@incollection{Khurana2024,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {Die Unheimlichkeit des Gew{\"o}hnlichen},
  series = {Trouble Every Day : Zum Schrecken des Allt{\"a}glichen},
  booktitle = {Trouble Every Day : Zum Schrecken des Allt{\"a}glichen},
  publisher = {Brill Fink},
  address   = {Paderborn},
  isbn      = {978-3-8467-6721-4},
  doi       = {10.30965/9783846767214_006},
  pages     = {91 -- 105},
  year      = {2024},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Wallage2023,
  author    = {Wallage, Martijn},
  title     = {Dotting the "I think"},
  series = {Reading R{\"o}dl : On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity},
  journal   = {Reading R{\"o}dl : On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity},
  publisher = {Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Milton},
  isbn      = {978-1-03-234951-0},
  doi       = {/10.4324/9781003324638},
  pages     = {316 -- 333},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {This chapter discusses a central problem in Sebastian R{\"o}dl's Self-Consciousness and Objectivity and in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. In a statement of the form "I think p", the words "I think" do not contribute to the content, and yet they are not redundant. In other words, a thinking subject is not something and yet not nothing. But then in what sense is a thinking subject a part of the world? The problem is intractable on a merely negative understanding of "I think", like Anscombe's merely negative thesis, endorsed by R{\"o}dl, that "I" is not a referring expression. In search of a positive understanding, this chapter proposes to understand "I think" by comparison to "hello". A speaking subject is the expression of mutual presence in conversation - in that sense a limit of the world. Such expression may be compared to facial expression, with the crucial difference that a verbal expression can be taken up - i.e., repeated - in the third person. A speaking subject, then, is potentially absent from conversation, and in that sense a part of the world.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Batti2023,
  author    = {Batti, Anil Dominic},
  title     = {Schopenhauer's doctrine of salvation in relation to his critique of religion and philosophical teachings},
  publisher = {Logos},
  address   = {Berlin},
  isbn      = {978-3-83255-735-5},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {319},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was perhaps the last polymath among the great Germanic philosophers. Switching with ease and elegance between epistemic positions and fields as diverse as idealism and empiricism, fideism and rationalism, realism and nominalism, art and religion, jurisprudence and politics, psychology and occultism, Schopenhauer erected an imposing edifice bearing testimony to his universal learning. This study is an investigation into the very conclusion of Schopenhauer's philosophy and endeavours to answer the following question: did Schopenhauer's doctrine of salvation issue forth organically from his intellectual output or was it annexed to his philosophy as a result of his critical engagement with religion? The labyrinthine paths through which Schopenhauer arrives at the soteriological culmination of his philosophy are subjected to critical assessment; the picture that emerges is of a philosopher who seemed convinced that he had solved some of the most pressing cosmic riddles to have tormented mankind through the ages.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Troeger2023,
  type      = {Master Thesis},
  author    = {Tr{\"o}ger, Hannah},
  title     = {Zeitreisen erkl{\"a}ren},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-59303},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-593039},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {77},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {Die vorliegende Arbeit dreht sich um die Frage, wie sich schl{\"u}ssig und im Einklang mit g{\"a}ngigen philosophischen Modellen von Zeit und Identit{\"a}t {\"u}ber Zeitreisen sprechen l{\"a}sst. Dabei l{\"a}uft die Darstellung nicht auf einen einzelnen theoretischen Ansatz hinaus, sondern zeigt verschiedene Implikationen von Zeitreisen angesichts unterschiedlicher Konzepte von Zeit und Persistenz auf. Gearbeitet wird mit den Zeitreise-Modellen von Jack Meiland (1974), Geoffrey Goddu (2003) und Peter van Inwagen (2010) und insbesondere {\"U}berlegungen zu growing block-Universen und vierdimensionaler Identit{\"a}t werden weitergef{\"u}hrt. Schwerpunkte der Arbeit liegen einerseits auf Erkl{\"a}rungen zu Ver{\"a}nderungen der Vergangenheit und andererseits auf dem Problem der Bilokation durch Zeitreisen in Zeiten, zu denen die Zeitreisende bereits existiert. Nicholas J. J. Smith (2015) hat als notwendige Voraussetzung f{\"u}r die Erkl{\"a}rbarkeit von Ver{\"a}nderungen der Vergangenheit dia-hyper-chrone Identit{\"a}tsbedingungen f{\"u}r Jahre gefordert. Ich zeige, dass es sich hierbei um eine zu starke Forderung handelt. Demnach ist die Erkl{\"a}rung von Ver{\"a}nderungen der Vergangenheit durch Annihilation in growing block-Universen, wie Goddu und van Inwagen sie einf{\"u}hren, legitim. Bilokation stellt eine Herausforderung f{\"u}r personale Identit{\"a}t dar. Ich schlage eine {\"u}berarbeitete Definition von gegenw{\"a}rtigen zeitlichen Teilen vor, die es zul{\"a}sst, dass mehr als ein zeitlicher Teil einer diachron identischen Person synchron pr{\"a}sent sein kann. Auf diese Weise muss nicht zwischen zeitlichen Teilen und Personenstadien differenziert werden, wie Ted Sider (2001) es tut. Ich komme im Rahmen dieser Arbeit zu den Ergebnissen, dass erstens bisher kein Modell von Zeit oder Persistenz bekannt ist, f{\"u}r das Zeitreisen grunds{\"a}tzlich auszuschließen sind. Eine umfangreiche Systematik {\"u}ber M{\"o}glichkeiten und Implikationen von Zeitreisen bleibt jedoch l{\"u}ckenhaft, solange keine pr{\"a}sentistischen Modelle von Zeitreisen vorliegen. Zweitens erweisen sich Zeitreisen, die keine Ver{\"a}nderungen verursachen, nicht als weniger problematisch als Zeitreisen, die Ver{\"a}nderungen verursachen. Erstere werfen eigene Probleme auf, wie das Motivationsproblem und die Frage nach der Determination durch Zukunftsfakten. Drittens lassen sich trotz all der geleisteten Erkl{\"a}rungen weiterhin Szenarien entwickeln, die suspekt bleiben. Dies verweist auf die weiterf{\"u}hrende Frage, inwiefern Chronologie wesentlich und unverzichtbar ist f{\"u}r die Intelligibilit{\"a}t beispielsweise sozialer Interaktionen und Institutionen.},
  language  = {de}
}
@incollection{Khurana2023,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {Self-knowledge and knowledge of nature},
  series = {Reading R{\"o}dl : On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity},
  booktitle = {Reading R{\"o}dl : On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity},
  publisher = {Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Milton},
  isbn      = {978-1-03-234951-0},
  doi       = {10.4324/9781003324638},
  pages     = {195 -- 223},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {In this chapter, I consider the unity of self-consciousness and objectivity. Starting from the notion that the objective character and the self-conscious character of thought seem in tension, I discuss Sebastian R{\"o}dl's Self-Consciousness and Objectivity and his thesis that this tension is merely apparent. This resolution suggests an immediate route to absolute idealism. I recall two Hegelian objections against such an immediate route. Against this background, it transpires that the dissolution of the apparent opposition of objectivity and self-consciousness can only be a preliminary step, opening our eyes to an actual opposition animating the pursuit of knowledge: the opposition of knowledge of nature and self-knowledge. This actual opposition cannot be removed as merely apparent and instead has to be sublated through articulation of its speculative unity. I consider two paradigms for the exposition of such a speculative unity: Kant's account of judgments of beauty, and Hegel's account of the speculative unity of life and self-consciousness. I close by contrasting these two approaches with R{\"o}dl's characterization, which strikes me as one-sided. Absolute idealism, properly understood, requires us to develop the speculative unity of knowledge of nature and self-knowledge from both sides, showing us that knowledge of nature is self-knowledge, but equally: that self-knowledge requires knowledge of ourselves as nature.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Khurana2023,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {Die "europ{\"a}ischen Wilden"},
