@article{deHaasPaha2020,
  author    = {de Haas, Samuel and Paha, Johannes},
  title     = {Non-controlling minority shareholdings and collusion},
  series = {Review of industrial organization},
  volume    = {58},
  journal   = {Review of industrial organization},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {0889-938X},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11151-020-09758-y},
  pages     = {431 -- 454},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {This article merges theoretical literature on non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS) in a coherent model to study the effects of NCMS on competition and collusion. The model encompasses both the case of a common owner holding shares of rival firms as well as the case of cross ownership among rivals. We find that by softening competition, NCMS weaken the sustainability of collusion under a greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. Such effects exist, in particular, in the presence of an effective competition authority.},
  language  = {en}
}