@techreport{BruttelStolleyUtikal2019,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Stolley, Florian and Utikal, Verena},
  title     = {Getting a Yes},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {2},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-42763},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427638},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game, in which the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter decides. We find that putting effort into the message, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictator's power and responsibility.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{Bruttel2019,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena},
  title     = {Is There a Loyalty-Enhancing Effect of Retroactive Price-Reduction Schemes?},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {5},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-42768},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427688},
  pages     = {25},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers' repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{BruttelNithammerStolley2019,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Nithammer, Juri and Stolley, Florian},
  title     = {"Thanks in Advance"},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {7},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-42770},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427706},
  pages     = {18},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {This paper studies the effect of the commonly used phrase "thanks in advance" on compliance with a small request. In a controlled laboratory experiment we ask participants to give a detailed answer to an open question. The treatment variable is whether or not they see the phrase "thanks in advance." Our participants react to the treatment by exerting less effort in answering the request even though they perceive the phrase as polite.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2022,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friedrichsen, Jana},
  title     = {How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-56223},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-562234},
  pages     = {67},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{AndresBruttel2024,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa},
  title     = {Communicating Cartel Intentions},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {77},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-63846},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-638469},
  pages     = {36},
  year      = {2024},
  abstract  = {While the economic harm of cartels is caused by their price-increasing effect, sanctioning by courts rather targets at the underlying process of firms reaching a price-fixing agreement. This paper provides experimental evidence on the question whether such sanctioning meets the economic target, i.e., whether evidence of a collusive meeting of the firms and of the content of their communication reliably predicts subsequent prices. We find that already the mere mutual agreement to meet predicts a strong increase in prices. Conversely, express distancing from communication completely nullifies its otherwise price-increasing effect. Using machine learning, we show that communication only increases prices if it is very explicit about how the cartel plans to behave.},
  language  = {en}
}