  series = {Historische Urteilskraft},
  volume    = {5},
  journal   = {Historische Urteilskraft},
  publisher = {Stiftung Deutsches Historisches Museum},
  address   = {Berlin},
  isbn      = {978-3-86102-231-2},
  issn      = {2626-8094},
  pages     = {15 -- 18},
  year      = {2023},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Khurana2023,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {Altera Natura: Das Anthropoz{\"a}n als {\"a}sthetisches Problem},
  series = {Dritte Natur},
  volume    = {6},
  journal   = {Dritte Natur},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Matthes \& Seitz},
  address   = {Berlin},
  isbn      = {978-3-7518-0704-3},
  issn      = {2625-9885},
  pages     = {175 -- 190},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {Der Kunst wird seit langem nachgesagt, dem Subjekt ein anderes Verh{\"a}ltnis zur Natur zu er{\"o}ffnen, als dies die gew{\"o}hnliche theoretische oder praktische Erkenntnis erm{\"o}glicht. Statt die Natur zum distanzierten Objekt unserer Betrachtung zu machen oder zum bloßen Material und Mittel unserer praktischen Konstruktionen, erschließt sich uns in der Kunst eine Intelligibilit{\"a}t der Natur, die weiter reicht als unsere Begriffe, und eine Nat{\"u}rlichkeit unserer selbst, die uns mit dem verbindet, was uns sonst bloß gegen{\"u}bersteht. Vor diesem Hintergrund scheint es nicht verwunderlich, dass die j{\"u}ngeren Diskussionen um das problematische Verh{\"a}ltnis zur Natur, die das Anthropoz{\"a}n gepr{\"a}gt haben, immer wieder den Blick auf die Kunst richten und ihr Verm{\"o}gen hervorheben, den problematischen modernen Gegensatz von Subjekt und Objekt, Geist und Natur zu {\"u}berwinden, der uns in diese missliche Lage gebracht hat. Wenn die Kunst hier aber weiterf{\"u}hren soll, dann muss sie {\"u}ber die klassischen {\"a}sthetischen Paradigmen des Sch{\"o}nen und des Erhabenen hinausf{\"u}hren. Das Sch{\"o}ne tr{\"a}umt von einer Passung von Subjekt und Natur, die im Anthropoz{\"a}n gerade in Frage steht, und das Erhabene verwendet die {\"U}bermacht der Natur als Vehikel, um eine Macht im intelligiblen Subjekt zu markieren, die von der nat{\"u}rlichen {\"U}bermacht unber{\"u}hrt bleibt. Diese klassischen Figuren {\"a}sthetischer Erfahrung verstellen so, wie tiefgreifend wir das Naturverh{\"a}ltnis neu bestimmen m{\"u}ssen, um auf das Anthropoz{\"a}n zu antworten.},
  language  = {de}
}
@misc{Khurana2023,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {Dialektische Anthropologie - oder romantischer Idealismus?},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie},
  volume    = {71},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {0012-1045},
  doi       = {10.1515/dzph-2023-0026},
  pages     = {304 -- 311},
  year      = {2023},
  language  = {de}
}
@incollection{Khurana2023,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {True right against formal right: The body of right and the limits of property},
  series = {Hegel's philosophy of right: critical perspectives on freedom and history},
  booktitle = {Hegel's philosophy of right: critical perspectives on freedom and history},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {London},
  isbn      = {9781003081036},
  doi       = {10.4324/9781003081036-10},
  pages     = {147 -- 168},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {The conception of property at the basis of Hegel's conception of abstract right seems committed to a problematic form of "possessive individualism." It seems to conceive of right as the expression of human mastery over nature and as based upon an irreducible opposition of person and nature, rightful will, and rightless thing. However, this chapter argues that Hegel starts with a form of possessive individualism only to show that it undermines itself. This is evident in the way Hegel unfolds the nature of property as it applies to external things as well as in the way he explains our self-ownership of our own bodies and lives. Hegel develops the idea of property to a point where it reaches a critical limit and encounters the "true right" that life possesses against the "formal" and "abstract right" of property. Ultimately, Hegel's account suggests that nature should precisely not be treated as a rightless object at our arbitrary disposal but acknowledged as the inorganic body of right.},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{Khurana2023,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {The stage of difference: On the second nature of civil society in Kant and Hegel},
  series = {Naturalism and social philosophy},
  booktitle = {Naturalism and social philosophy},
  publisher = {Rowman \& Littlefield},
  address   = {Lanham},
  isbn      = {978-1-5381-7492-0},
  pages     = {35 -- 64},
  year      = {2023},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Schmidt2023,
  author    = {Schmidt, Christian},
  title     = {Vom Trauma zum bedeutungsvollen Ersterlebnis},
  publisher = {Karl Alber},
  address   = {Baden-Baden},
  isbn      = {978-3-4959-9450-4},
  doi       = {10.5771/9783495994511},
  pages     = {342},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {Ausgehend von {\"U}berlegungen des anthropologisch orientierten Psychiaters Erwin Straus geht dieses Buch der Frage nach, welche Bedingungen vorliegen, wenn bestimmte Ereignisse von Personen als bedeutsam erlebt werden. Des Weiteren wird ausf{\"u}hrlich er{\"o}rtert, wie sich Personalit{\"a}t im Menschen ausbildet und inwieweit sie von der gelingenden Integration bedeutungsvoller Ersterlebnisse abh{\"a}ngt. Das dabei zugrundeliegende Person-Konzept stellt einen eigenst{\"a}ndigen Syntheseversuch der vier Konzepte von Erwin Straus, Viktor Emil von Gebsattel, Helmuth Plessner und Max Scheler dar. Der Autor arbeitet in ober{\"a}rztlicher Funktion am Klinikum Schloss L{\"u}tgenhof in Dassow, einer Akutklinik f{\"u}r Personale Medizin, integrierte Psychosomatik, Innere Medizin und Psychotherapie},
  language  = {de}
}
@phdthesis{OmerbasicSchiliro2022,
  author    = {Omerbasic-Schiliro, Alina},
  title     = {Das Problem der Nicht-Identit{\"a}t und die Grenzen der personenbezogenen Moral},
  publisher = {Brill},
  address   = {Paderborn},
  isbn      = {978-3-95743-228-5},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {326},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Dass das Wohlergehen k{\"u}nftig lebender Individuen moralische Ber{\"u}cksichtigung verdient, ist unbestritten. Sowohl im Rahmen des {\"o}ffentlichen Diskurses als auch in der akademischen Umwelt- oder Zukunftsethik wird diese Ansicht vertreten.Durch das Problem der Nicht-Identit{\"a}t wird sie jedoch auf empfindliche Weise in Frage gestellt: Wie kann eine Handlung wie die Verschwendung begrenzt verf{\"u}gbarer Ressourcen falsch sein, wenn die faktisch davon betroffenen k{\"u}nftig lebenden Individuen nur durch sie in die Existenz gelangen konnten? Gilt dann nicht, dass diese Handlung f{\"u}r niemanden schlecht ist und keine Sch{\"a}digung darstellt? Dieses Buch verfolgt das Ziel zu verdeutlichen, wie das moralische Unrecht, das k{\"u}nftig lebende Individuen durch Handlungen gegenw{\"a}rtig lebender Akteur:innen erfahren - trotz des Faktums der Nicht-Identit{\"a}t - mithilfe eines nicht-personenbezogenen Prinzips identifiziert und das Problem der Nicht-Identit{\"a}t somit gel{\"o}st werden kann.},
  language  = {de}
}
@book{Tolksdorf2022,
  author    = {Tolksdorf, Stefan},
  title     = {Wissen als ad{\"a}quate Information},
  publisher = {Brill},
  address   = {Paderborn},
  isbn      = {978-3-95743-258-2},
