@article{vanBuuren2016,
  author    = {van Buuren, Jasper},
  title     = {critique of neuroscience},
  series = {Continental philosophy review},
  volume    = {49},
  journal   = {Continental philosophy review},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {1387-2842},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11007-015-9318-4},
  pages     = {223 -- 241},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {Bennett and Hacker criticize a number of neuroscientists and philosophers for attributing capacities which belong to the human being as a whole, like perceiving or deciding, to a "part" of the human being, viz. the brain. They call this type of mistake the "mereological fallacy". Interestingly, the authors say that these capacities cannot be ascribed to the mind either. They reject not only materialistic monism but also Cartesian dualism, arguing that many predicates describing human life do not refer to physical or mental properties, nor to the sum of such properties. I agree with this important principle and with the critique of the mereological fallacy which it underpins, but I have two objections to the authors' view. Firstly, I think that the brain is not literally a part of the human being, as suggested. Secondly, Bennett and Hacker do not offer an account of body and mind which explains in a systematic way how the domain of phenomena which transcends the mental and the physical relates to the mental and the physical. I first argue that Helmuth Plessner's philosophical anthropology provides the kind of account we need. Then, drawing on Plessner, I present an alternative view of the mereological relationships between brain and human being. My criticism does not undercut Bennett and Hacker's diagnosis of the mereological fallacy but rather gives it a more solid philosophical-anthropological foundation.},
  language  = {en}
}
@book{EbkeZanfiKruegeretal.2017,
  author    = {Ebke, Thomas and Zanfi, Caterina and Kr{\"u}ger, Hans-Peter and Sommer, Christian and Viennet, Thomas and Johannßen, Dennis and Balzaretti, Ugo and Toussaint Ondoua, Herv{\´e} and Agard, Olivier and Henckmann, Wolfhart and Simonotti, Edoardo and Hand, Annika and Tavakkoli, Amirpasha and Hackbarth, Daniel and Edinger, Sebastian and Schollmeyer, Justus and von Kalckreuth, Moritz Alexander and Schmieg, Gregor and Batista Rates, Bruno and Kressmann, Philipp and Hilt, Annette and van Buuren, Jasper and Keusch, Juliane and Guzun, Mădălina and Bruff, Kyla and Stahl, Marion and Held, Lukas},
  title     = {Das Leben im Menschen oder der Mensch im Leben?},
  editor    = {Ebke, Thomas and Zanfi, Caterina},
  publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  isbn      = {978-3-86956-382-4},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-95409},
  publisher      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {514 Seiten},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {In der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts wird deutlich, dass es in Frankreich und in Deutschland voneinander abweichende Sichtweisen auf die Frage gibt, ob der Mensch eine "Sonderstellung" in der Dynamik des biologischen und geschichtlichen Lebens genießt. W{\"a}hrend sich in Deutschland die Tradition eines anthropologischen Denkens neu formiert, ist in Frankreich eine scharfe Skepsis gegen{\"u}ber dem Erbe des Humanismus charakteristisch. Die Beitr{\"a}ge dieses zweisprachigen Buches untersuchen diese deutsch-franz{\"o}sische Konstellation von Fragen und Autoren, und aktualisieren die Reflexion auf die (Grenzen der) Singularit{\"a}t des Menschen.},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{vanBuuren2017,
  author    = {van Buuren, Jasper},
  title     = {Exzentrizit{\"a}t, Dingstruktur und der Leib als Subjekt und Objekt},
  series = {Das Leben im Menschen oder der Mensch im Leben?},
  journal   = {Das Leben im Menschen oder der Mensch im Leben?},
  publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  isbn      = {978-3-86956-382-4},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-396170},
  pages     = {419 -- 439},
  year      = {2017},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{vanBuuren2016,
  author    = {van Buuren, Jasper},
  title     = {The Difference between Moral Sources and Hypergoods},
  series = {International philosophical quarterly},
  volume    = {56},
  journal   = {International philosophical quarterly},
  publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
  address   = {Charlottesville},
  issn      = {0019-0365},
  doi       = {10.5840/ipq201641259},
  pages     = {171 -- 186},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {In Sources of the Self Charles Taylor makes clear that both hypergoods and moral sources are essential to the moral life. Although hypergoods and moral sources are not the same thing, Taylor's descriptions of these concepts are quite similar, and so their distinction requires interpretation. I propose that we interpret the difference on the basis of another distinction that is central to Taylor's thinking: that between immanence and transcendence. Whereas a moral source transcends us, a hypergood is the value of our immanent way of relating to that moral source. This interpretation requires that we first differentiate between a narrow and a wide sense of "moral source."},
  language  = {en}
}