@article{HaagHoeppner2019, author = {Haag, Johannes and Hoeppner, Till}, title = {Denken und Welt - Wege kritischer Metaphysik}, series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, volume = {67}, journal = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, number = {1}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, address = {Berlin}, issn = {0012-1045}, doi = {10.1515/dzph-2019-0006}, pages = {76 -- 97}, year = {2019}, abstract = {Wird Metaphysik realistisch verstanden, so ist sie mit dem Anspruch verbunden, in objektiver Weise von der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung der Welt (oder Realit{\"a}t, Wirklichkeit etc.) zu handeln. Damit beansprucht sie die M{\"o}glichkeit von Objektivit{\"a}t, d. h. die M{\"o}glichkeit der Repr{\"a}sentation der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung einer Welt, die von uns und unserer Repr{\"a}sentation verschieden ist. Realistisch verstandene Metaphysik verf{\"a}hrt dogmatisch, wenn sie ihre eigene M{\"o}glichkeit einfach voraussetzt. Eine dogmatische Metaphysik ist unkritisch, weil sie ohne eine Untersuchung der Frage betrieben wird, wie eine objektive und ad{\"a}quate Repr{\"a}sentation der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung der Welt {\"u}berhaupt m{\"o}glich ist. Im Unterschied dazu nennen wir eine realistische Metaphysik in einem vorl{\"a}ufigen Sinne kritisch, sofern sie ihren Ausgang von einer Untersuchung dieser M{\"o}glichkeit nimmt und erst auf der Grundlage positiver Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchung einen - vor diesem Hintergrund nunmehr gerechtfertigten - Objektivit{\"a}tsanspruch erhebt.}, language = {de} } @article{Mueller2019, author = {M{\"u}ller, Christian Th.}, title = {Die Kalaschnikow, eine Kriegsikone}, series = {Europa : die Gegenwart unserer Geschichte ; Band III, Globale Verflechtung}, journal = {Europa : die Gegenwart unserer Geschichte ; Band III, Globale Verflechtung}, editor = {Vogel, Jakob}, publisher = {wbg Theiss}, address = {Darmstadt}, isbn = {978-3-8062-4021-4}, pages = {261 -- 264}, year = {2019}, language = {de} } @phdthesis{John2019, author = {John, Emanuel}, title = {Die Negativit{\"a}t des Sittlichen}, series = {Praktische Philosophie ; 95}, journal = {Praktische Philosophie ; 95}, publisher = {Alber}, address = {Freiburg}, isbn = {978-3-495-49059-4}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {339}, year = {2019}, abstract = {Hat f{\"u}r Personen eine ethische Auseinandersetzung mit ihrem Leiden an Problemen und Konflikten gegen{\"u}ber strategischen und technischen L{\"o}sungen eine Bedeutung? Diese Abhandlung zeigt, dass Ans{\"a}tze philosophischer Ethik, die von formalen Prinzipien, menschlichen Lebensformen oder sozialen Praktiken ausgehen, diese Frage unzureichend beantworten. Zu deren Beantwortung werden stattdessen ethische Subjektivit{\"a}t in der Klage {\"u}ber Leid, ethische {\"U}berlegungen als Negation von Leid und ethischer Dialog als {\"U}berwindung von Leid er{\"o}rtert.}, language = {de} } @article{BaehrensVoigt2019, author = {Baehrens, Konstantin and Voigt, Frank}, title = {Die Problemgeschichte wird tats{\"a}chlich zur Geschichte der Probleme}, series = {Material und Begriff ; Arbeitsverfahren und theoretische Beziehungen Walter Benjamins}, journal = {Material und Begriff ; Arbeitsverfahren und theoretische Beziehungen Walter Benjamins}, publisher = {Argument}, address = {Hamburg}, isbn = {978-3-86754-322-4}, pages = {193 -- 242}, year = {2019}, language = {de} } @article{Rosso2019, author = {Rosso, Enrico}, title = {Ein „Zusammengehen ohne Zusammenkommen". Der Entstehungsprozess des intellektuellen Netzwerkes um die Zeitschrift Die Kreatur}, series = {Naharaim}, volume = {13}, journal = {Naharaim}, number = {1-2}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, address = {Berlin}, issn = {1862-9148}, doi = {10.1515/naha-2019-0006}, pages = {73 -- 97}, year = {2019}, abstract = {Eine Gruppe, gar eine innerlich verbundene Gemeinschaft, k{\"o}nnen Intellektuelle im Normalfall nur bilden, soweit sie von gleichem Denken und Wollen bewegt werden […]. Wo dagegen die von den Intellektuellen vertretenen Ansichten weit divergieren, da kann es nur unter sehr kritischen Umst{\"a}nden geschehen, daß die verschieden gearteten (sozialen, politischen, rechtlichen, kulturellen, religi{\"o}sen) Standpunkte und Anliegen - auf Zeit - sich zusammenfinden […]. Das polemische Element, das kritischen Intellektuellen ja wesensm{\"a}ßig zu eigen ist, bringt am ehesten eine gemeinsame Front zwischen ihnen zustande.