@article{Oberauer2006, author = {Oberauer, Klaus}, title = {Reasoning with conditionals: A test of formal models of four theories}, series = {Cognitive psychology}, volume = {53}, journal = {Cognitive psychology}, number = {3}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {Amsterdam}, issn = {0010-0285}, doi = {10.1016/j.cogpsych.2006.04.001}, pages = {238 -- 283}, year = {2006}, abstract = {The four dominant theories of reasoning from conditionals are translated into formal models: The theory of mental models (Johnson-Laird, P. N., \& Byrne, R. M. J. (2002). Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review, 109, 646-678), the suppositional theory (Evans, J. S. B. T., \& Over, D. E. (2004). If. Oxford: Oxford University Press), a dual-process variant of the model theory (Verschueren, N., Schaeken, W., \& d'Ydewalle, G. (2005). A dual-process specification of causal conditional reasoning. Thinking \& Reasoning, 11, 278-293), and the probabilistic theory (Oaksford, M., Chater, N., \& Larkin, J. (2000). Probabilities and polarity biases in conditional inference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 883-899). The first three theories are formalized as multinomial models. The models are applied to the frequencies of patterns of acceptance or rejection across the four basic inferences modus ponens, acceptance of the consequent, denial of the antecedent, and modus tollens. Model fits are assessed for two large data sets, one representing reasoning with abstract, basic conditionals, the other reflecting reasoning with pseudo-realistic causal and non-causal conditionals. The best account of the data was provided by a modified version of the mental-model theory, augmented by directionality, and by the dual-process model.}, language = {en} } @article{HoernigOberauerWeidenfeld2006, author = {Hoernig, Robin and Oberauer, Klaus and Weidenfeld, Andrea}, title = {Between reasoning}, series = {The quarterly journal of experimental psychology}, volume = {59}, journal = {The quarterly journal of experimental psychology}, number = {10}, publisher = {SAGE Publishing}, address = {Thousand Oaks, CA}, issn = {1747-0218}, doi = {10.1080/17470210500416151}, pages = {1805 -- 1825}, year = {2006}, abstract = {In two experiments we investigated three-term reasoning with spatial relational assertions using the preposition between as compared to projective prepositions (such as to the left of). For each kind of assertion we distinguish the referent expression (i.e., the grammatical subject) from the relatum expression (i.e., the internal argument of the preposition; e.g., [The hedgehog](referent)_(expression) is to the left of [the frog](relatum)_(expression); [the snake](referent)_(expression) is between [the donkey and the deer](relatum)_(expression)). Previous research has shown that integrating premises with projective prepositions is easier (a) when the relatum expression of the second premise denotes an element already given by the first premise (relatum = given), and (b) when the term denoting a given element precedes the term denoting a new element (given - new). Experiment 1 extended this finding to second premises with the preposition between. In Experiment 2, between figured in the first premise. In this case, participants built an initial preferred model already from the first premise, although such a premise is indeterminate with respect to the array that it describes. Since there is no need left for integrating the second premise, this premise is instead used to verify the initial model and to modify it when necessary. A further investigation of conclusion evaluation times showed that conclusions were evaluated faster when they first mentioned the element that was included most recently into the mental model of the premises. The use of premises with between permitted the separation of recency of model inclusion from recency of appearance of an element in a premise.}, language = {en} } @article{WilhelmOberauer2006, author = {Wilhelm, Oliver and Oberauer, Klaus}, title = {Why are reasoning ability and working memory capacity related to mental speed? An investigation of stimulus- response compatibility in choice reaction time tasks}, doi = {10.1080/09541440500215921}, year = {2006}, abstract = {A study with 114 young adults investigated the correlations of intelligence factors and working-memory capacity with reaction time (RT) tasks. Within two sets of four-choice RT tasks, stimulus-response compatibility was varied over three levels: compatible, incompatible, and arbitrary mappings. Two satisfactory measurement models for the RTs could be established: A general factor model without constraints on the loadings and a nested model with two correlated factors, distinguishing compatible from arbitrary mappings, with constraints