@misc{Haag2020, author = {Haag, Johannes}, title = {Rezension zu: Willascheck, Marcus: Kant on the sources of metaphysics: the dialectic of pure reason. - New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018, 298pp. - ISBN: 978-1-108-47263-0}, series = {European journal of philosophy}, volume = {28}, journal = {European journal of philosophy}, number = {2}, publisher = {Wiley}, address = {Hoboken}, issn = {0966-8373}, doi = {10.1111/ejop.12555}, pages = {524 -- 528}, year = {2020}, language = {en} } @article{Haag2020, author = {Haag, Johannes}, title = {Transcendental Principles and Perceptual Warrant}, series = {Wilfrid Sellars and twentieth-century philosophy}, journal = {Wilfrid Sellars and twentieth-century philosophy}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {Abingdon}, isbn = {978-1-351-20275-6}, pages = {130 -- 150}, year = {2020}, language = {en} } @article{Haag2017, author = {Haag, Johannes}, title = {A kantian critique of sellars transcendental realism}, series = {Wilfrid Sellars, Idealism, and Realism: Understanding Psychological Nominalism}, journal = {Wilfrid Sellars, Idealism, and Realism: Understanding Psychological Nominalism}, publisher = {Bloomsbury}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-1-4742-3895-3}, pages = {149 -- 171}, year = {2017}, language = {en} } @article{Haag2021, author = {Haag, Johannes}, title = {Intuiting the Original Unity?}, series = {Kantian legacies in German idealism}, journal = {Kantian legacies in German idealism}, publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {New York ; London}, isbn = {978-1-032-00160-9}, pages = {161 -- 185}, year = {2021}, language = {en} } @article{Haag2017, author = {Haag, Johannes}, title = {Analytic Kantianism}, series = {Con-textos kantianos : international journal of philosophy}, journal = {Con-textos kantianos : international journal of philosophy}, publisher = {Instituto de Filosof{\´i}a del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cient{\´i}ficas}, address = {Madrid}, issn = {2386-7655}, doi = {10.5281/zenodo.1092766}, pages = {18 -- 41}, year = {2017}, abstract = {Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell can both be read as proponents of Analytic Kantianism. However, their accounts differ in important detail. In particular, McDowell has criticized Sellars's account of sensory consciousness in a number of papers (most notably in LFI and SC), both as a reading of Kant and on its systematic merits. The present paper offers a detailed analysis of this criticism and a defense of Sellars's position against the background of a methodology of transcendental philosophy.}, language = {en} } @article{HaagHoeppner2019, author = {Haag, Johannes and Hoeppner, Till}, title = {Denken und Welt - Wege kritischer Metaphysik}, series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, volume = {67}, journal = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, number = {1}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, address = {Berlin}, issn = {0012-1045}, doi = {10.1515/dzph-2019-0006}, pages = {76 -- 97}, year = {2019}, abstract = {Wird Metaphysik realistisch verstanden, so ist sie mit dem Anspruch verbunden, in objektiver Weise von der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung der Welt (oder Realit{\"a}t, Wirklichkeit etc.) zu handeln. Damit beansprucht sie die M{\"o}glichkeit von Objektivit{\"a}t, d. h. die M{\"o}glichkeit der Repr{\"a}sentation der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung einer Welt, die von uns und unserer Repr{\"a}sentation verschieden ist. Realistisch verstandene Metaphysik verf{\"a}hrt dogmatisch, wenn sie ihre eigene M{\"o}glichkeit einfach voraussetzt. Eine dogmatische Metaphysik ist unkritisch, weil sie ohne eine Untersuchung der Frage betrieben wird, wie eine objektive und ad{\"a}quate Repr{\"a}sentation der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung der Welt {\"u}berhaupt m{\"o}glich ist. Im Unterschied dazu nennen wir eine realistische Metaphysik in einem vorl{\"a}ufigen Sinne kritisch, sofern sie ihren Ausgang von einer Untersuchung dieser M{\"o}glichkeit nimmt und erst auf der Grundlage positiver Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchung einen - vor diesem Hintergrund nunmehr gerechtfertigten - Objektivit{\"a}tsanspruch erhebt.}, language = {de} } @misc{HaagHoeppner2019, author = {Haag, Johannes and Hoeppner, Till}, title = {Errata zu: Denken und Welt - Wege kritischer Metaphysik. dzph. Band 67, 2019, Heft 1, S. 76-97}, series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, volume = {67}, journal = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, number = {2}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, address = {Berlin}, issn = {0012-1045}, doi = {10.1515/dzph-2019-0888}, pages = {326 -- 327}, year = {2019}, abstract = {We begin by considering two common ways of conceiving critical metaphysics. According to the first (and polemical) conception, critical metaphysics analyzes nothing more than the form of thought and thereby misses the proper point of metaphysics, namely to investigate the form of reality. According to the second (and affirmative) conception, critical metaphysics starts from the supposed insight that the form of reality can't be other than the form of thought and is thus not required to analyze anything but that form. We argue that the first conception is too weak while the second is too strong. Then we sketch an alternative conception of critical metaphysics, a conception we find expressed both in Kant's B-Deduction and in the way Barry Stroud has recently investigated the possibility of metaphysics. According to such a conception, a properly critical metaphysics needs to proceed in two steps: first, it needs to analyze the most general and necessary form of any thought that is about an objective reality at all; second, it needs to investigate how that form of thought relates to the reality it purports to represent. But unlike Kant, Stroud remains sceptical regarding the possibility of a satisfying transition from thought to reality in metaphysics. We argue that this dissatisfaction can be traced back to a notion of objectivity and reality in terms of complete mind-independence. Then we sketch an alternative notion of objectivity and reality in terms of distinctness from subjects and acts of thinking, and argue that it is that notion that allows Kant, with his Transcendental Idealism, to make the transition required for any satisfying metaphysics, namely that from the form of thought to reality.}, language = {de} } @book{HaagWild, author = {Haag, Johannes and Wild, Markus}, title = {Philosophie der Neuzeit}, series = {Beck Wissen ; 2822}, journal = {Beck Wissen ; 2822}, publisher = {Beck}, address = {M{\"u}nchen}, isbn = {978-3-406-73210-2}, pages = {128}, abstract = {Mit der Neuzeit r{\"u}ckt die Urteilskraft des Menschen ins Zentrum des Denkens. Ab dem 17. Jahrhundert entwickeln sich auf europ{\"a}ischem Boden vielf{\"a}ltige aufkl{\"a}rerische Bewegungen, die das Bewusstsein menschlicher Freiheit nicht nur zum Maßstab der Erkenntnis, sondern auch zum Fundament der Politik machen. Diese Einf{\"u}hrung in Rationalismus, Empirismus und politische Philosophie stellt die Untrennbarkeit von Wissen und Handeln als Leitidee des intellektuellen Aufbruchs vor. Im Zentrum der Darstellung stehen Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Hume und Rousseau.}, language = {de} } @misc{Haag2006, author = {Haag, Johannes}, title = {Seibt, J., Willem DeVries: Wilfrid Selars; Paderborn, Mentis, 2006}, year = {2006}, language = {de} } @article{Haag2009, author = {Haag, Johannes}, title = {Anschauung und die sinnlichen Aspekte des Wahrnehmens}, isbn = {978-3-86838-042-2}, year = {2009}, language = {de} }