patterns aiming at both, voluntary cooperation and (immediate) payoff equality.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bruttel2018,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena},
  title     = {The effects of recommended retail prices on consumer and retailer behaviour},
  series = {Economica},
  volume    = {85},
  journal   = {Economica},
  number    = {339},
  publisher = {Wiley},
  address   = {Hoboken},
  issn      = {0013-0427},
  doi       = {10.1111/ecca.12218},
  pages     = {649 -- 668},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {This paper presents results from an experiment on the effects of recommended retail prices on consumer and retailer behaviour. We present evidence that recommended retail prices, despite their non-binding nature, influence consumers' willingness to pay by setting a reference point. At a given price, consumers buy more the higher the recommended retail price is, and their demand drops at prices above the recommended retail price, even when it is entirely uninformative about the value of the product. Retailers in this study are subject to similar anchoring effects, but they do not anticipate consumers' behaviour well and are thus not able to exploit their behavioural biases.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{BruttelGuethHertwigetal.2020,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Hertwig, Ralph and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Do people harness deliberate ignorance to avoid envy and its detrimental effects?},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {17},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-44446},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-444463},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Envy is an unpleasant emotion. If individuals anticipate that comparing their payoff with the (potentially higher) payoff of others will make them envious, they may want to actively avoid information about other people's payoffs. Given the opportunity to reduce another person's payoff, an individual's envy may trigger behavior that is detrimental to welfare. In this case, if individuals anticipate that they will react in a welfare-reducing way, they may also avoid information about other people's payoffs from the outset. We investigated these two hypotheses using three experiments. We found that 13\% of our potentially envious subjects avoided information when they did not have the opportunity to reduce another participant's payoff. Psychological scales do not explain this behavior. We also found that voluntarily uninformed subjects did neither deduct less of the payoff nor less frequently than subjects who could not avoid the information.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelStolley2020,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Stolley, Florian},
  title     = {Getting a yes},
  series = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  volume    = {86},
  journal   = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {2214-8043},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.socec.2020.101550},
  pages     = {10},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game, in which the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter decides. We find that putting effort into the message, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictators power and responsibility.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bruttel2018,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena},
  title     = {The Limits of Buyer Power},
  series = {Review of Behavioral Economics},
  volume    = {5},
  journal   = {Review of Behavioral Economics},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Now Publishers inc.},
  address   = {Hannover},
  issn      = {2326-6198},
  doi       = {10.1561/105.00000082},
  pages     = {149 -- 167},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {This paper studies the behavior of buyers confronting an incumbent monopolist and a potential market entrant in a repeated trade situation. In the experiment, buyers have two possibilities to demand lower prices in future trade periods. First, they can withhold demand. Second, they can voluntarily pay a higher price to the entrant in order to encourage future re-entry. Both these forms of buyer behavior occur in the experiment. They are less frequent when the number of buyers is large as opposed to small. A control treatment tests to what extent such behavior can be attributed to strategic motives.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{BruttelStolleyUtikal2019,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Stolley, Florian and Utikal, Verena},
  title     = {Getting a Yes},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {2},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-42763},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427638},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game, in which the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter decides. We find that putting effort into the message, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictator's power and responsibility.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{Bruttel2019,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena},
  title     = {Is There a Loyalty-Enhancing Effect of Retroactive Price-Reduction Schemes?},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {5},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-42768},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427688},
  pages     = {25},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers' repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{BruttelNithammerStolley2019,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Nithammer, Juri and Stolley, Florian},
  title     = {"Thanks in Advance"},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {7},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-42770},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427706},
  pages     = {18},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {This paper studies the effect of the commonly used phrase "thanks in advance" on compliance with a small request. In a controlled laboratory experiment we ask participants to give a detailed answer to an open question. The treatment variable is whether or not they see the phrase "thanks in advance." Our participants react to the treatment by exerting less effort in answering the request even though they perceive the phrase as polite.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2022,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friedrichsen, Jana},
  title     = {How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-56223},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-562234},
  pages     = {67},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{BruttelBulutayCornandetal.2022,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Bulutay, Muhammed and Cornand, Camille and Heinemann, Frank and Zylbersztejn, Adam},