}, language = {de} } @phdthesis{Fuhr2019, author = {Fuhr, Antonie}, title = {Eine Hypothese {\"u}ber die Grundlagen von Moral und einige Implikationen}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-44309}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-443091}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {172}, year = {2019}, abstract = {In der Dissertationsarbeit mit dem Titel „Eine Hypothese {\"u}ber die Grundlagen von Moral und einige Implikationen" unternimmt die Autorin den Versuch, die anthropologischen Pr{\"a}missen moralischen Handelns herauszuarbeiten. Es wird eine Hypothese aufgestellt und erl{\"a}utert, die behauptet, dass moralisches Handeln nur dann verst{\"a}ndlich wird, wenn der Handelnde erstens die F{\"a}higkeit der Phantasie aufweist, zweitens auf Erfahrungen (mittels seines Ged{\"a}chtnisses) zugreifen kann und durch Konversation mit anderen Personen interagierte und interagiert, denn nur auf der Basis dieser drei Grundlagen von Moral k{\"o}nnen sich diejenigen F{\"a}higkeiten ent¬wickeln, die als Voraussetzungen moralischen Handeln gesehen werden m{\"u}ssen: Selbstbewusstsein, Freiheit, die Entwicklung eines Wir-Gef{\"u}hls, die Genese eines moralischen Ideals und die F{\"a}higkeit, sich im Entscheiden und Handeln nach diesem Ideal richten zu k{\"o}nnen. Außerdem werden in dieser Dissertation einige Implikationen dieser Hypothese auf individueller und zwischenmenschlicher Ebene diskutiert.}, language = {de} } @misc{HaagHoeppner2019, author = {Haag, Johannes and Hoeppner, Till}, title = {Errata zu: Denken und Welt - Wege kritischer Metaphysik. dzph. Band 67, 2019, Heft 1, S. 76-97}, series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, volume = {67}, journal = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, number = {2}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, address = {Berlin}, issn = {0012-1045}, doi = {10.1515/dzph-2019-0888}, pages = {326 -- 327}, year = {2019}, abstract = {We begin by considering two common ways of conceiving critical metaphysics. According to the first (and polemical) conception, critical metaphysics analyzes nothing more than the form of thought and thereby misses the proper point of metaphysics, namely to investigate the form of reality. According to the second (and affirmative) conception, critical metaphysics starts from the supposed insight that the form of reality can't be other than the form of thought and is thus not required to analyze anything but that form. We argue that the first conception is too weak while the second is too strong. Then we sketch an alternative conception of critical metaphysics, a conception we find expressed both in Kant's B-Deduction and in the way Barry Stroud has recently investigated the possibility of metaphysics. According to such a conception, a properly critical metaphysics needs to proceed in two steps: first, it needs to analyze the most general and necessary form of any thought that is about an objective reality at all; second, it needs to investigate how that form of thought relates to the reality it purports to represent. But unlike Kant, Stroud remains sceptical regarding the possibility of a satisfying transition from thought to reality in metaphysics. We argue that this dissatisfaction can be traced back to a notion of objectivity and reality in terms of complete mind-independence. Then we sketch an alternative notion of objectivity and reality in terms of distinctness from subjects and acts of thinking, and argue that it is that notion that allows Kant, with his Transcendental Idealism, to make the transition required for any satisfying metaphysics, namely that from the form of thought to reality.}, language = {de} } @article{vonKalckreuth2019, author = {von Kalckreuth, Moritz Alexander}, title = {Expansivit{\"a}t, Objektivit{\"a}t und Aktualit{\"a}t des Betroffenseins}, series = {Horizon : studies in phenomenology : Studien zur Ph{\"a}nomenologie : fenomenologičeskie issledovanija : {\´e}tudes ph{\´e}nom{\´e}nologiques}, volume = {8}, journal = {Horizon : studies in phenomenology : Studien zur Ph{\"a}nomenologie : fenomenologičeskie issledovanija : {\´e}tudes ph{\´e}nom{\´e}nologiques}, number = {1}, publisher = {St. Petersburg University Press}, address = {St. Petersburg}, issn = {2226-5260}, doi = {10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-1-211-229}, pages = {211 -- 229}, year = {2019}, abstract = {The aim of this paper is to discuss Nicolai Hartmann's conception of personhood as developed in his philosophy of spiritual being. Many contemporary accounts of personhood are systematically focused on rational phenomena as self-consciousness or practical reasoning, which are understood as 'conditions of personhood'. Apart from having some technical problems, those accounts limit our self-under-standing as persons on