@article{Tanneberg2020, author = {Tanneberg, Dag}, title = {Introduction}, series = {The Politics of Repression Under Authoritarian Rule : How Steadfast is the Iron Throne?}, journal = {The Politics of Repression Under Authoritarian Rule : How Steadfast is the Iron Throne?}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Cham}, isbn = {978-3-030-35477-0}, issn = {2198-7289}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-35477-0_1}, pages = {1 -- 7}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Does political repression work and if so, under what conditions? Many contributions to the empirical study of non-democratic rule assume it does. As a consequence, strong convictions on political repression abound, but empirical investigations into the matter remain rare. This introduction sets the agenda for the chapters to come and outlines the answers given to the three motivating questions of this volume. First, what variants of political repression are there, and how do they interact? Second, what impact does the interaction of different forms of political repression have on the problem of authoritarian control? Finally, what difference does the complementary use of violence and restrictions make for the problem of authoritarian power-sharing?}, language = {en} } @incollection{Tanneberg2020, author = {Tanneberg, Dag}, title = {Toward a theory of political repression}, series = {The politics of repression under authoritarian rule : how steadfast is the Iron Throne?}, booktitle = {The politics of repression under authoritarian rule : how steadfast is the Iron Throne?}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Cham}, isbn = {978-3-030-35477-0}, issn = {2198-7289}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-35477-0_2}, pages = {9 -- 41}, year = {2020}, abstract = {To ensure political survival, autocrats must prevent popular rebellion, and political repression is a means to that end. However, autocrats face threats from both the inside and the outside of the center of power. They must avoid popular rebellion and at the same time share power with strategic actors who enjoy incentive to challenge established power-sharing arrangements whenever repression is ordered. Can autocrats turn repression in a way that allows trading one threat off against the other? This chapter first argues that prior research offers scant insight on that question because it relies on umbrella concepts and questionable measurements of repression. Next, the chapter disaggregates repression into restrictions and violence and reflects on their drawbacks. Citizens adapt to the restriction of political civil liberties, and violence backfires against its originators. Hence, restrictions require enforcement, and violence requires moderation. When interpreted as complements, it becomes clear that restrictions and violence have the potential to compensate for their respective weaknesses. The complementarity between violence and restrictions turns political repression into a valuable addition to the authoritarian toolkit. The chapter concludes with an application of these ideas to the twin problems of authoritarian control and power-sharing.}, language = {en} } @article{Tanneberg2020, author = {Tanneberg, Dag}, title = {How to measure dictatorship, dissent, and political repression}, series = {The politics of repression under authoritarian rule}, journal = {The politics of repression under authoritarian rule}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Cham}, isbn = {978-3-030-35477-0}, issn = {2198-7289}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-35477-0_3}, pages = {43 -- 75}, year = {2020}, abstract = {This chapter operationalizes the three fundamental concepts of this study. It outlines what counts as authoritarian rule, it explains how to recognize dissent in non-democratic contexts, and it debates how to quantify repression in the shadow of the politicized discourse on human rights. First, the chapter opts to classify every political regime as authoritarian that fails to elect its executive or legislature in free and competitive elections. Second, the chapter proposes to see dissent through the lens of campaigns, i.e., series of connected contentious events that involve large-scale collective action and formulate far-reaching political demands. Finally, after some elaboration on the problems involved in measuring political repression reliably and validly, the chapter turns to rescaled versions of the Human Rights Protection Scores 2.04 and the V-Dem 6.2 political civil liberties index as indicators for violence and restrictions. This choice of indicators of repression is, finally, defended against three central objections: the separability of violence from restrictions, the so-called information paradox, and, finally, differences in the timing of violence and restrictions.