@article{Gruene2011,
  author    = {Gr{\"u}ne, Stefanie},
  title     = {Is there a Gap in Kant's B Deduction?},
  series = {International journal of philosophical studies},
  volume    = {19},
  journal   = {International journal of philosophical studies},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Abingdon},
  issn      = {0967-2559},
  doi       = {10.1080/09672559.2011.595196},
  pages     = {465 -- 490},
  year      = {2011},
  abstract  = {In 'Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content', Robert Hanna argues for a very strong kind of non-conceptualism, and claims that this kind of non-conceptualism originally has been developed by Kant. But according to 'Kant's Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects and the Gap in the B Deduction', Kant's non-conceptualism poses a serious problem for his argument for the objective validity of the categories, namely the problem that there is a gap in the B Deduction. This gap is that the B Deduction goes through only if conceptualism is true, but Kant is a non-conceptualist. In this paper, I will argue, contrary to what Hanna claims, that there is not a gap in the B Deduction.},
  language  = {en}
}