@article{Fruhstorfer2021, author = {Fruhstorfer, Anna}, title = {Constitutional revolutions under autocracy}, series = {Constitutional studies}, volume = {7}, journal = {Constitutional studies}, number = {1}, publisher = {University of Wisconsin Press}, address = {Madison}, issn = {2474-9427}, pages = {33 -- 47}, year = {2021}, abstract = {Gary Jacobsohn and Yaniv Roznai's (2020) book Constitutional Revolution offers a sophisticated conceptual framework with a fascinating description of empirical occurrences of substantive revolutions in the practice and understanding of constitutionalism in Germany, India, Hungary, and Israel. While the conceptualization in the book and its empirical illustration clearly draw from regime transformations or substantive changes within democratic regimes, we know little about the extent to which substantive constitutional reforms are possible and meaningful in autocratic regimes. As their concept of constitutional revolution is ambiguous and requires a substantive engagement with an individual case at hand, we cannot sim- ply expect concept equivalence when expanding its use beyond a transitory or democratic context. Hence, in this contribution I ask, What constitutes a constitutional revolution in an autocratic regime? To shed light on this question, I rely on the expectation that we do not find important differences in the substance of autocratic constitutions compared to democratic constitutions. Autocratic elites, also, under- stand the possibilities of constitutional change and respond to them as they offer regime stability and simply more power, but that is not a revolution. Therefore, I argue that the substantive meaning of an amendment must be a departure from the inherent logic of the constitution, especially outside the standard procedures for autocratic ruling. