@article{Scianna2018, author = {Scianna, Bastian Matteo}, title = {A prelude to total war?}, series = {International Journal of Military History and Historiography}, volume = {38}, journal = {International Journal of Military History and Historiography}, number = {1}, publisher = {Brill}, address = {Leiden}, issn = {2468-3299}, doi = {10.1163/24683302-03801001}, pages = {5 -- 33}, year = {2018}, abstract = {The conflict between Italy and Ethiopia in 1935-36 has been framed as a prelude to the Second World War and as a watershed towards 'Total War'. One perspective has so far been neglected: the assessments of foreign military observers. This article examines American, British, German, and Austrian views on the operations and thereby also analyses the mindset of European officers at the time. The core argument emerging from these reports is that the war was perceived as a rather 'normal' colonial conflict. Neither the use of gas, nor the employment of aircraft against civilians was seen as a taboo or created significant outrage among the military observers. Instead, they lauded the Italians' steady logistical efforts and employment of artillery and airpower to overcome nature and the enemy's resistance.}, language = {en} } @article{Scianna2018, author = {Scianna, Bastian Matteo}, title = {A Blueprint for Successful Peacekeeping?}, series = {The international history review}, volume = {41}, journal = {The international history review}, number = {3}, publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {Abingdon}, issn = {0707-5332}, doi = {10.1080/07075332.2018.1431804}, pages = {650 -- 672}, year = {2018}, abstract = {On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to fight the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Between August 1982 and February 1984, the US, France, Britain and Italy deployed a Multinational Force (MNF) to Beirut. Its task was to act as an interposition force to bolster the government and to bring peace to the people. The mission is often forgotten or merely remembered in context with the bombing of US Marines' barracks. However, an analysis of the Italian contingent shows that the MNF was not doomed to fail and could accomplish its task when operational and diplomatic efforts were coordinated. The Italian commander in Beirut, General Franco Angioni, followed a successful approach that sustained neutrality, respectful behaviour and minimal force, which resulted in a qualified success of the Italian efforts.}, language = {en} } @article{Scianna2019, author = {Scianna, Bastian Matteo}, title = {Forging an Italian hero?}, series = {European Review of History: Revue europ{\´e}enne d'histoire}, volume = {26}, journal = {European Review of History: Revue europ{\´e}enne d'histoire}, number = {3}, publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {Abingdon}, issn = {1350-7486}, doi = {10.1080/13507486.2018.1492520}, pages = {369 -- 385}, year = {2019}, abstract = {Over the last two decades, Amedeo Guillet (1909-2010) has been turned into a public and military hero. His exploits as a guerrilla leader in Italian East Africa in 1941 have been exaggerated to forge a narrative of an honourable resistance against overwhelming odds. Thereby, Guillet has been showcased as a romanticized colonial explorer who was an apolitical and timeless Italian officer. He has been compared to Lawrence of Arabia in order to raise his international visibility, while his genuine Italian brand is perpetuated domestically. By elevating him to an official role model, the Italian Army has gained a focal point for military heroism that was also acceptable in the public memory as the embodiment of a 'glorious' defeat narrative.}, language = {en} } @misc{Scianna2018, author = {Scianna, Bastian Matteo}, title = {A blueprint for successful peacekeeping?}, series = {The International History Review}, journal = {The International History Review}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-412937}, pages = {24}, year = {2018}, abstract = {On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to fight the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Between August 1982 and February 1984, the US, France, Britain and Italy deployed a Multinational Force (MNF) to Beirut. Its task was to act as an interposition force to bolster the government and to bring peace to the people. The mission is often forgotten or merely remembered in context with the bombing of US Marines' barracks. However, an analysis of the Italian contingent shows that the MNF was not doomed to fail and could accomplish its task when operational and diplomatic efforts were coordinated. The Italian commander in Beirut, General Franco Angioni, followed a successful approach that sustained neutrality, respectful behaviour and minimal force, which resulted in a qualified success of the Italian efforts.}, language = {en} } @misc{Scianna2018, author = {Scianna, Bastian Matteo}, title = {Forging an Italian hero?}, series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe}, journal = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe}, number = {152}, issn = {1866-8380}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-416866}, pages = {18}, year = {2018}, abstract = {Over the last two decades, Amedeo Guillet (1909-2010) has been turned into a public and military hero. His exploits as a guerrilla leader in Italian East Africa in 1941 have been exaggerated to forge a narrative of an honourable resistance against overwhelming odds. Thereby, Guillet has been showcased as a romanticized colonial explorer who was an apolitical and timeless Italian officer. He has been compared to Lawrence of Arabia in order to raise his international visibility, while his genuine Italian brand is perpetuated domestically. By elevating him to an official role model, the Italian Army has gained a focal point for military heroism that was also acceptable in the public memory as the embodiment of a 'glorious' defeat narrative.}, language = {en} }