@phdthesis{Kirchner2023,
  author    = {Kirchner, Jan-Robert},
  title     = {Negotiations in Audit Processes},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-60085},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-600854},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {II, 156},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {This cumulative dissertation consists of three full empirical investigations based on three separate collections of data dealing with the phenomenon of negotiations in audit processes, which are combined in two research articles. In the first study, I examine internal auditors' views on negotiation interactions with auditees. My research is based on 23 semi-structured interviews with internal auditors (14 in-house and 9 external service providers) to gain insight into when and about what (RQ1), why (RQ2), and how (RQ3) they negotiate with auditees. By adapting the Gibbins et al. (2001) negotiation framework to the context of internal auditing, I obtain specific process (negotiation issue, auditor-auditee process, and outcome) and context elements that form the basis of my analyses. Through the additional use of inductive procedures, I conclude that internal auditors negotiate when they face professional and non-professional resistance from auditees during the audit process (RQ1). This resistance occurs in a variety of audit types and audit issues. Internal auditors choose negotiations to overcome this resistance primarily out of functional interest, as they cannot simply instruct auditees to acknowledge the findings and implement the required actions (RQ2). I find that the implementation of the required actions is the main goal of the respondents, which is also an important quality factor for internal auditing. Although few respondents interpret these interactions with auditees as negotiations, all respondents use a variety of negotiation strategies to create value (e.g., cost cutting, logrolling, and bridging) and claim value (e.g. positional commitment and threats) (RQ3). Finally, I contribute to empirical research on internal audit negotiations and internal audit quality by shedding light on the black box of internal auditor-auditee interactions. The second study consists of two experiments that examine the effects of tax auditors' emotion expressions during tax audit negotiations. In the first experiment, we demonstrate that auditors expressing anger obtain more concessions from taxpayers than auditors expressing happiness. This reveals that taxpayers interpret auditors' emotions strategically and do not respond affectively. In the second experiment, we show that the experience with an auditor who expressed either happiness or anger reduces taxpayers' post-audit compliance compared to the experience with an emotionally neutral auditor. Apparently, taxpayers use their experience with an emotional auditor to rationalize later noncompliance. Taken together, both experiments show the potentially detrimental effects of positive and negative emotion expressions by the auditor and point to the benefits of avoiding emotion expressions. We find that when auditors avoid emotion expressions this does not result in fewer concessions from taxpayers than when auditors express anger. However, when auditors avoid emotion expressions this leads to a significantly better evaluation of the taxpayer-auditor relationship and significantly reduces taxpayers' post-audit noncompliance.},
  language  = {en}
}