on the loadings. Structural models additionally including factors for working memory and intelligence showed that the nested model with correlated factors is superior in fit. Working-memory capacity and fluid intelligence were correlated strongly with the nested factor for the RT tasks with arbitrary mappings, and less with the general RT factor. The results support the hypothesis that working memory is needed to maintain arbitrary bindings between stimulus representations and response representations, and this could explain the correlation of working-memory capacity with speed in choice RT tasks}, language = {en} } @article{OberauerGoethe2006, author = {Oberauer, Klaus and G{\"o}the, Katrin}, title = {Dual-task effects in working memory : interference between two processing tasks, between two memory demands, and between storage and processing}, doi = {10.1080/09541440500423038}, year = {2006}, abstract = {Two experiments with a working-memory updating task investigated dual-task interference between short-term storage of numerical and spatial material, between execution of a numerical and a spatial updating operation, and between storage and processing. Participants memorised a set of digits and a set of spatial positions, updated elements of both sets by a sequence of operations, and then recalled the final values. In Experiment 1, a single element in each memory set had to be updated several times. There was little interference between storage of the two sets, and between storage and processing, but parallel execution of the two operations was not possible. In Experiment 2, all elements in both memory sets were updated in random order. There was substantial interference between memory for the numerical and the spatial sets, and between storage and processing. Parallel execution of two operations was again not possible. Moreover, trying to do two operations simultaneously resulted in impaired memory of final results. The results support the distinction between the activated part of long-term memory that can hold elements currently not needed for processing, and a more central, capacity-limited part of working memory that provides access to its contents for processing}, language = {en} } @article{Oberauer2006, author = {Oberauer, Klaus}, title = {Is the focus of attention in working memory expanded through practice?}, doi = {10.1037/0278-7393.32.2.197}, year = {2006}, abstract = {This article reinvestigates the claim by P. Verhaeghen, J. Cerella, and C. Basak (2004) that the focus of attention in working memory can be expanded from 1 to 4 items through practice. Using a modified version of Verhaeghen et al.'s n-back paradigm, Experiments 1 and 3 show that a signature of a one-item focus, the time cost for switching between items in working memory, persists over practice. Verhaeghen et al. reported a shift over practice from a step function to a linear slope of reaction times over set size and argued that it reflects the expansion of the focus. With an improved counterbalancing scheme, a continuously increasing slope was found even without practice in Experiment 2. The results question the hypothesis that the focus is expanded through practice. They are in line with predictions from a model that distinguishes a one-item focus from a direct-access region holding about 4 items}, language = {en} } @article{HornigOberauerWeidenfeld2005, author = {Hornig, R. and Oberauer, Klaus and Weidenfeld, Andrea}, title = {Two principles of premise integration in spatial reasoning}, year = {2005}, abstract = {We propose two principles that facilitate integration of two relational premises in spatial reasoning. Integration is easier if the anaphor in the second premise, P2, bears the role of the relatum (relatum = given). Moreover, integration is easier if, in P2, the anaphor is mentioned before the new element (given-new). In premises with canonical word order (grammatical subjects mentioned first), these principles always conflict with one another. In topicalized statements mentioning the prepositional phrase first, the two principles work in tandem. By varying word order, we tested the two principles by measuring P2 comprehension times. Comprehension times indicated that integration was easiest when P2 obeyed both principles and most difficult when both principles were violated. Canonical premises were of intermediate difficulty. This pattern emerged regardless of whether the anaphor was a definite description or a pronoun}, language = {en} } @article{WeidenfeldOberauerHornig2005, author = {Weidenfeld, Andrea and Oberauer, Klaus and Hornig, R}, title = {Causal and noncausal conditionals : an integrated model of interpretation and reasoning}, year = {2005}, abstract = {We present an integrated model for the understanding of and the reasoning from conditional