@article{EppnerGanghof2017,
  author    = {Eppner, Sebastian and Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Institutional veto players and cabinet formation},
  series = {European journal of political research : official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research},
  volume    = {56},
  journal   = {European journal of political research : official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Wiley},
  address   = {Hoboken},
  issn      = {0304-4130},
  doi       = {10.1111/1475-6765.12172},
  pages     = {169 -- 186},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {Are potential cabinets more likely to form when they control institutional veto players such as symmetric second chambers or minority vetoes? Existing evidence for a causal effect of veto control has been weak. This article presents evidence for this effect on the basis of conditional and mixed logit analyses of government formations in 21 parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies between 1955 and 2012. It also shows that the size of the effect varies systematically across political-institutional contexts. The estimated causal effect was greater in countries that eventually abolished the relevant veto institutions. It is suggested that the incidence of constitutional reform is a proxy for context-specific factors that increased the incentives for veto control and simultaneously provided a stimulus for the weakening of institutional veto power.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{GanghofEppnerPoerschke2018,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian and P{\"o}rschke, Alexander},
  title     = {Semi-parliamentary government in perspective},
  series = {Australian Journal of Political Science},
  volume    = {53},
  journal   = {Australian Journal of Political Science},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Abingdon},
  issn      = {1036-1146},
  doi       = {10.1080/10361146.2018.1451488},
  pages     = {264 -- 269},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {The article responds to four commentaries on the concept of semi-parliamentary government and its application to Australian bicameralism. It highlights four main points: (1) Our preferred typology is not more 'normative' than existing approaches, but applies the criterion of 'direct election' equally to executive and legislature; (2) While the evolution of semi-parliamentary government had contingent elements, it plausibly also reflects the 'equilibrium' nature of certain institutional configurations; (3) The idea that a pure parliamentary system with pure proportional representation has absolute normative priority over 'instrumentalist' concerns about cabinet stability, identifiability and responsibility is questionable; and (4) The reforms we discuss may be unlikely to occur in Australia, but deserve consideration by scholars and institutional reformers in other democratic systems.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{GanghofEppnerPoerschke2018,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian and P{\"o}rschke, Alexander},
  title     = {Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism},
  series = {Australian Journal of Political Science},
  volume    = {53},
  journal   = {Australian Journal of Political Science},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Abingdon},
  issn      = {1036-1146},
  doi       = {10.1080/10361146.2018.1451487},
  pages     = {211 -- 233},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {The article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system - a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government - which we call 'semi-parliamentary government'. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing models or visions of democracy. We specify theoretically how the semi-parliamentary separation of powers contributes to the balancing of democratic visions and propose a conceptual framework for comparing democratic visions. We use this framework to locate the Australian Commonwealth, all Australian states and 22 advanced democratic nation-states on a two-dimensional empirical map of democratic patterns for the period from 1995 to 2015.},
  language  = {en}
}