  pages     = {XXX, 407},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Die vorliegende Arbeit verteidigt die von Richard Foley entwickelte Wissenstheorie, der zufolge propositionales Wissen nicht mehr, aber auch nicht weniger als ad{\"a}quate Information ist. Wissen ist eine Funktion der G{\"u}te von Informationszust{\"a}nden. Glaubt ein Subjekt wahrerweise, dass p, ohne zu wissen, dass p, so fehlt dem Subjekt mindestens eine wichtige Information im Umfeld der Ziel{\"u}berzeugung. Die Ad{\"a}quatheitstheorie ist eine minimalistische und pragmatische Wissenstheorie. Sie ist minimalistisch, weil es {\"u}ber wahre {\"U}berzeugung hinausgehend keiner weiteren epistemischen Schl{\"u}sseleigenschaft bedarf. Sie ist pragmatisch, weil Ad{\"a}quatheit epistemische Signifikanz voraussetzt. Klassische Zusatzbedingungen f{\"u}r Wissen, beispielsweise Rechtfertigung oder verl{\"a}ssliche Meinungsbildung, sind lediglich Begleitph{\"a}nomene.},
  language  = {de}
}
@phdthesis{Sperotto2022,
  author    = {Sperotto, Tommaso U. A.},
  title     = {Axel Honneth and the Movement of Recognition},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie / Sonderb{\"a}nde ; 46},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie / Sonderb{\"a}nde ; 46},
  publisher = {de Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  isbn      = {978-3-11-077207-4},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {IX, 331},
  year      = {2022},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Kabeshkin2022,
  author    = {Kabeshkin, Anton},
  title     = {Logical and natural life in Hegel},
  series = {European journal of philosophy},
  volume    = {30},
  journal   = {European journal of philosophy},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address   = {Oxford},
  issn      = {0966-8373},
  doi       = {10.1111/ejop.12647},
  pages     = {129 -- 147},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {In this article, I discuss the specific ways in which Hegel's account of life and organisms advances upon Kant's account of natural purposes in the third Critique. First of all, I argue that it is essential for Hegel's account that it contains two levels. The first level is that of logical life, the discussion of which does not depend on any empirical knowledge of natural organisms. I provide my reconstruction of this logical account of life that answers to the objection made by a number of Hegel scholars to the effect that Hegel does in fact rely on empirical knowledge at this place in the logic. The second level is that of natural organisms themselves. I argue that it is with the help of this separation of the logical and natural levels, as well as his doctrine of the impotence of nature, that Hegel, unlike Kant, (a) is able to claim that not everything in natural organisms is purposive, and (b) provide a philosophical, and not merely empirical, account of the distinction between plants and animals. In both of these respects, Hegel's position can be seen as a welcome advance over Kant.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Mulamustafic2022,
  author    = {Mulamustafic, Adem},
  title     = {The Clash of the Images},
  series = {Theoria ; 3},
  journal   = {Theoria ; 3},
  publisher = {Schwabe Verlag},
  address   = {Berlin},
  isbn      = {978-3-7574-0065-1},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-55816},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {212},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {In everyday life, we take there to be ordinary objects such as persons, tables, and stones bearing certain properties such as color and shape and standing in various causal relationships to each other. Basic convictions such as these form our everyday picture of the world: the manifest image. The scientific image, on the other hand, is a system of beliefs that is only based on scientific results. It contains many beliefs that are not contained in the manifest image. At first glance, this may not seem to be a problem. But Mulamustafi? shows convincingly that this is a mistake: The world as it is in itself cannot be both the way the manifest image depicts it and the way the scientific image describes it to be. Adem Mulamustafic studied and completed his PhD in philosophy at the University of Potsdam. His areas of specialization are metaphysics, philosophy of science, and critical thinking.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Heuberger2022,
  author    = {Heuberger, Adrian},
  title     = {Das Erste ist das Letzte und das Letzte ist das Erste},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-54984},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-549846},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {224},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {The following paper argues that Hegel's Science of Logic is a radical attempt to conceive the absolute as having no outside. This can already be noticed in the beginning of the Logic: If there can be nothing outside the absolute, then the beginning cannot be outside the absolute either. Consequently, the beginning must be made with the absolute itself. However, setting the beginning as absolute is at the same time testing the beginning of its absoluteness. And the beginning does not pass this test. For it is the nature of a beginning to be only a beginning and not the whole. And thus it is also not the absolute. The beginning is the most distant determination from being the whole and must therefore be considered as the most non-absolute in Logic. Consequently, the beginning is both: It is a beginning with the absolute and it is a beginning with the most non-absolute. The very beginning of the Logic is already a self-contradiction. The Logic must free itself from this contradiction. And this liberation is what makes the progress that leads beyond the beginning and in which the beginning is sublated. The progress develops subsequent determinations. Each of them is posited as absolute, but none of them can satisfy this absoluteness so that each of them is sublated again in subsequent determinations. Every determination that follows the beginning undergoes this movement of absolutisation, of failing to fulfill absoluteness, and of sublating itself, until - at the very end of Logic - this very movement is recognised as that which alone is capable of fulfilling absoluteness. For if every determination is submitted to this movement, then there is no outside to this movement. And therefore, it must be the absolute. On its progress to elaborate the true meaning of the absolute, the Logic returns repeatedly to the determination of its beginning, in order to catch up with presuppositions that had to be made for exposing its initial determination. The following passages will be of particular interest for catching up with these presuppositions: the transition into the science of Essence, the transition into the science of Notion and the concluding chapter of the Logic. For even at the very end, the Logic returns to its beginning. This led to the following statement by Hegel, which also inspired the title of this paper: The first is also the last and the last is also the first.},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Bruno2022,
  author    = {Bruno, Daniele},
  title     = {Being fully excused for wrongdoing},
  series = {Pacific philosophical quarterly},
  volume    = {104},
  journal   = {Pacific philosophical quarterly},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address   = {Hoboken, NJ},
  issn      = {0279-0750},
  doi       = {10.1111/papq.12425},
  pages     = {324 -- 347},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {On the classical understanding, an agent is fully excused for an action if and only if performing this action was a case of faultless wrongdoing. A major motivation for this view is the apparent existence of paradigmatic types of excusing considerations, affecting fault but not wrongness. I show that three such considerations, ignorance, duress and compulsion, can be shown to have direct bearing on the permissibility of actions. The appeal to distinctly identifiable excusing considerations thus does not stand up to closer scrutiny, undermining the classical view and giving us reason to seek alternative ways of drawing the justification/excuse distinction.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{SalaKabeshkin2022,
  author    = {Sala, Lorenzo and Kabeshkin, Anton},
  title     = {A priori philosophy of nature in Hegel and German rationalism},
  series = {British journal for the history of philosophy : Bjhp},
  volume    = {30},
