@misc{Scianna2018,
  author    = {Scianna, Bastian Matteo},
  title     = {Stuck in the past?},
  series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe},
  journal   = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe},
  number    = {153},
  issn      = {1866-8380},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-420615},
  pages     = {17},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {After the Civil War the Spanish army functioned as a guardian of domestic order, but suffered from antiquated material and little financial means. These factors have been described as fundamental reasons for the army's low potential wartime capability. This article draws on British and German sources to demonstrate how Spanish military culture prevented an augmented effectiveness and organisational change. Claiming that the army merely lacked funding and modern equipment, falls considerably short in grasping the complexities of military effectiveness and organisational cultures, and might prove fatal for current attempts to develop foreign armed forces in conflict or post-conflict zones.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Scianna2018,
  author    = {Scianna, Bastian Matteo},
  title     = {A blueprint for successful peacekeeping?},
  series = {The International History Review},
  journal   = {The International History Review},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-412937},
  pages     = {24},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to fight the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Between August 1982 and February 1984, the US, France, Britain and Italy deployed a Multinational Force (MNF) to Beirut. Its task was to act as an interposition force to bolster the government and to bring peace to the people. The mission is often forgotten or merely remembered in context with the bombing of US Marines' barracks. However, an analysis of the Italian contingent shows that the MNF was not doomed to fail and could accomplish its task when operational and diplomatic efforts were coordinated. The Italian commander in Beirut, General Franco Angioni, followed a successful approach that sustained neutrality, respectful behaviour and minimal force, which resulted in a qualified success of the Italian efforts.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Scianna2018,
  author    = {Scianna, Bastian Matteo},
  title     = {Forging an Italian hero?},
  series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe},
  journal   = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe},
  number    = {152},
  issn      = {1866-8380},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-416866},
  pages     = {18},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {Over the last two decades, Amedeo Guillet (1909-2010) has been turned into a public and military hero. His exploits as a guerrilla leader in Italian East Africa in 1941 have been exaggerated to forge a narrative of an honourable resistance against overwhelming odds. Thereby, Guillet has been showcased as a romanticized colonial explorer who was an apolitical and timeless Italian officer. He has been compared to Lawrence of Arabia in order to raise his international visibility, while his genuine Italian brand is perpetuated domestically. By elevating him to an official role model, the Italian Army has gained a focal point for military heroism that was also acceptable in the public memory as the embodiment of a 'glorious' defeat narrative.},
  language  = {en}
}