distinct rational properties and often fail to consider the sociocultural aspects of the personal situation. Nicolai Hartmann — although respecting the role of reason — understands personhood particularly as participation in a shared spiritual sphere called Objektiver Geist (objective spirit), which includes various intersubjective phenomena as languages, religion, moral, arts, and the sciences. Being part of this sphere seems to be more fundamental than having distinct rational properties, which requests a spiritual frame to be exerted. Further it is shown that Hartmann's ontology of person also includes a notion of being affected by the existential weight of situations and other person's actions — an idea often maintained by phenomenological positions. By regarding rational, intersubjective and affective aspects, Hartmann's philosophy of person succeeds in offering a broad articulation of our self-understanding and may also be seen as providing a background to understand certain phenomena that are part of the personal situation.}, language = {de} } @misc{Schumann2019, type = {Master Thesis}, author = {Schumann, Michael}, title = {Extraterrestrische Ex-zentriker}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-43420}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-434203}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {93}, year = {2019}, abstract = {Seit ihrem Beginn ist die Raumfahrt Untersuchungsgegenstand verschiedenster Disziplinen. Auch die Philosophie hat seither eine kritische Perspektive auf diese Aktivit{\"a}t eingenommen. Und doch fehlt es bislang eines philosophisch-systematischen Zugangs, mit einem genuin ‚anthropologischen' Gesichtspunkt. Diese L{\"u}cke wird immer offensichtlicher, seitdem sich, nach Entdeckung der ersten Exoplaneten, neue ‚Astro-wissenschaften' (z.B. Astrobiologe, Astrokognition, Astrosoziologie) gebildet haben, die explizit Menschen als Raumfahrer voraussetzen bzw. menschliche Eigenschaften auf ihre ‚Abl{\"o}sbarkeit' hin diskutieren. Mit vorliegender Masterarbeit soll der Versuch gemacht werden, die notwendigen Pr{\"a}suppositionen, f{\"u}r das Verst{\"a}ndnis von Menschen als ‚raumfahrende Lebewesen', aufzudecken, ohne naturalistische oder kulturalistische Verk{\"u}rzungen zu betreiben. Zu diesem Zweck wird der systematische Rahmen von Helmuth Plessners Philosophischer Anthropologie gew{\"a}hlt, da dieser eine umfassende ‚spezies-neutrale' (d.h. es erlaubt {\"u}ber Menschen, Tiere und Extraterrestriker gleichermaßen nachzudenken, ohne ‚anthropozentrische' oder ‚speziesistische' Vorurteile zu machen) Untersuchung des infrage stehenden Sachverhaltes bietet. Um diesen Rahmen zu exemplifizieren, und w{\"a}hrenddessen den philosophisch-systematischen Ansatz zur Raumfahrt zu elaborieren, der raumfahrende Extraterrestriker ohne Anthropomorphisierung konzeptualisieren, wie auch den Umgang mit Extraterrestrikern in ethischer und politischer Hinsicht ber{\"u}cksichtigen kann, werden die Themenkreise der Astrobiologie, Astroethik und Astropolitik in einzelnen Kapiteln besprochen. Abschließend ist, entgegen aller Erwartung, der gew{\"a}hlte Ansatz als ‚kritisch-posthumanistische' Option zu verteidigen.}, language = {de} } @phdthesis{Damour2019, author = {Damour, Jean-Claude}, title = {Hegel und Wittgenstein {\"u}ber den Sinn der Sprache}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-43103}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-431036}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {132}, year = {2019}, abstract = {The key objectives of this dissertation are to justify the use of dialectic methodology in the realm of the philosophy of language and to conduct a systematic processing of a limited part of this field. In order to explain and determine this approach, which is found rarely, if ever, in contemporary research, I will begin by referring to two philosophical authors: Hegel and Wittgenstein. Although Hegel and Wittgenstein are, prima facie, two authors who have very little in common, the primary supposition of this dissertation regarding the history of ideas is that Hegel's concept of "Spirit" and Wittgenstein's concept of "Form of life" are nevertheless both approaches and the results of philosophical effort that imply the necessity of solving a sceptical challenge. Wittgenstein actually developed an argument in his Philosophical Investigations that has been described as the "rule-following paradox" and has been considered in secondary literature (especially Kripke) as the main tenet of a sceptical argument. Consequently, Wittgenstein's theory of language as developed in Philosophical Investigations has been interpreted by various authors either as a solution