@misc{HeuerOrland2019, author = {Heuer, Leonie and Orland, Andreas}, title = {Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma}, series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, journal = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, number = {107}, issn = {1867-5808}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-43592}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-435929}, pages = {9}, year = {2019}, abstract = {Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts' level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects' level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BruttelFelgendreherGuethetal.2019, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Felgendreher, Simon and G{\"u}th, Werner and Hertwig, Ralph}, title = {Strategic ignorance in repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments and its effects on the dynamics of voluntary cooperation}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {10}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-43188}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-431881}, pages = {30}, year = {2019}, abstract = {Being ignorant of key aspects of a strategic interaction can represent an advantage rather than a handicap. We study one particular context in which ignorance can be beneficial: iterated strategic interactions in which voluntary cooperation may be sustained into the final round if players voluntarily forego knowledge about the time horizon. We experimentally examine this option to remain ignorant about the time horizon in a finitely repeated two-person prisoners' dilemma game. We confirm that pairs without horizon knowledge avoid the drop in cooperation that otherwise occurs toward the end of the game. However, this effect is superposed by cooperation declining more rapidly in pairs without horizon knowledge during the middle phase of the game, especially if players do not know that the other player also wanted to remain ignorant of the time horizon.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BruttelNithammerStolley2019, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Nithammer, Juri and Stolley, Florian}, title = {"Thanks in Advance"}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {7}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-42770}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427706}, pages = {18}, year = {2019}, abstract = {This paper studies the effect of the commonly used phrase "thanks in advance" on compliance with a small request. In a controlled laboratory experiment we ask participants to give a detailed answer to an open question. The treatment variable is whether or not they see the phrase "thanks in advance." Our participants react to the treatment by exerting less effort in answering the request even though they perceive the phrase as polite.}, language = {en} } @techreport{Bruttel2019, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena}, title = {Is There a Loyalty-Enhancing Effect of Retroactive Price-Reduction Schemes?}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {5}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-42768}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427688}, pages = {25}, year = {2019}, abstract = {This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers' repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BruttelStolleyUtikal2019, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Stolley, Florian and Utikal, Verena}, title = {Getting a Yes}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {2}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-42763}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427638}, year = {2019}, abstract = {This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game, in which the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter decides. We find that putting effort into the message, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictator's power and responsibility.}, language = {en} }