}, language = {en} } @misc{GieblerRuthTanneberg2018, author = {Giebler, Heiko and Ruth, Saskia P. and Tanneberg, Dag}, title = {Why choice matters}, series = {Politics and Governance}, volume = {6}, journal = {Politics and Governance}, number = {1}, publisher = {Cogitatio Press}, address = {Lisbon}, issn = {2183-2463}, doi = {10.17645/pag.v6i1.1428}, pages = {1 -- 10}, year = {2018}, abstract = {Measures of democracy are in high demand. Scientific and public audiences use them to describe political realities and to substantiate causal claims about those realities. This introduction to the thematic issue reviews the history of democracy measurement since the 1950s. It identifies four development phases of the field, which are characterized by three recurrent topics of debate: (1) what is democracy, (2) what is a good measure of democracy, and (3) do our measurements of democracy register real-world developments? As the answers to those questions have been changing over time, the field of democracy measurement has adapted and reached higher levels of theoretical and methodological sophistication. In effect, the challenges facing contemporary social scientists are not only limited to the challenge of constructing a sound index of democracy. Today, they also need a profound understanding of the differences between various measures of democracy and their implications for empirical applications. The introduction outlines how the contributions to this thematic issue help scholars cope with the recurrent issues of conceptualization, measurement, and application, and concludes by identifying avenues for future research.}, language = {en} } @article{KailitzWursterTanneberg2017, author = {Kailitz, Steffen and Wurster, Stefan and Tanneberg, Dag}, title = {Autokratische Regimelegitimation und soziale Entwicklung}, series = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r vergleichende Politikwissenschaft : ZfVP}, volume = {11}, journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r vergleichende Politikwissenschaft : ZfVP}, publisher = {Springer VS}, address = {Wiesbaden}, issn = {1865-2646}, doi = {10.1007/s12286-017-0330-4}, pages = {275 -- 299}, year = {2017}, abstract = {Gibt es einen Zusammenhang zwischen dem sozialen Entwicklungsstand einer Autokratie und ihrem Legitimationsanspruch? Dieser Frage geht der Beitrag am Beispiel der S{\"a}uglingssterblichkeit nach. Unter Ber{\"u}cksichtigung von 321 Autokratien aus 120 L{\"a}ndern im Zeitraum von 1960 bis 2010 zeigen sich Unterschiede in der sozialen Entwicklung zwischen sechs Autokratietypen mit verschiedenen Legitimationsstrategien: elektorale Autokratien, kommunistische Ideokratien, Monarchien, Einparteiautokratien, Milit{\"a}rautokratien und personalistische Autokratien. Insbesondere, dass kommunistische Ideokratien im Vergleich besser abschneiden als (nicht-ideokratische) Einparteiautokratien, spricht daf{\"u}r, dass sich die Art der Legitimationsstrategie auf die soziale Entwicklung auswirkt. Allerdings sollte der Einfluss von Legitimationsstrategien auf die soziale Entwicklung nicht {\"u}bersch{\"a}tzt werden, vor allem da sich die Ergebnisse im Rahmen eines Wachstumskurvenmodells als vorl{\"a}ufig erweisen.}, language = {de} } @incollection{Tanneberg2020, author = {Tanneberg, Dag}, title = {Conclusion}, series = {Politics of repression under authoritarian rule}, booktitle = {Politics of repression under authoritarian rule}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Cham}, isbn = {978-3-030-35477-0}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-35477-0_6}, pages = {163 -- 176}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Does political repression work for authoritarian rule? On the one hand, repression is a hallmark of authoritarian governance. It denotes any action governments take to increase the costs of collective action. Autocrats consciously apply repression to curb popular opposition within their territorial jurisdiction. They repress in order to protect their policies, personnel, or other interests against challenges from below. Repression is, thus, a means to the end of political survival in non-democratic contexts. A useful means lives up to its promises. Does repression do that? This project started on the suspicion that we do not yet know the answer. This concluding chapter recalls the key theoretical ideas developed along the way, highlights the main findings of the book, and concludes with opportunities for future research.}, language = {en} } @article{Tanneberg2020, author = {Tanneberg, Dag}, title = {Does Repression Prevent Successful Campaigns?