@phdthesis{Blankovsky2014,
  author    = {Blankovsky, Yuval},
  title     = {עבירה לשמה},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-87158},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  year      = {2014},
  abstract  = {A Transgression for the Sake of God -'Averah li-shmah: A Tale of a Radical Idea in Talmudic Literature All cultures, religions, and ethical or legal systems struggle with the role intention plays in evaluating actions. The Talmud compellingly elaborates on the notion of intention through the radical concept that "A sin committed for the sake of God [averah li-shmah] is greater than a commandment fulfilled not for the sake of God [mi-mizvah she-lo li-shmah]." The Babylonian Talmud attributes this concept—which challenges one of rabbinic Judaism's most fundamental dogmas, the obligation to fulfill the commandments and avoid sin—to R. Nahman b. Isaac (RNBI), a renowned 4th century Amora. Considering the normative character of the rabbinic culture in which Halakhah (Jewish religious law) plays such a central role, this concept, seems almost like a foreign body in the Talmudic corpus. The study focuses on the linguistic stratum of RNBI's statement. By tracking the development of the meanings and uses of the word 'li-shmah' the research locates RNBI's statement as part of the broader Talmudic discourse evaluating two levels of performing religious actions 'li-shmah/she-lo li-shmah'. Since we wish to explain the word 'li-shmah' consistently both times it appears in the statement, the best translation would be 'for the sake of God'. This translation is based on the linguistic connection between the word 'li-shmah' and the term 'le-shem shamayim' (for the sake of God) that appears in several rabbinic sources. This linguistic connection is also the key to identifying the possible root of RNBI's concept. RNBI bolsters his idea by quoting a verse about Jael, thus implying that Jael sinned for the sake of God. The research describes at least five statements in Sages' Literature that attribute sins for the sake of God to other biblical figures, all the while using the term 'le-shem shamim'. Therefore we may presume that RNBI's concept has evolved from the exegetical notion of attributing sin for the sake of God to biblical figures. To understand the way RNBI's statement was accepted in Talmudic culture, we must explore the textual witnesses to the literary frame of RNBI's statement: the Talmudic sugya (Nazir 23a; Horayot 10b). We possess five versions of the sugya's dialectical structure. Comparison of these versions, allows us to reconstruct the earlier dialectical structure, from which the familiar versions developed. The radical potential of RNBI's statement led to cultural activity, in the transmission of the sugya, in an effort to mitigate it. This activity is reflected in late additions to the sugya identified by our research—which should be viewed as a process of self-censorship for ideological reasons. This research explores a fundamental issue in rabbinic world: the immanent contradiction between law and intention. The research depicts in detail the movement of a radical idea from the margins culture to mainstream - in this case into the Babylonian Talmud. Therefore, the findings of this research provide substantial insight into our understanding of the interpretive process and of conceptual adaptation in rabbinic culture.},
  language  = {mul}
}