  journal   = {British journal for the history of philosophy : Bjhp},
  number    = {5},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {0960-8788},
  doi       = {10.1080/09608788.2022.2044753},
  pages     = {797 -- 817},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Hegel's many remarks that seem to imply that philosophy should proceed completely a priori pose a problem for his philosophy of nature since, on this reading, Hegel offers an a priori derivation of empirical results of natural sciences. We show how this perception can be mitigated by interpreting Hegel's remarks as broadly in line with the pre-Kantian rationalist notion of a priori and offer reasons for doing so. We show that, rather than being a peculiarity of Hegel's philosophy, the practice of demonstrating a priori the results of empirical sciences was widespread in the pre-Kantian rationalist tradition. We argue that this practice was intelligible in light of the notion of a priori that was still quite prominent during Hegel's life. This notion of a priori differs from Kant's in that, while the latter's notion concerns propositions, the former concerned only their demonstration. According to it, the same proposition could be demonstrated both a posteriori and a priori. Post-Kantian idealists likewise developed projects of demonstrating specific scientific contents a priori. We then make our discussion more concrete by examining a particular case of an a priori derivation of a natural law, namely the law of fall, by both Leibniz and Hegel.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Khurana2022,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {Gattungswesen},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  volume    = {70},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {0012-1045},
  doi       = {10.1515/dzph-2022-0023},
  pages     = {373 -- 399},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {In which sense can human beings be conceived as social animals? To elucidate this question, the present paper (I) distinguishes the logical sociality of all living beings from the material sociality of social animals and the political sociality of self-conscious social animals. (II) The self-conscious political sociality that characterises the human genus-being requires a complex interplay of first and second person through which alone we can participate in our form of life and determine its content. (III) The human form of life thus constituted is characterised by a particularly open, and at the same time precarious, membership which involves specific forms of vulnerability and power. (IV) Against this background, forms of objective spirit are necessary which grant us a generalized recognition and relieve us from the contingency of each particular second-personal recognition, without abandoning the openness of the sociality of the human form of life. This double requirement has led to paradoxical institutions in modern society which strive to protect and ensure the sociality of the human form of life precisely by naturalising and individualising our access to it.},
  language  = {de}
}
@incollection{Khurana2022,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {Genus-being: On Marx's dialectical naturalism},
  series = {Nature and naturalism in classical German philosophy},
  booktitle = {Nature and naturalism in classical German philosophy},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {New York},
  isbn      = {978-0-367-54172-9},
  doi       = {10.4324/9781003092056-13},
  pages     = {246 -- 278},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {In his 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx famously claims that the human being is or has a 'Gattungswesen.' This is often understood to mean that the human being is a 'species-being' and is determined by a given 'species-essence.' In this chapter, I argue that this reading is mistaken. What Marx calls Gattungswesen is precisely not a 'species-being,' but a being that, in a very specific sense, transcends the limits of its own given species. This different understanding of the genus- character of the human being opens up a new perspective on the naturalism of the early Marx. He is not informed by a problematic speciesist and essentialist naturalism, as is often assumed, but by a different form of naturalism which I propose to call 'dialectical naturalism.' The chapter starts (I) by developing Hegel's account of genus which provides us with a useful background for (II) understanding Marx's original notion of a genus-being and its practical, social, developmental character. In the last section, I show that (III) the actualization of our genus-being thus depends on the production of a specific type of 'second nature' that is at the heart of Marx's dialectical naturalism.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Khurana2022,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {The art of second nature},
  series = {Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal},
  volume    = {43},
  journal   = {Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {0093-4240},
  doi       = {10.5840/gfpj20224312},
  pages     = {33 -- 69},
  year      = {2022},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Spiegel2022,
  author    = {Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf},
  title     = {Verschw{\"o}rungstheorien und das Erbe der Aufkl{\"a}rung},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  volume    = {70},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {0012-1045},
  doi       = {10.1515/dzph-2022-0015},
  pages     = {253 -- 273},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Conspiracy theories are currently all the rage in philosophy and broader intellectual culture. One of the most common background assumptions in the discourse on conspiracy theories is that conspiracy theorists exhibit certain epistemic vices in the sense of cognitive misconduct. This epistemic vice is mostly seen as a form of irrationality; the corresponding "remedy", as suggested by some commentators, is a return to the ideals of the Enlightenment. This article argues that this idea is wrongheaded. Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that conspiracy theorists are actually motivated by the rational Enlightenment ideal of self-thinking in the first place. In contrast to the standard discourse, the article posits that conspiracism is based on a certain form of social scepticism, according to which conspiracy theorists radically mistrust a certain form of expert testimony, namely "official" statements. This form of social scepticism in turn facilitates a naive appropriation of the Enlightenment ideal of self-thinking. The article closes by drawing connections to the ethical and epistemological debate on trust and offers the pessimistic assessment that there are no easy solutions based on individual epistemic virtues.},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{KayaKopshteyn2022,
  author    = {Kaya, Gizem and Kopshteyn, Georgy},
  title     = {Die Impfpflicht-Debatte auf dem philosophischen Pr{\"u}fstand},
  series = {MenschenRechtsMagazin : MRM ; Informationen, Meinungen, Analysen},
  volume    = {27},
  journal   = {MenschenRechtsMagazin : MRM ; Informationen, Meinungen, Analysen},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  issn      = {1434-2820},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-57154},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-571541},
  pages     = {94 -- 110},
  year      = {2022},
  language  = {de}
}
@misc{Khurana2022,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {Ein Recht gegen das Recht},
  series = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe},
  journal   = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe},
  editor    = {Berger, Christian and Frey, Michael and Priesemuth, Florian},
  isbn      = {978-3-11-078466-4},
  issn      = {1866-8380},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-60006},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-600060},
  pages     = {18},
  year      = {2022},
  language  = {de}
}
@incollection{Khurana2022,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {Ein Recht gegen das Recht},
  series = {Rechte des K{\"o}rpers},
  booktitle = {Rechte des K{\"o}rpers},
