@article{Bruttel2018,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena},
  title     = {The Limits of Buyer Power},
  series = {Review of Behavioral Economics},
  volume    = {5},
  journal   = {Review of Behavioral Economics},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Now Publishers inc.},
  address   = {Hannover},
  issn      = {2326-6198},
  doi       = {10.1561/105.00000082},
  pages     = {149 -- 167},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {This paper studies the behavior of buyers confronting an incumbent monopolist and a potential market entrant in a repeated trade situation. In the experiment, buyers have two possibilities to demand lower prices in future trade periods. First, they can withhold demand. Second, they can voluntarily pay a higher price to the entrant in order to encourage future re-entry. Both these forms of buyer behavior occur in the experiment. They are less frequent when the number of buyers is large as opposed to small. A control treatment tests to what extent such behavior can be attributed to strategic motives.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelGueth2018,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Gueth, Werner},
  title     = {Asymmetric voluntary cooperation},
  series = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  volume    = {47},
  journal   = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Heidelberg},
  issn      = {0020-7276},
  doi       = {10.1007/s00182-018-0633-y},
  pages     = {873 -- 891},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {This paper tests the robustness of voluntary cooperation in a sequential best shot game, a public good game in which the maximal contribution determines the level of public good provision. Thus, efficiency enhancing voluntary cooperation requires asymmetric behavior whose coordination is more difficult. Nevertheless, we find robust cooperation irrespective of treatment-specific institutional obstacles. To explain this finding, we distinguish three behavioral patterns aiming at both, voluntary cooperation and (immediate) payoff equality.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bruttel2018,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena},
  title     = {Is There a Loyalty-Enhancing Effect of Retroactive Price-Reduction Schemes?},
  series = {Review of industrial organization},
  volume    = {54},
  journal   = {Review of industrial organization},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {0889-938X},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11151-018-9653-9},
  pages     = {575 -- 593},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers' repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelFriehe2015,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friehe, Tim},
  title     = {A note on making humans randomize},
  series = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  volume    = {58},
  journal   = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {2214-8043},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.socec.2015.06.008},
  pages     = {40 -- 45},
  year      = {2015},
  abstract  = {This note presents results from an experiment studying a two person 4 4 pure coordination game. We explore different strategy labels in an attempt to implement the mixed strategy equilibrium that selects all four strategies with equal probability. Such strategy labels must be free from salient properties that might be used by participants to coordinate. Testing 23 different sets of strategy labels, we identify two sets that produce a distribution of subjects' choices which approximate the uniform distribution quite well. Our results are relevant for studies intending to compare the behavior of subjects who play against a random mechanism with that of participants who play against human counterparts.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelFriehe2014,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friehe, Tim},
  title     = {Can short-term incentives induce long-lasting cooperation? Results from a public-goods experiment},
  series = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  volume    = {53},
  journal   = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {2214-8043},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.socec.2014.09.001},
  pages     = {120 -- 130},
  year      = {2014},
  abstract  = {This paper investigates whether providing strong cooperation incentives only at the outset of a group interaction spills over to later periods to ensure cooperation in the long run. We study a repeated linear public-good game with punishment opportunities and a parameter change after the first ten (of twenty) rounds. Our data shows that cooperation among subjects who had experienced a higher marginal return on public-good contributions or low punishment costs in rounds 1-10 rapidly deteriorated in rounds 11-20 once these incentives were removed, eventually trending below the level of cooperation in the control group. This suggests the possibility of temporary incentives backfiring in the long run. This paper ties in with the literature highlighting the potentially adverse effects of the use of incentives. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.},
  language  = {en}
}