@techreport{AndreeSchwan2012,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Andree, Kai and Schwan, Mike},
  title     = {Collusive market sharing with spatial competition},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-62146},
  year      = {2012},
  abstract  = {This paper develops a spatial model to analyze the stability of a market sharing agreement between two firms. We find that the stability of the cartel depends on the relative market size of each firm. Collusion is not attractive for firms with a small home market, but the incentive for collusion increases when the firm's home market is getting larger relative to the home market of the competitor. The highest stability of a cartel and additionally the highest social welfare is found when regions are symmetric. Further we can show that a monetary transfer can stabilize the market sharing agreement.},
  language  = {en}
}