  editor    = {Berger, Christian and Frey, Michael and Priesemuth, Florian},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin, Boston},
  isbn      = {978-3-11-078466-4},
  doi       = {10.1515/9783110784985-004},
  pages     = {45 -- 60},
  year      = {2022},
  language  = {de}
}
@phdthesis{vonKalckreuth2021,
  author    = {von Kalckreuth, Moritz Alexander},
  title     = {Philosophie der Personalit{\"a}t},
  publisher = {Meiner},
  address   = {Hamburg},
  isbn      = {978-3-7873-4026-2},
  pages     = {328},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Die Philosophie der Person tritt mit dem Anspruch an, unser Selbstverst{\"a}ndnis als Individuen artikulieren zu wollen. Wird die g{\"a}ngige Lesart von Personen als rationalen, selbstbewussten Individuen diesem Anspruch wirklich gerecht? In Auseinandersetzung mit unterschiedlichen Ans{\"a}tzen der Gegenwart arbeitet Moritz von Kalckreuth neben der rationalen auch die leibliche, emotionale und soziokulturelle Dimension von Personalit{\"a}t heraus und fragt nach der M{\"o}glichkeit, sie alle in einem „Syntheseversuch" zusammenzuf{\"u}hren. Im Anschluss an Helmuth Plessners Philosophische Anthropologie, Nicolai Hartmanns Neue Ontologie und Max Schelers Ph{\"a}nomenologie lassen sich verschiedene Lesarten von Geist gewinnen, die sich f{\"u}r eine solche Verkn{\"u}pfung der einzelnen Dimensionen von Personalit{\"a}t besonders eignen.},
  language  = {de}
}
@phdthesis{Tamponi2021,
  author    = {Tamponi, Guido Karl},
  title     = {George Santayana},
  series = {Epistemata Philosophie ; 618},
  journal   = {Epistemata Philosophie ; 618},
  publisher = {K{\"o}nigshausen \& Neumann},
  address   = {W{\"u}rzburg},
  isbn      = {978-3-8260-7335-9},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {422},
  year      = {2021},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Petsche2021,
  author    = {Petsche, Hans-Joachim},
  title     = {Transzendentaler Materialismus, Emergenz und Quantengravitation},
  series = {Aufhebung : Zeitschrift f{\"u}r dialektische Philosophie},
  journal   = {Aufhebung : Zeitschrift f{\"u}r dialektische Philosophie},
  number    = {16},
  publisher = {Gesellschaft f{\"u}r Dialektische Philosophie},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {2567-3629},
  pages     = {93 -- 98},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Bezug nehmend auf Rainer E. Zimmermanns Buch "Metaphysik als Grundlegung von Naturdialektik. Zum Sagbaren und Unsagbaren im spekulativen Denken" wird der von Zimmermann entwickelte Ansatz eines transzendentalen Materialismus in der Traditionslinie Schellingscher Dialektik einerseits und dem Spin-Schaum-Ansatz der Quantengravitationstheorie andererseits er{\"o}rtert. Die R{\"u}ckf{\"u}hrung von Wirklichkeitsstrukturen auf mathematische Strukturen - auf das Prozessieren von Zahlen - wird problematisiert.},
  language  = {de}
}
@misc{Ranaee2021,
  author    = {Ranaee, Mahdi},
  title     = {Rezension zu: Pasnau, Robert: After certainty: a history of our epistemic ideals and illusions. - Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. - 384 pp. - ISBN: 978-0-19-885218-6},
  series = {Archiv f{\"u}r Geschichte der Philosophie},
  volume    = {103},
  journal   = {Archiv f{\"u}r Geschichte der Philosophie},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {0003-9101},
  doi       = {10.1515/agph-2020-2013},
  pages     = {189 -- 194},
  year      = {2021},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Ranaee2021,
  author    = {Ranaee, Mahdi},
  title     = {Book review: de Boer, Karin: Kant's reform of metaphysics: the critique of pure reason reconsidered. - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. - 290 pp. - ISBN: 978-11-0889798-3},
  series = {International journal of philosophical studies},
  volume    = {29},
  journal   = {International journal of philosophical studies},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Abingdon},
  isbn      = {9781108897983},
  issn      = {0967-2559},
  doi       = {10.1080/09672559.2021.1873545},
  pages     = {121 -- 126},
  year      = {2021},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Spiegel2021,
  author    = {Spiegel, Thomas J.},
  title     = {Das Wesen des Menschen in der Philosophischen Anthropologie},
  series = {Allgemeine Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : AZP},
  volume    = {46},
  journal   = {Allgemeine Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : AZP},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Frommann-Holzboog},
  address   = {Stuttgart},
  issn      = {0340-7969},
  doi       = {10.12857/AZP.910460120.},
  pages     = {121 -- 126},
  year      = {2021},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Ginev2021,
  author    = {Ginev, Dimitri},
  title     = {Die Idee einer Sprachhermeneutik},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  volume    = {69},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {0012-1045},
  doi       = {10.1515/dzph-2021-0049},
  pages     = {576 -- 602},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Any conception in linguistics and linguistic philosophy that prioritizes the world-disclosing function over the world-representing function of language can be regarded as a kind of linguistic hermeneutics. The paper tries to specify this general thesis by picking up and analysing historical trends in the philosophy of language. It spells out the relationship between the situatedness of locutors in the medium of linguistic practices and the way in which they (through their speech acts) articulate this medium by actualizing possibilities for personal expressivity and interpersonal communication. It is argued that the starting point from the medium that always already transcends the particular speech acts offers an alternative to inferential semantics. From the perspective of linguistic hermeneutics, the world is disclosed and exposed to ongoing articulation in characteristic hermeneutic situations of language use. The concepts of linguistic medium and discursive articulation of the world are treated in terms of hermeneutic trans- subjectivity as enabling all forms of communicative intersubjectivity. If one ignores the fore-structuring role of the former, one would hypostatise the latter. With regard to this claim, the theory of formal pragmatics is critically discussed.},
  language  = {de}
}
@misc{Khurana2021,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {This other life that knows itself as life},
  series = {European journal of philosophy},
  volume    = {29},
  journal   = {European journal of philosophy},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address   = {Oxford},
  isbn      = {978-0-19-094761-3},
  issn      = {0966-8373},
  doi       = {10.1111/ejop.12745},
  pages     = {1136 -- 1144},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {In this paper, I discuss Karen Ng's reconstruction of Hegel's concept of life. On Ng's account, Hegel's conception of life has a remarkable double role to play: Life is both the proper object of judgment as well as a fundamental characterization of the activity of the judging subject. In a first step, I highlight the insight that Ng's account sheds on the internal connection of life and self-consciousness and the peculiar normativity of life. In a second step, I raise three concerns about Ng's strong focus on the logical notion of life which she characterizes as non-empirical and a priori. I argue that in order to uncover the full significance of the notion of life for Hegel we have to turn to his Philosophy of Nature and Spirit.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Haag2021,
  author    = {Haag, Johannes},
  title     = {Intuiting the Original Unity?},
  series = {Kantian legacies in German idealism},
  journal   = {Kantian legacies in German idealism},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {New York ; London},
  isbn      = {978-1-032-00160-9},
  pages     = {161 -- 185},
  year      = {2021},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Spiegel2021,
  author    = {Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf},
  title     = {The Scientific Weltanschauung},
  series = {Journal of Transcendental Philosophy},
  volume    = {2},
  journal   = {Journal of Transcendental Philosophy},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin ; Boston},
