@article{Haag2009,
  author    = {Haag, Johannes},
  title     = {Anschauung und die sinnlichen Aspekte des Wahrnehmens},
  isbn      = {978-3-86838-042-2},
  year      = {2009},
  language  = {de}
}
@book{Raters2009,
  author    = {Raters, Marie-Luise},
  title     = {Atheismus},
  series = {Religion und Weltanschaungen},
  volume    = {6},
  journal   = {Religion und Weltanschaungen},
  publisher = {BWV Berliner Wissenschafts-Verl.},
  address   = {Berlin},
  isbn      = {978-3-8305-1599-9},
  pages     = {197 S.},
  year      = {2009},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Petsche2009,
  author    = {Petsche, Hans-Joachim},
  title     = {Wissenschaft und Emotionalit{\"a}t},
  isbn      = {978-3-643-50081-6},
  year      = {2009},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Petsche2009,
  author    = {Petsche, Hans-Joachim},
  title     = {Studierende im Netz : Ergebnisse und m{\"o}gliche Perspektiven einer empirisch-vergleichenden CultMedia- Erhebung unter Studierenden aus Deutschland, Polen, Spanien, Tschechien und Ungarn},
  isbn      = {978-3-89626-922-5},
  year      = {2009},
  language  = {de}
}
@book{Krueger2009,
  author    = {Kr{\"u}ger, Hans-Peter},
  title     = {Philosophische Anthropologie als Lebenspolitik : deutsch-j{\"u}dische und pragmatistische Modernekritik},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Sonderband},
  volume    = {23},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Sonderband},
  publisher = {Akad.-Verl.},
  address   = {Berlin},
  isbn      = {978-3-05-004605-1},
  pages     = {371 S.},
  year      = {2009},
  language  = {de}
}
@book{Meisl2009,
  author    = {Meisl, Joseph},
  title     = {Haskalah : Geschichte der Aufkl{\"a}rungsbewegung unter den Juden in Russland},
  series = {Studienbibliothek},
  volume    = {1},
  journal   = {Studienbibliothek},
  editor    = {Kennecke, Andreas},
  publisher = {Verl. von {\"U}bigau},
  address   = {Berlin},
  isbn      = {978-3-942047-00-5},
  pages     = {271 S.},
  year      = {2009},
  language  = {de}
}
@book{Petsche2009,
  author    = {Petsche, Hans-Joachim},
  title     = {Hermann Grassmann : biography},
  series = {Grassmann-Trilogie},
  volume    = {1},
  journal   = {Grassmann-Trilogie},
  publisher = {Birkh{\"a}user Basel},
  address   = {Basel},
  isbn      = {978-3-7643-8859-1},
  doi       = {10.1007/978-3-7643-8860-7},
  pages     = {XX, 306 S. : Ill., graph. Dar.},
  year      = {2009},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{GrundmannSpitzleyStoecker2009,
  author    = {Grundmann, Thomas and Spitzley, Thomas and Stoecker, Ralf},
  title     = {Editorial},
  issn      = {0165-0106},
  doi       = {10.1007/s10670-009-9163-0},
  year      = {2009},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Setton2009,
  author    = {Setton, Dirk},
  title     = {Das Medea-Prinzip : vom Problem der Akrasia zu einer Theorie des Un-Vermoegens},
  issn      = {0012-1045},
  doi       = {10.1524/dzph.2009.0008},
  year      = {2009},
  abstract  = {The topic of this essay is akrasia in its most paradoxical kind, as it appears to us in the emblem of Medea. The argument starts with the claim that the problem with akrasia is especially a problem of rational potentiality: to understand it philosophically, we are forced to embrace the idea that its possibility is immanent to the rational capacity of action. By discussing elements of Plato's, Aristotle's, and Davidson's explanations of practical irrationality, the argument proceeds to demonstrate that the reasons a practical capacity provides exist as "forces", that rational forces are structurally in excess with respect to their normative statuses, and that Medea is the mythical figure par excellence of such an immanent excess of rational agency. On account of these insights, we can begin to understand that akrasia is not only a kind of failure, or incapacity, but entails the very possibility of a "metamorphosis" of the subject.},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Rebentisch2009,
  author    = {Rebentisch, Juliane},
  title     = {Der Demokrat und seine Schw{\"a}chen : eine Lekt{\"u}re von Plato's Politeia},
  issn      = {0012-1045},
  doi       = {10.1524/dzph.2009.0004},
  year      = {2009},
  abstract  = {Whereas Plato's Protagoras rejects the notion that someone who knows what is good for him can nonetheless do something else of his own free volition, his Republic names the particular conditions under which such an act, an act of weakness of the will, can take place: the conditions of democracy. Because democracy, Plato writes, places an excessive freedom at its centre, it fosters desires, weakening the force of reason, destabilizing the will, and thus engendering an unprincipled human being. This paper defends the democratic conception of freedom against this portrayal by advocating a concept of freedom of the will that does not unilaterally identify it with willpower.},
  language  = {de}
}