@article{TomaszewskaSchuster2019,
  author    = {Tomaszewska, Paulina and Schuster, Isabell},
  title     = {Comparing sexuality-related cognitions, sexual behavior, and acceptance of sexual coercion in dating app users and non-users},
  series = {Sexuality research \& social policy},
  volume    = {17},
  journal   = {Sexuality research \& social policy},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {1868-9884},
  doi       = {10.1007/s13178-019-00397-x},
  pages     = {188 -- 198},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Using dating apps has become popular for many young adults worldwide, promising the chance to meet new sexual partners. Because there is evidence that using dating apps may be associated with risky sexual behavior, this study compared users and non-users concerning their sexuality-related cognitions, namely their risky sexual scripts and sexual self-esteem, as well as their risky and sexually assertive behavior. It also explored the link between dating app use and acceptance of sexual coercion. A total of 491 young heterosexual adults (295 female) participated in an online survey advertised in social media and college libraries in Germany. Results indicated that users had more risky sexual scripts and reported more risky sexual behavior than non-users. Furthermore, male dating app users had lower sexual self-esteem and higher acceptance of sexual coercion than male non-users. In both gender groups, dating app use predicted casual sexual activity via a more risky casual sex script. Gender differences, potential underlying mechanisms, and directions for future research are discussed.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Ganghof2012,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Does public reason require super-majoritarian democracy?},
  series = {Politics, philosophy \& economics},
  volume    = {12},
  journal   = {Politics, philosophy \& economics},
  number    = {2},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-477860},
  pages     = {18},
  year      = {2012},
  abstract  = {The project of public-reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member from the eligible set of inconclusively justified proposals. Yet if liberal principles are too vague to select sufficiently specific legislative proposals, can they, nevertheless, select specific legislative procedures? Based on the work of Gerald Gaus, this article argues that the only candidate for a conclusively justified decision procedure is a majoritarian or otherwise 'neutral' democracy. If the justification of democracy requires an equality baseline in the design of political regimes and if justifications for departure from this baseline are subject to reasonable disagreement, a majoritarian design is justified by default. Gaus's own preference for super-majoritarian procedures is based on disputable specifications of justified liberal principles. These procedures can only be defended as a sectarian preference if the equality baseline is rejected, but then it is not clear how the set of justifiable political regimes can be restricted to full democracies.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Ganghof2013,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Does public reason require super-majoritarian democracy? Liberty, equality, and history in the justification of political institutions},
  series = {Politics, philosophy \& economics},
  volume    = {12},
  journal   = {Politics, philosophy \& economics},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {Thousand Oaks},
  issn      = {1470-594X},
  doi       = {10.1177/1470594X12447786},
  pages     = {179 -- 196},
  year      = {2013},
  abstract  = {The project of public-reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member from the eligible set of inconclusively justified proposals. Yet if liberal principles are too vague to select sufficiently specific legislative proposals, can they, nevertheless, select specific legislative procedures? Based on the work of Gerald Gaus, this article argues that the only candidate for a conclusively justified decision procedure is a majoritarian or otherwise 'neutral' democracy. If the justification of democracy requires an equality baseline in the design of political regimes and if justifications for departure from this baseline are subject to reasonable disagreement, a majoritarian design is justified by default. Gaus's own preference for super-majoritarian procedures is based on disputable specifications of justified liberal principles. These procedures can only be defended as a sectarian preference if the equality baseline is rejected, but then it is not clear how the set of justifiable political regimes can be restricted to full democracies.},
  language  = {en}
}