  issn      = {2626-8329},
  doi       = {10.1515/jtph-2021-0016},
  pages     = {259 -- 276},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Different forms of methodological and ontological naturalism constitute the current near-orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Many prominent figures have called naturalism a (scientific) image (Sellars, W. 1962. "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man." In Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, Reality, 1-40. Ridgeview Publishing), a Weltanschauung (Loewer, B. 2001. "From Physics to Physicalism." In Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by C. Gillett, and B. Loewer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Stoljar, D. 2010. Physicalism. Routledge), or even a "philosophical ideology" (Kim, J. 2003. "The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism." Journal of Philosophical Research 28: 83-98). This suggests that naturalism is indeed something over-and-above an ordinary philosophical thesis (e.g. in contrast to the justified true belief-theory of knowledge). However, these thinkers fail to tease out the host of implications this idea - naturalism being a worldview - presents. This paper draws on (somewhat underappreciated) remarks of Dilthey and Jaspers on the concept of worldviews (Weltanschauung, Weltbild) in order to demonstrate that naturalism as a worldview is a presuppositional background assumption which is left untouched by arguments against naturalism as a thesis. The concluding plea is (in order to make dialectical progress) to re-organize the existing debate on naturalism in a way that treats naturalism not as a first-order philosophical claim, but rather shifts its focus on naturalism's status as a worldview.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Khurana2021,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {The struggle for recognition and the authority of the second person},
  series = {European journal of philosophy},
  volume    = {29},
  journal   = {European journal of philosophy},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address   = {Oxford},
  issn      = {0966-8373},
  doi       = {10.1111/ejop.12675},
  pages     = {552 -- 561},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {In this introductory paper, I discuss the second-personal approach to ethics and the theory of recognition as two accounts of the fundamental sociality of the human form of life. The first section delineates the deep affinities between the two approaches. They both put a reciprocal social constellation front and center from which they derive the fundamental norms of moral and social life and a social conception of freedom. The second section discusses three points of contrast between the two approaches: The accounts differ in that the second-personal approach opts for a narrower conception of recognition focusing on mutual moral accountability, whereas recognition theory suggests a broader conception including relations of love, respect, and esteem. Secondly, the accounts differ as to how they conceive of the interrelation of the I-thou and the I-We relationship. Finally, they differ with regard to the way they think of struggles for recognition. Whereas the second-personal approach suggests that we can understand struggles on the basis of a transcendental infrastructure of second-personal address, the theory of recognition considers norms of recognition as themselves constituted by dialectical social struggles. The paper closes with a reflection on the ways in which both approaches can help us understand the social vulnerability of the human form of life.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Grosso2021,
  author    = {Grosso, Stefano},
  title     = {Anerkennung und Macht},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-50846},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-508461},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {152},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {In der vorliegenden Untersuchung habe ich das Ziel verfolgt, einen sachlich-eigenst{\"a}ndigen Beitrag f{\"u}r eine Debatte gegen Honneths kritische Gesellschaftstheorie zu leisten. In dieser Debatte wird Honneth dahingehend kritisiert, dass es ihm mit seiner kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie entgegen seiner eigenen systematischen Zielsetzung nicht gelingt, in modernen liberaldemokratischen Gesellschaften s{\"a}mtliche Ph{\"a}nomene von sozialer Herrschaft kritisch zu hinterfragen. Denn soziale Anerkennung, die Honneth als Schl{\"u}sselbegriff f{\"u}r diese kritische Hinterfragung behandelt, bei der soziale Herrschaft in Verbindung mit sozialer Missachtung (als mangelnde soziale Anerkennung) steht, kann laut der Kritik faktisch selbst ein Medium f{\"u}r die Stiftung von sozialer Unterwerfung sein. Dies geschieht in Prozessen von Identit{\"a}tsentwicklung, in denen soziale Anerkennung f{\"u}r Individuen als Anerkannte bestimmte Identit{\"a}tsm{\"o}glichkeiten einr{\"a}umt und auf diese Weise gleichzeitig andere Identit{\"a}tsm{\"o}glichkeiten ausschließt, womit sie auf diese Identit{\"a}t einschr{\"a}nkend und insofern herrschend wirkt. Es handelt sich um eine Form von sozialer Herrschaft, die durch soziale Anerkennung gestiftet wird. Honneth zieht dem Vorwurf zufolge nicht in Erw{\"a}gung, dass soziale Anerkennung bei Individuen als Anerkannte einen solchen negativen Effekt erzielen kann. Hieraus ergeben sich die Fragen, ob soziale Anerkennung in Prozessen von Identit{\"a}tsentwicklung jeweils mit sozialer Herrschaft einhergeht und wie dieser Typus von sozialer Herrschaft kritisiert werden kann. Diese Fragen hat Honneth zuletzt in einem pers{\"o}nlichen Gespr{\"a}ch mit Allen und Cooke (als zwei Teilnehmerinnen der Debatte gegen Honneth) beantwortet. An dieser Stelle vertritt er mit beiden Gespr{\"a}chsteilnehmerinnen die Auffassung, dass die Operation der Einschr{\"a}nkung von Identit{\"a}tsm{\"o}glichkeiten an sich keine Operation darstellt, welche, wie sonst in der Debatte gegen seine kritische Gesellschaftstheorie behauptet wird, auf soziale Herrschaft zur{\"u}ckf{\"u}hrt. Diese Auffassung beruht auf der Idee, wonach soziale Anerkennung sich in jenem praktischen Kontext nur unter der Bedingung als herrschaftsstiftend erweist, dass sie immanente Prinzipien verletzt, die substanziell kritische Maßst{\"a}be definieren. Mein Beitrag zu dieser Debatte gegen Honneth besteht auf der einen Seite in der Erkl{\"a}rung, dass sowohl jene Auffassung als auch jene Idee argumentativ mangelhaft sind, und auf der anderen Seite in der Ausf{\"u}hrung des Vorhabens, diesen argumentativen Mangel selbst zu beheben. Gegen jene Auffassung behaupte ich, dass die drei Autoren in ihrem Gespr{\"a}ch nicht erl{\"a}utern, inwiefern soziale Anerkennung nicht herrschend wirkt, wenn sie die Identit{\"a}tsm{\"o}glichkeiten von Individuen als Anerkannte einschr{\"a}nkt, denn mit dieser Einschr{\"a}nkung wird vielmehr faktisch {\"u}ber diese Individuen geherrscht - die Debatte gegen Honneth, so zur Unterst{\"u}tzung dieser Ansicht, baut haupts{\"a}chlich auf ebendiesem Faktum auf. Gegen jene Idee habe ich f{\"u}nf problematische Fragen gestellt und beantwortet, die Bezug eigentlich nicht allein auf diese Idee selbst, sondern {\"u}berdies auf weitere, naheliegende Ideen nehmen, welche die drei Autoren angesprochen haben.},
  language  = {de}
}
@misc{Petsche2021,
  author    = {Petsche, Hans-Joachim},
  title     = {Transzendentaler Materialismus, Emergenz und Quantengravitation},
  series = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe},
  journal   = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe},
  number    = {176},
  issn      = {1866-8380},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-53448},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-534481},
  pages     = {93 -- 98},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Bezug nehmend auf Rainer E. Zimmermanns Buch "Metaphysik als Grundlegung von Naturdialektik. Zum Sagbaren und Unsagbaren im spekulativen Denken" wird der von Zimmermann entwickelte Ansatz eines transzendentalen Materialismus in der Traditionslinie Schellingscher Dialektik einerseits und dem Spin-Schaum-Ansatz der Quantengravitationstheorie andererseits er{\"o}rtert. Die R{\"u}ckf{\"u}hrung von Wirklichkeitsstrukturen auf mathematische Strukturen - auf das Prozessieren von Zahlen - wird problematisiert.},
