@unpublished{HippLeumannSchober2024,
  author    = {Hipp, Lena and Leumann, Sandra and Schober, Pia S.},
  title     = {Partnership penalties for working in gender-atypical occupations?},
  doi       = {10.31235/osf.io/ydurp},
  pages     = {35},
  year      = {2024},
  abstract  = {Does working in a gender-atypical occupation reduce individuals' likelihood of finding a different-sex romantic partner, and do such occupational partnership penalties contribute to occupational gender segregation? To answer this question, we theorized partnership penalties for working in gender-atypical occupations by drawing on insights from evolutionary psychology, social constructivism, and rational choice theory and exploited the stability of occupational pathways in Germany. In Study 1, we analyzed observational data from a national probability sample (N= 1,634,944) to assess whether individuals in gender-atypical occupations were less likely to be partnered than individuals who worked in gender typical occupations. To assess whether the observed partnership gaps found in Study 1 were causally related to the gender typicality of men's and women's occupations, we conducted a field experiment on a dating app (N = 6,778). Because the findings from Study 2 suggested that young women and men indeed experienced penalties for working in a gender-atypical occupation (at least when they were not highly attractive), we employed a choice-experimental design in Study 3 (N = 1,250) to assess whether women and men were aware of occupational partnership penalties and showed that anticipating occupational partnership penalties may keep young and highly educated women from working in gender-atypical occupations. Our main conclusion therefore is that that observed penalties and their anticipation seem to be driven by unconscious rather than conscious processes.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BauernschusterBorck2016,
  author    = {Bauernschuster, Stefan and Borck, Rainald},
  title     = {Formal Child Care and Family Structure: Theory and Evidence},
  series = {CESifo economic studies : a joint initiative of Ludwig-Maximilians-Universit{\~A}\it and Ifo Institute for Economic Research},
  volume    = {62},
  journal   = {CESifo economic studies : a joint initiative of Ludwig-Maximilians-Universit{\~A}\it and Ifo Institute for Economic Research},
  publisher = {Oxford Univ. Press},
  address   = {Oxford},
  issn      = {1610-241X},
  doi       = {10.1093/cesifo/ifv025},
  pages     = {699 -- 724},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {This article studies the effect of child care provision on family structure. We present a model of a marriage market with positive assortative matching, where in equilibrium, the poorest women stay single. Couples have to decide on the number of children and spousal specialization in home production of public goods and child care. We then study how child care provision affects the equilibrium. Due to specialization in home production, the incentive to use child care is smaller for married mothers than for single mothers. We show that this increases the number of single mothers and the divorce rate. Using survey data from Germany, we present suggestive empirical evidence consistent with this finding. (JEL codes: J12 and J13).},
  language  = {en}
}