statements. Central assumptions from several approaches are integrated into a causal path model. According to the model, the cognitive availability of exceptions to a conditional reduces the subjective conditional probability of the consequent, given the antecedent. This conditional probability determines people's degree of belief in the conditional, which in turn affects their willingness to accept logically valid inferences. In addition to this indirect pathway, the model contains a direct pathway: Availability of exceptional situations directly reduces the endorsement of valid inferences. We tested the integrated model with three experiments using conditional statements embedded in pseudonaturalistic cover stories. An explicitly mentioned causal link between antecedent and consequent was either present (causal conditionals) or absent (arbitrary conditionals). The model was supported for the causal but not for the arbitrary conditional statements}, language = {en} } @article{LangeOberauer2005, author = {Lange, Elke B. and Oberauer, Klaus}, title = {Overwriting of phonemic features in serial recall}, issn = {0965-8211}, year = {2005}, abstract = {We tested explanations of the phonological similarity effect in verbal short-term memory: the confusion hypothesis assumes that serial positions of similar items are confused. The overwriting hypothesis states that similar items share feature representations, which are overwritten. Participants memorised a phonologically dissimilar list of CVC-trigrams (Experiment 1) or words (Experiment 2 and 3) for serial recall. In the retention interval they real aloud other items. The material of the distractor task jointly overlapped one item of the memory list. The recall of this item was impaired, and the effect was not based on intrusions from the distractor task alone. The results provide evidence for feature overwriting as one potential mechanism contributing to the phonological similarity effect}, language = {en} } @article{LewandowskyStritzkeOberaueretal.2005, author = {Lewandowsky, Stephan and Stritzke, W. G. K. and Oberauer, Klaus and Morales, M.}, title = {Memory for fact, fiction, and misinformation : the Iraq War 2003}, issn = {0956-7976}, year = {2005}, abstract = {Media coverage of the 2003 Iraq War frequently contained corrections and retractions of earlier information. For example, claims that Iraqi forces executed coalition prisoners of war after they surrendered were retracted the day after the claims were made. Similarly, tentative initial reports about the discovery of weapons of mass destruction were all later disconfirmed. We investigated the effects of these retractions and disconfirmations on people's memory for and beliefs about war-related events in two coalition countries (Australia and the United States) and one country that opposed the war (Germany). Participants were queried about (a) true events, (b) events initially presented as fact but subsequently retracted, and (c) fictional events. Participants in the United States did not show sensitivity to the correction of misinformation, whereas participants in Australia and Germany discounted corrected misinformation. Our results are consistent with previous findings in that the differences between samples reflect greater suspicion about the motives underlying the war among people in Australia and Germany than among people in the United States}, language = {en} } @article{Oberauer2005, author = {Oberauer, Klaus}, title = {Binding and inhibition in working memory : individual and age differences in short-term recognition}, issn = {0096-3445}, year = {2005}, abstract = {Two studies investigated the relationship between working memory capacity (WMC), adult age, and the resolution of conflict between familiarity and recollection in short-term recognition tasks. Experiment 1 showed a specific deficit of young adults with low WMC in rejecting intrusion probes (i.e., highly familiar probes) in a modified Sternberg task, which was similar to the deficit found in old adults in a parallel experiment (K. Oberauer, 2001). Experiment 2 generalized these results to 3 recognition paradigms (modified Sternberg, local recognition, and n back tasks). Old adults showed disproportional performance deficits on intrusion probes only in terms of reaction times, whereas young adults with low WMC showed them only in terms of errors. The generality of the effect across paradigms is more compatible with a deficit in content-context bindings subserving recollection than with a deficit in inhibition of irrelevant information in working memory. Structural equation models showed that WMC is related to the efficiency of recollection but not of familiarity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2005 APA, all rights reserved)}, language = {en} }