  title     = {Measuring strategic-uncertainty attitudes},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {54},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-56234},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-562340},
  pages     = {40},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Strategic uncertainty is the uncertainty that players face with respect to the purposeful behavior of other players in an interactive decision situation. Our paper develops a new method for measuring strategic-uncertainty attitudes and distinguishing them from risk and ambiguity attitudes. We vary the source of uncertainty (whether strategic or not) across conditions in a ceteris paribus manner. We elicit certainty equivalents of participating in two strategic 2x2 games (a stag-hunt and a market-entry game) as well as certainty equivalents of related lotteries that yield the same possible payoffs with exogenously given probabilities (risk) and lotteries with unknown probabilities (ambiguity). We provide a structural model of uncertainty attitudes that allows us to measure a preference for or an aversion against the source of uncertainty, as well as optimism or pessimism regarding the desired outcome. We document systematic attitudes towards strategic uncertainty that vary across contexts. Under strategic complementarity [substitutability], the majority of participants tend to be pessimistic [optimistic] regarding the desired outcome. However, preferences for the source of uncertainty are distributed around zero.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2021,
  author    = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa and Friedrichsen, Jana},
  title     = {The leniency rule revisited},
  series = {International journal of industrial organization},
  volume    = {76},
  journal   = {International journal of industrial organization},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0167-7187},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102728},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant in the role of the competition authority, who is properly incentivized to judge the communication content and price setting behavior of the firms. Using this novel design, we revisit the question whether a leniency rule successfully destabilizes cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss potential explanations for this contrasting result.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2022,
  author    = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa and Friedrichsen, Jana},
  title     = {How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion},
  series = {European economic review},
  volume    = {152},
  journal   = {European economic review},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0014-2921},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104331},
  pages     = {1 -- 18},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelZiemann2022,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Ziemann, Niklas},
  title     = {How do people discount over spatial distance?},
  series = {German economic review},
  volume    = {24},
  journal   = {German economic review},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {1465-6485},
  doi       = {10.1515/ger-2021-0106},
  pages     = {33 -- 67},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {This paper studies how individuals discount the utility they derive from their provision of goods over spatial distance. In a controlled laboratory experiment in Germany, we elicit preferences for the provision of the same good at different locations. To isolate spatial preferences from any other direct value of the goods being close to the individual, we focus on goods with "existence value." We find that individuals put special weight on the provision of these goods in their immediate vicinity. This "vicinity bias" represents a spatial analogy to the "present bias" in the time dimension.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{BruttelPetrishcheva2024,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Petrishcheva, Vasilisa},
  title     = {Does communication increase the precision of beliefs?},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {74},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-62936},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-629367},
  pages     = {1 -- 33},
  year      = {2024},
  abstract  = {In this paper, we study one channel through which communication may facilitate cooperative behavior - belief precision. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, we show that communication not only makes individuals more optimistic that their partner will cooperate but also increases the precision of this belief, thereby reducing strategic uncertainty. To disentangle the shift in mean beliefs from the increase in precision, we elicit beliefs and precision in a two-stage procedure and in three situations: without communication, before communication, and after communication. We find that the precision of beliefs increases during communication.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelGuethNithammeretal.2022,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Nithammer, Juri and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Inefficient cooperation under stochastic and strategic uncertainty},
  series = {Conflict resolution},
  volume    = {66},
  journal   = {Conflict resolution},
  number    = {4-5},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {Thousand Oaks},
  issn      = {0022-0027},
  doi       = {10.1177/00220027211066614},
  pages     = {755 -- 782},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{BruttelEisenkopfNithammer2024,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Eisenkopf, Gerald and Nithammer, Juri},
  title     = {Pre-election communication in public good games with endogenous leaders},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {73},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-62395},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-623952},
  pages     = {28},
  year      = {2024},
  abstract  = {Leadership plays an important role for the efficient and fair solution of social dilemmas but the effectiveness of a leader can vary substantially. Two main factors of leadership impact are the ability to induce high contributions by all group members and the (expected) fair use of power. Participants in our experiment decide about contributions to a public good. After all contributions are made, the leader can choose how much of the joint earnings to assign to herself; the remainder is distributed equally among the followers. Using machine learning techniques, we study whether the content of initial open statements by the group members predicts their behavior as a leader and whether groups are able to identify such clues and endogenously appoint a "good" leader to solve the dilemma. We find that leaders who promise fairness are more likely to behave fairly, and that followers appoint as leaders those who write more explicitly about fairness and efficiency. However, in their contribution decision, followers focus on the leader's first-move contribution and place less importance on the content of the leader's statements.},
  language  = {en}
}