}, series = {The Politics of Repression Under Authoritarian Rule}, journal = {The Politics of Repression Under Authoritarian Rule}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Cham}, isbn = {978-3-030-35477-0}, issn = {2198-7289}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-35477-0_4}, pages = {77 -- 120}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Campaigns against authoritarian rule trigger the problems of authoritarian control and power-sharing. Hence, autocrats cannot ignore campaigns, but can they repress them? This chapter hypothesizes that restrictions and violence do just that—if those forms of political repression complement each other. Each variant of political repression has drawbacks: Restrictions dampen, but they do not eliminate interdependent behavior; violence imposes high individual costs on dissent, but it frequently backfires against its originators. Complementarity asserts that those drawbacks matter less when both variants of repression work in tandem. Statistical analysis of 50 campaigns distributed across 112 authoritarian regimes between 1977 and 2001 yields mixed support for the argument. Based on a binary probit model with sample selection correction, the analysis adds a preemptive and a reactive aspect to political repression. The results imply that complementarity matters as long as repression preempts campaigns, but not when it reacts to them. Moreover, once citizens knock at the palace gates, restrictions turn futile. Finally, violence reduces the outlook for successful resistance against authoritarian rule, but it also backfires at all times—preemptive and reactive. By implication, political repression thwarts successful resistance today, but it breeds more resistance tomorrow.}, language = {en} } @article{Tanneberg2020, author = {Tanneberg, Dag}, title = {Does repression of campaigns trigger coups d'{\´e}tat?}, series = {The politics of repression under authoritarian rule : how steadfast is the Iron Throne?}, journal = {The politics of repression under authoritarian rule : how steadfast is the Iron Throne?}, publisher = {Springer Nature}, address = {Cham}, isbn = {978-3-030-35477-0}, issn = {2198-7289}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-35477-0_5}, pages = {121 -- 162}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Does complementarity between restrictions and violence stabilize authoritarian power-sharing in the face of popular rebellion? Scholars widely concur that the central political conflict in authoritarian regimes plays out between people on the inside of the regime. This chapter adds to the debate and studies coup attempts in light of two interconnected hypotheses. First, violence against campaigns destabilizes power-sharing because it exposes a weak leadership. Second, this adverse effect of violence declines as the routine level of restrictions increases, because restrictions act as a sorting mechanism for uncompromising political opposition. Both hypotheses are tested using Bayesian multilevel statistical analysis on a data set of 253 coup attempts in 198 authoritarian regimes between 1949 and 2007. This study design allows separation of repression's time-dependent effects from its context effects, and it demonstrates the value of Bayesian methods for studying rare political phenomena such as coups d'{\´e}tat. The chapter's conclusion, however, is straightforward: Once citizens form campaigns, repression can only deteriorate the situation because it opens a frontline right at the center of authoritarian rule.}, language = {en} } @misc{GieblerRuthTanneberg2018, author = {Giebler, Heiko and Ruth, Saskia P. and Tanneberg, Dag}, title = {Why choice matters}, series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, journal = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, number = {104}, issn = {1867-5808}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-42789}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427891}, pages = {10}, year = {2018}, abstract = {Measures of democracy are in high demand. Scientific and public audiences use them to describe political realities and to substantiate causal claims about those realities. This introduction to the thematic issue reviews the history of democracy measurement since the 1950s. It identifies four development phases of the field, which are characterized by three recurrent topics of debate: (1) what is democracy, (2) what is a good measure of democracy, and (3) do our measurements of democracy register real-world developments? As the answers to those questions have been changing over time, the field of democracy measurement has adapted and reached higher levels of theoretical and methodological sophistication. In effect, the challenges facing contemporary social scientists are not only limited to the challenge of constructing a sound index of democracy. Today, they also need a profound understanding of the differences between various measures of democracy and their implications for empirical applications. The introduction outlines how the contributions to this thematic issue help scholars cope with the recurrent issues of conceptualization, measurement, and application, and concludes by identifying avenues for future research.}, language = {en} }