@article{EppnerGanghof2017,
  author    = {Eppner, Sebastian and Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Institutional veto players and cabinet formation},
  series = {European journal of political research : official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research},
  volume    = {56},
  journal   = {European journal of political research : official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Wiley},
  address   = {Hoboken},
  issn      = {0304-4130},
  doi       = {10.1111/1475-6765.12172},
  pages     = {169 -- 186},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {Are potential cabinets more likely to form when they control institutional veto players such as symmetric second chambers or minority vetoes? Existing evidence for a causal effect of veto control has been weak. This article presents evidence for this effect on the basis of conditional and mixed logit analyses of government formations in 21 parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies between 1955 and 2012. It also shows that the size of the effect varies systematically across political-institutional contexts. The estimated causal effect was greater in countries that eventually abolished the relevant veto institutions. It is suggested that the incidence of constitutional reform is a proxy for context-specific factors that increased the incentives for veto control and simultaneously provided a stimulus for the weakening of institutional veto power.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Ganghof2013,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Equality-based comparison how to justify democratic institutions in the Real World},
  series = {Politics},
  volume    = {33},
  journal   = {Politics},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address   = {Hoboken},
  issn      = {0263-3957},
  doi       = {10.1111/1467-9256.12002},
  pages     = {101 -- 111},
  year      = {2013},
  abstract  = {Political scientists regularly justify particular democratic institutions. This article explores two desiderata for such justifications. The first is a formal equality baseline which puts the burden of justification on those who favour more unequal institutions. This baseline is seen as an implication of the rule of law. The second desideratum, the comparison requirement, builds on the first: adequate justifications of particular institutions must compare them to the best alternative, and this comparison must consider the costs for political equality. The two desiderata are applied to political science debates about the proportionality of the electoral system and bicameral systems of legislative decision-making.},
  language  = {en}
}