  language  = {de}
}
@misc{Spiegel2021,
  author    = {Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf},
  title     = {The Scientific Weltanschauung},
  series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe},
  journal   = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe},
  number    = {2},
  issn      = {1866-8380},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-54291},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-542910},
  pages     = {259 -- 276},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Different forms of methodological and ontological naturalism constitute the current near-orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Many prominent figures have called naturalism a (scientific) image (Sellars, W. 1962. "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man." In Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, Reality, 1-40. Ridgeview Publishing), a Weltanschauung (Loewer, B. 2001. "From Physics to Physicalism." In Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by C. Gillett, and B. Loewer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Stoljar, D. 2010. Physicalism. Routledge), or even a "philosophical ideology" (Kim, J. 2003. "The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism." Journal of Philosophical Research 28: 83-98). This suggests that naturalism is indeed something over-and-above an ordinary philosophical thesis (e.g. in contrast to the justified true belief-theory of knowledge). However, these thinkers fail to tease out the host of implications this idea - naturalism being a worldview - presents. This paper draws on (somewhat underappreciated) remarks of Dilthey and Jaspers on the concept of worldviews (Weltanschauung, Weltbild) in order to demonstrate that naturalism as a worldview is a presuppositional background assumption which is left untouched by arguments against naturalism as a thesis. The concluding plea is (in order to make dialectical progress) to re-organize the existing debate on naturalism in a way that treats naturalism not as a first-order philosophical claim, but rather shifts its focus on naturalism's status as a worldview.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{FuchsKoenigGerstenberg2021,
  author    = {Fuchs, Susanne and Koenig, Laura L. and Gerstenberg, Annette},
  title     = {A longitudinal study of speech acoustics in older French females},
  series = {Languages : open access journal},
  volume    = {6},
  journal   = {Languages : open access journal},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {MDPI},
  address   = {Basel},
  issn      = {2226-471X},
  doi       = {10.3390/languages6040211},
  pages     = {24},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Aging in speech production is a multidimensional process. Biological, cognitive, social, and communicative factors can change over time, stay relatively stable, or may even compensate for each other. In this longitudinal work, we focus on stability and change at the laryngeal and supralaryngeal levels in the discourse particle euh produced by 10 older French-speaking females at two times, 10 years apart. Recognizing the multiple discourse roles of euh, we divided out occurrences according to utterance position. We quantified the frequency of euh, and evaluated acoustic changes in formants, fundamental frequency, and voice quality across time and utterance position. Results showed that euh frequency was stable with age. The only acoustic measure that revealed an age effect was harmonics-to-noise ratio, showing less noise at older ages. Other measures mostly varied with utterance position, sometimes in interaction with age. Some voice quality changes could reflect laryngeal adjustments that provide for airflow conservation utterance-finally. The data suggest that aging effects may be evident in some prosodic positions (e.g., utterance-final position), but not others (utterance-initial position). Thus, it is essential to consider the interactions among these factors in future work and not assume that vocal aging is evident throughout the signal.},
  language  = {en}
}
@book{OPUS4-62242,
  title     = {Kantian legacies in German idealism},
  series = {Routledge studies in nineteenth-century philosophy},
  journal   = {Routledge studies in nineteenth-century philosophy},
  editor    = {Gentry, Gerad},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {New York ; London},
  isbn      = {978-1-032-00160-9},
  issn      = {978-0-429-42982-8},
  doi       = {10.4324/9780429429828},
  pages     = {298},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Scholarship on German Idealism typically couches the systems of Idealism in terms of a rejection of or departure from Kant's critical philosophy. The few accounts that do look to the positive influence of Kant on the Idealists typically focus on the perceived need among the Idealists to revise Kant's system due to various shortcomings arising from his dualism. This volume seeks to reverse this norm. It does this by bringing together an original set of critical reflections on the ways in which the German Idealists maintain specific and fundamental Kantian qualities in their own systems. At the same time, the aim of this volume is not a reduction of German Idealism to Kant's thought. Instead, this volume highlights a set of core ways in which the German Idealists retain specific, fundamentally Kantian principles and qualities. To that extent, this volume paves the way for new interpretations by laying the ground for identifying those significant components of German Idealism that can defensibly be called "Kantian.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Krueger2021,
  author    = {Kr{\"u}ger, Hans-Peter},
  title     = {Der geistig-kulturelle Umgang mit der Covid-19-Pandemie und ihrer Wirtschaftskrise als Testfall},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  volume    = {69},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {0012-1045},
  doi       = {10.1515/dzph-2021-0004},
  pages     = {67 -- 97},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Why has the global West (North America, Europe) handled the covid-19 pandemic and the corresponding economic crisis so much worse than the global East (East Asia)? The crises demonstrate the degree to which the West is shaped by its forms of competition and the East by its forms of cooperation. In the West, we have become habitualised to American neoliberalism over the last two generations. In the East, varieties of neo-Confucianism and neo-Buddhism have been transformed into national cultures. The way humans understand their position in the world intellectually and react to crises according to corresponding habit makes an effective difference. The present comparison between global East and West makes use of Hannah Arendt's conception of politics and the shared world as well as of Helmuth Plessner's conception of mediated immediacy in forms of modern biopower. The pandemic is a catalyst within the decline of the West and the rise of the East.},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Brenner2021,
  author    = {Brenner, Leon S.},
  title     = {The autistic mirror in the real},
  series = {Theory \& psychology},
  volume    = {31},
  journal   = {Theory \& psychology},
  number    = {6},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {0959-3543},
  doi       = {10.1177/09593543211034569},
  pages     = {950 -- 972},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {The mirror stage is one of Jacques Lacan's most well-received metapsychological models in the English-speaking world. In its many renditions Lacan elucidates the different forms of identification that lead to the construction of the Freudian ego. This article utilizes Lacan's mirror stage to provide a novel perspective on autistic embodiment. It develops an integrative model that accounts for the progression of four distinct forms of autistic identification in the mirror stage; these forms provide the basis for the development of four different clinical trajectories in the treatment of autism. This model is posed as an alternative to the clinical and diagnostic framework associated with the autistic spectrum disorder.},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{Gentry2021,