to this scepticism or as a sceptical, or "aporetic", text in itself (Brandom). The first section of my dissertation aims to demonstrate that dealing with this paradox does not constitute a full sceptical argument and can be considered as the first moment of a higher form of sceptical challenge, an antinomy. A full sceptical challenge implies both the possibility that the theory corresponding to the unique solution of the paradox, the negation of any explicit normativity ("dispositionalism"), and the negation of the principle of this solution, can be proved. I'll therefore attempt to establish an antinomy of the concept of normativity with respect to the rule of language, similar to Kant's exposure of his cosmological antinomy (thesis cum antithesis). The second aim of my dissertation is to show: that Kant's approach to solving his antinomy is ineffective concerning the antinomy of normativity; that this antinomy implies a confrontation with radical scepticism in a sense that we are committed not to simply challenging or reconsidering some theories, but to engaging in a deep revision of our methodology (This in turn entails a deep revision of the current norms of rationality); that the Hegelian dialectic emerges as the solution to such a radical sceptical challenge, as the true solution to antinomy. A further goal of this dissertation is to use this methodological result to gain a new knowledge of language, consisting of two contradictory moments of cognition that are constructively combined: normativity by means of disposition, and normativity by means of an explicit rule-following. The tangible benefit of such a methodological approach is the possibility of building a systematic philosophy of language that enables the establishment of a dialectical deduction of the moments of the concept of language as moments of the concept of the spirit, in other words, to establish the sense of language. Nonetheless, I must limit myself to exposure to the doctrine of imagination, which encompasses general semiotics and the system of grammar.}, language = {de} } @article{Krueger2019, author = {Kr{\"u}ger, Hans-Peter}, title = {How is the Human Life-Form of Mind Really Possible in Nature?}, series = {Human studies}, volume = {42}, journal = {Human studies}, number = {1}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, issn = {0163-8548}, doi = {10.1007/s10746-017-9429-5}, pages = {47 -- 64}, year = {2019}, abstract = {J. Dewey and H. Plessner both and independently of one another treated the central question of what new task philosophy must set itself if the assumption is correct that the life-form of mind, i.e., the mental life-form of humans, arose in nature and must also sustain itself in the future within nature. If nature has to reconceived so as to make the irreducible qualities of life and mind truly possible, then it can no longer be restricted to the role of physical material. Conversely humans cannot no longer take on the role of God outside and independent of nature. Instead these philosophers distinguish between three plateaus (Dewey) or stages (Plessner), between physical (inorganic) nature, psycho-physical (living) nature and the nature that is mental life. This distinction is drawn such that a connection between the plateaus is truly possible. The third level, that of the mental form of life, answers mentally within conduct to the break with the first two levels. Hence it depends in the future as well on the continuously renewed difference (between the precarious and the stable for Dewey, between immediacy and mediation for Plessner) in our experience of nature. Within this difference nature as a whole remains an open unknown, which is why we can credit Dewey with a philosophy of diversified and negative holism, Plessner with a differential philosophy of the negativity of the absolute.}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{KeulenKeulen2019, author = {Keulen, Konstantin and Keulen, Kornelius}, title = {Im Netz der Zeit}, series = {Hochschulschriften ; 56}, journal = {Hochschulschriften ; 56}, publisher = {trafo}, address = {Berlin}, isbn = {978-3-86464-170-1}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {445}, year = {2019}, abstract = {In der vorliegenden Schrift, die aus der Dissertation der Zwillinge Konstantin und Kornelius Keulen im Fach Philosophie hervorgegangen ist, werden die vielf{\"a}ltigen Verwebungs- und Vernetzungszusammenh{\"a}nge des Internet zeit- und ereignisphilosophischer Ausdeutung weist nach Meinung der Autoren den Weg, das Konglomerat Internet als technomediales menschliches Produkt in seinen sozio-kulturellen, politisch-{\"o}konomischen und psychosozialen Komplexit{\"a}ten ausdeutbar zu machen.