@misc{Ganghof2019,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Designing Democratic Constitutions},
  series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  journal   = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  number    = {120},
  issn      = {1867-5808},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-44540},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-445408},
  pages     = {13},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{GanghofEppnerSteckeretal.2019,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian and Stecker, Christian and Heeß, Katja and Schukraft, Stefan},
  title     = {Do minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively?},
  series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  journal   = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  number    = {114},
  issn      = {1867-5808},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-43417},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-434175},
  pages     = {541 -- 561},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {A widespread view in political science is that minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively, more in line with a median-oriented and 'consensual' vision of democracy. Yet there is only little empirical evidence for it. We study legislative coalition-building in the German state of North-Rhine-Westphalia, which was ruled by a minority government between 2010 and 2012. We compare the inclusiveness of legislative coalitions under minority and majority cabinets, based on 1028 laws passed in the 1985-2017 period, and analyze in detail the flexibility of legislative coalition formation under the minority government. Both quantitative analyses are complemented with brief case studies of specific legislation. We find, first, that the minority cabinet did not rule more inclusively. Second, the minority cabinet's legislative flexibility was fairly limited; to the extent that it existed, it follows a pattern that cannot be explained on the basis of the standard spatial model with policy-seeking parties.},
  language  = {en}
}