  author    = {Gentry, Gerad},
  title     = {Hegel's logic of purposiveness},
  series = {Kantian legacies in German idealism},
  booktitle = {Kantian legacies in German idealism},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {New York ; London},
  isbn      = {978-1-032-00160-9},
  doi       = {10.4324/9780429429828},
  pages     = {36 -- 70},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {I argue that Hegel's Logic traces an emergent-purposive, logical method that entails two key identities in reason. These identities are (1) between a logic of freedom and necessity, and (2) between the possibilities of a priori and a posteriori reasoning in a purposive method. The purposive method of the Logic is the basis for these identities and, in Hegel's view, facilitates the transition from Kant's transcendental idealism to absolute idealism. I suggest that this method is Hegel's attempt to rework a critique of philosophy according to Kant's insight about the principle grounding the formal purposiveness of the faculties, what Hegel calls, "one of Kant's greatest services to philosophy."},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{Gentry2021,
  author    = {Gentry, Gerad},
  title     = {Introduction},
  series = {Kantian legacies in German Idealism},
  booktitle = {Kantian legacies in German Idealism},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {New York},
  isbn      = {978-0-42942-982-8},
  doi       = {10.4324/9780429429828},
  pages     = {1 -- 12},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Kant wrote in the Critique of Pure Reason, "For the law of reason to seek unity is necessary, since without it we would have no reason, and without that, no coherent use of the understanding, and, lacking that, no sufficient mark of empirical truth." This unity of reason, taken as a holistic condition, was central to the convictions of the idealists. To them, Kant layed bare the right path forward, but also fundamental failings in his execution of a critique of reason which needed to be overcome in order for reason to secure its own, internal end. In this chapter, I discuss key themes in the positive inheritance of Kant's thought in classical German philosophy and offer an overview of the arguments and significances of each contribution to this volume. The aim is not to minimize important differences between Kant and post-Kantian Idealists, but rather to emphasize core retentions of Kant's thought.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Hoeppner2021,
  author    = {Hoeppner, Till},
  title     = {Urteil und Anschauung},
  series = {Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie},
  journal   = {Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie},
  number    = {143},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin ; Boston},
  isbn      = {978-3-11-055627-8},
  issn      = {0344-8142},
  doi       = {10.1515/9783110557374},
  pages     = {XIII, 410},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Wie hier durch textnahe und argumentative Rekonstruktion erstmals gezeigt wird, entwickelt Kant in der Metaphysischen Deduktion in drei Schritten: (i) einen Begriff des Urteils, auf dem die Tafel logischer Funktionen beruht; (ii) einen Begriff der Synthesis der Anschauung, der die Inhalte der Kategorien erkl{\"a}rt; und (iii) einen Begriff des Verstandes, demzufolge die Kategorien a priori zu demselben Verm{\"o}gen geh{\"o}ren, durch das wir auch urteilen. Die vorliegende Untersuchung ist eine argumentative Rekonstruktion von Kants Text. Der rekonstruierte Text ist der „Leitfaden der Entdeckung aller reinen Verstandesbegriffe" auf A 64 bis 83 / B 89 bis 113 der Kritik der reinen Vernunft in ihren beiden Auflagen von 1781 (A) und 1787 (B). Zudem werden andere, f{\"u}r ein Verst{\"a}ndnis der {\"U}berlegungen in diesem Kapitel erforderliche oder zumindest erhellende Textstellen aus der Kritik herangezogen; aus Schriften, die Kant nach der Kritik geschrieben hat; sowie schließlich aus Kants Nachlass-Notizen und aus Nachschriften zu seinen Vorlesungen jeweils seit der Entstehungszeit der Kritik. Von entscheidender Bedeutung sind dabei vor allem vier weitere Passagen der Kritik selbst: i) die r{\"u}ckblickende Beschreibung der Aufgabe der Metaphysischen Deduktion auf B 159, ii) die r{\"u}ckblickende Beschreibung des Vorgehens im „Leitfaden" auf A 299/B 355 f., iii) der Abschnitt „Von den Gr{\"u}nden a priori zur M{\"o}glichkeit der Erfahrung" auf A 95 bis 110 der Transzendentalen Deduktion der Kategorien in der ersten Auflage und schließlich iv) die \S\S 15 bis 21 auf B 128 bis 148 der Transzendentalen Deduktion der Kategorien in der zweiten Auflage der Kritik. Vor dem Hintergrund einer umfassenden und detaillierten Analyse des „Leitfadens", bei Hinzuziehung verwandter Stellen aus dem umgrenzten Textbestand und nicht zuletzt bei Ber{\"u}cksichtigung des Verh{\"a}ltnisses des „Leitfadens" zu den genannten vier Passagen der Kritik legt sich eine Interpretation der Metaphysischen Deduktion nahe, die sich nur schwer bestreiten l{\"a}sst, sobald diese Texte einmal gemeinsam betrachtet und auf eine bestimmte Weise zueinander ins Verh{\"a}ltnis gesetzt werden. Dabei kann eine durchgehend wohlwollende, argumentative Rekonstruktion dazu beitragen, auch die philosophische {\"U}berzeugungskraft der Position Kants deutlich zu machen.},
  subject      = {Kant, Immanuel [1724-1804]},
  language  = {de}
}
@phdthesis{Seiberth2021,
  author    = {Seiberth, Luz Christopher},
  title     = {Intentionality in Sellars},
  series = {Routledge studies in American philosophy},
  journal   = {Routledge studies in American philosophy},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {New York, NY},
  isbn      = {978-1-032-11493-4},
  doi       = {10.4324/9781003221364},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {xxii, 230},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {This book argues that Sellars' theory of intentionality can be understood as an advancement of a transcendental philosophical approach. It shows how Sellars develops his theory of intentionality through his engagement with the theoretical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The book delivers a provocative reinterpretation of one of the most problematic and controversial concepts of Sellars' philosophy: the picturing-relation. Sellars' theory of intentionality addresses the question of how to reconcile two aspects that seem opposed: the non-relational theory of intellectual and linguistic content and a causal-transcendental theory of representation inspired by the philosophy of the early Wittgenstein. The author explains how both parts cohere in a transcendental account of finite knowledge. He claims that this can only be achieved by reading Sellars as committed to a transcendental methodology inspired by Kant. In a final step, he brings his interpretation to bear on the contemporary metaphilosophical debate on pragmatism and expressivism. Intentionality in Sellars will be of interest to scholars of Sellars and Kant, as well as researchers working in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Petsche2020,
  author    = {Petsche, Hans-Joachim},
  title     = {Einf{\"u}hrung},
  series = {Zyklizit{\"a}t \& Rhythmik: eine multidisziplin{\"a}re Vorlesungsreihe},
  journal   = {Zyklizit{\"a}t \& Rhythmik: eine multidisziplin{\"a}re Vorlesungsreihe},
  publisher = {trafo},
  address   = {Berlin},
  isbn      = {978-3-86464-169-5},
  pages     = {9 -- 11},
  year      = {2020},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{BuettnervonStuelpnagel2020,
  author    = {B{\"u}ttner-von St{\"u}lpnagel, Stefan},
  title     = {Galileis "Platonismus" als Reaktion auf das prinzipielle Manko der aristotelischen Bewegungslehre},
  series = {Philosophie \& Weltbild : Philosophie und Wissenschaft im Diskurs - ein interdisziplin{\"a}res Projekt},
  journal   = {Philosophie \& Weltbild : Philosophie und Wissenschaft im Diskurs - ein interdisziplin{\"a}res Projekt},
  publisher = {trafo},
  address   = {Berlin},
  isbn      = {978-3-86464-208-1},
  pages     = {51 -- 67},
  year      = {2020},
  language  = {de}
}