@article{Streck2023,
  author    = {Streck, Charlotte},
  title     = {Synergies between the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and the Paris Agreement},
  series = {Climate policy},
  volume    = {23},
  journal   = {Climate policy},
  number    = {6},
  publisher = {Taylor \& Francis},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {1469-3062},
  doi       = {10.1080/14693062.2023.2230940},
  pages     = {800 -- 811},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {The 2022 Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) and Paris Agreement (PA) are highly complementary agreements where each depends on the other's success to be effective. The GBF offers a very specific framework of interim goals and targets that break down the objective of the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) into a decade-spanning work plan. Comprised of 10 sections - including a 2050 vision and a 2030 mission, four overarching goals and 23 specific targets - the GBF is expected to guide biodiversity policy around the world in the coming years to decades. A similar set of global interim climate policy targets could translate the global temperature goal into concrete policy milestones that would provide policy makers and civil society with reference points for policy making and efforts to hold governments accountable. Beyond inspiring climate policy experts to convert temperature goals into policy milestones, GBF has the potential to strengthen the implementation of the PA at the nexus of biodiversity and climate (adaptation and mitigation) action. For example, the GBF can help to ensure that nature-based climate solutions are implemented with full consideration of biodiversity concerns, of the rights and interests of Indigenous Peoples and local communities, and with fair and transparent benefit sharing arrangements. In sum, the GBF should be mandatory reading for all climate policy makers.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{StreckvonUngerGreiner2020,
  author    = {Streck, Charlotte and von Unger, Moritz and Greiner, Sandra},
  title     = {COP 25},
  series = {Journal for European environmental \& planning law},
  volume    = {17},
  journal   = {Journal for European environmental \& planning law},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Brill},
  address   = {Leiden},
  issn      = {1613-7272},
  doi       = {10.1163/18760104-01702003},
  pages     = {136 -- 160},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {The 25th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-25) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) became the longest COP on record - but yielded few results. It appears that four years after the adoption of the Paris Agreement, enthusiasm has waned and political bargaining and bean-counting have taken over. Countries, for even the slightest chance to keep temperatures 'well below' 2 degrees Celsius, must do much more than they have previously committed to and accelerate the shift towards a zero-carbon economy. However, the conference largely failed to heed the rallying cry of the Chilean presidency. The flagship decisions (grouped under the banner "Chile-Madrid Time for Action") neither produced new commitments - enhancing ambition or finance for developing countries - nor new rules that would nudge countries closer to the climate action targets needed. The leftover pieces from last year's negotiations of the "Paris Rulebook" were also not resolved, in particular the unfinished decisions on Article 6 on market- and non-market mechanisms. The procrastination shows that the new architecture of the Paris Agreement, while addressing several of the shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol, suffers from its own weaknesses. The meager results of Madrid give reason to pause and reflect on the conditions that may hold countries back from fully embracing the Paris Agreement, but also to consider the future and nature of carbon markets and what is making the issue so difficult to resolve.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Hickmann2017,
  author    = {Hickmann, Thomas},
  title     = {Voluntary global business initiatives and the international climate negotiations},
  series = {Journal of Cleaner Production},
  volume    = {169},
  journal   = {Journal of Cleaner Production},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Oxford},
  issn      = {0959-6526},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.06.183},
  pages     = {94 -- 104},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {The past few years have witnessed the emergence of a plethora of transnational climate governance experiments. They have been developed by a broad range of actors, such as cities, non-profit organizations, and private corporations. Several scholars have lately devoted particular attention to voluntary global business initiatives in the policy domain of climate change. Their studies have provided considerable insights into the role and function of such new modes of climate governance. However, the precise nature of the relationship between the various climate governance experiments and the international climate negotiations has not been analyzed in enough detail. Against this backdrop, the present article explores the interplay of a business sector climate governance experiment, i.e. the Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHG Protocol) with the international climate regime. On the one hand, the article underscores that the GHG Protocol has filled a regulatory gap in global climate policy-making by providing the means for the corporate sector to comprehensively account and report their GHGs. On the other hand, it reveals that the application of the GHG Protocol guidelines depends to a large extent on the existence of an overarching policy framework set up by nation-states at the intergovernmental level. Only if private companies receive a clear political signal that stringent mandatory GHG emission controls and a global market-based instrument are at least likely to be adopted will they put substantial efforts into the accurate measurement and management of their GHGs. Thus, this article points to the limits of climate governance experimentation and suggests that business sector climate governance experiments need to be embedded in a coherent international regulatory setting which generates a clear stimulus for corporate action.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HoviSprinzSaelenetal.2019,
  author    = {Hovi, Jon and Sprinz, Detlef F. and Saelen, H{\aa}kon and Underdal, Arild},
  title     = {The Club Approach: A Gateway to Effective Climate Co-operation?},
  series = {British Journal of Political Science},
  volume    = {49},
  journal   = {British Journal of Political Science},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {0007-1234},
  doi       = {10.1017/S0007123416000788},
  pages     = {1071 -- 1096},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Although the Paris Agreement arguably made some progress, interest in supplementary approaches to climate change co-operation persist. This article examines the conditions under which a climate club might emerge and grow. Using agent-based simulations, it shows that even with less than a handful of major actors as initial members, a club can eventually reduce global emissions effectively. To succeed, a club must be initiated by the 'right' constellation of enthusiastic actors, offer sufficiently large incentives for reluctant countries and be reasonably unconstrained by conflicts between members over issues beyond climate change. A climate club is particularly likely to persist and grow if initiated by the United States and the European Union. The combination of club-good benefits and conditional commitments can produce broad participation under many conditions.},
  language  = {en}
}