}, language = {de} } @book{OPUS4-43025, title = {Material und Begriff}, series = {Argument / Sonderband ; Neue Folge, AS 322}, journal = {Argument / Sonderband ; Neue Folge, AS 322}, editor = {Voigt, Frank and Tzanakis Papadakis, Nicos and Loheit, Jan and Baehrens, Konstantin}, publisher = {Argument}, address = {Hamburg}, isbn = {978-3-86754-322-4}, pages = {319}, year = {2019}, language = {de} } @article{Rosso2019, author = {Rosso, Enrico}, title = {Moskauer Passagen}, series = {Material und Begriff ; Arbeitsverfahren und theoretische Beziehungen Walter Benjamins}, journal = {Material und Begriff ; Arbeitsverfahren und theoretische Beziehungen Walter Benjamins}, publisher = {Argument}, address = {Hamburg}, isbn = {978-3-86754-322-4}, pages = {102 -- 134}, year = {2019}, language = {de} } @article{Montemayor2019, author = {Montemayor, Carlos}, title = {On the human uniqueness of the temporal reasoning system}, series = {Behavioral and brain sciences : an international journal of current research and theory with open peer commentary}, volume = {42}, journal = {Behavioral and brain sciences : an international journal of current research and theory with open peer commentary}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ. Press}, address = {New York}, issn = {0140-525X}, doi = {10.1017/S0140525X19000335}, pages = {69}, year = {2019}, abstract = {A central claim by Hoerl \& McCormack is that the temporal reasoning system is uniquely human. But why exactly? This commentary evaluates two possible options to justify the thesis that temporal reasoning is uniquely human, one based on considerations regarding agency and the other based on language. The commentary raises problems for both of these options.}, language = {en} } @misc{Kraemer2019, author = {Kr{\"a}mer, Felicitas}, title = {Perspectives on embryo donation}, series = {Bioethics}, volume = {33}, journal = {Bioethics}, number = {6}, publisher = {Wiley}, address = {Hoboken}, issn = {0269-9702}, doi = {10.1111/bioe.12636}, pages = {634 -- 636}, year = {2019}, language = {en} } @article{Pirwitz2019, author = {Pirwitz, Anne}, title = {Romanian Migrants in Western Europe}, series = {Philologica Jassyensia}, volume = {15}, journal = {Philologica Jassyensia}, number = {1}, publisher = {Editura Tracus Arte}, address = {Bucharest}, issn = {1841-5377}, pages = {221 -- 230}, year = {2019}, abstract = {This article aims to sum up the main results of a research project made in 2016 and 2017 about the situation of 1190 Romanian migrants in Western Europe and to give an overview about the push and pull factors, transnational family structures, as well as the challenges and difficulties of the Romanian survey respondents living in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy. It also considers the role of personal networks which represent an important motor of migration and constitute the main motive for the choice of a certain destination region. These migration networks lead to the construction of transnational social spaces between Romania and the destination country and have high influence in the search for housing or jobs but can also influence the integration process abroad.}, language = {en} } @article{Ette2019, author = {Ette, Ottmar}, title = {Schreiben zwischen den Welten}, series = {Europa : die Gegenwart unserer Geschichte ; Band III, Globale Verflechtungen}, journal = {Europa : die Gegenwart unserer Geschichte ; Band III, Globale Verflechtungen}, editor = {Vogel, Jacob}, publisher = {wbg Theiss}, address = {Darmstadt}, isbn = {978-3-8062-4021-4}, pages = {419 -- 427}, year = {2019}, language = {de} } @article{vonKalckreuth2019, author = {von Kalckreuth, Moritz Alexander}, title = {Wie viel Religionsphilosophie braucht es f{\"u}r eine Philosophie der Person?}, series = {Neue Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie}, volume = {61}, journal = {Neue Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie}, number = {1}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, address = {Berlin}, issn = {0028-3517}, doi = {10.1515/nzsth-2019-0004}, pages = {67 -- 83}, year = {2019}, abstract = {Der vorliegende Beitrag er{\"o}rtert das Verh{\"a}ltnis einer Philo-sophie der Person zur Religionsphilosophie bzw. einer Philosophie religi{\"o}ser Ph{\"a}nomene. Dabei soll die These vertreten werden, dass der personale Lebenszusammenhang bestimmte Ph{\"a}nomene aufweist, die nur in einem religi{\"o}sen Kontext ad{\"a}quat verstanden werden k{\"o}nnen. Die Interpretation dieser Ph{\"a}nomene kann einen Zugang zu bestimmten Aspekten von Personalit{\"a}t erm{\"o}glichen, die von den meisten Persontheorien der Gegenwart kaum beachtet werden.}, language = {de} }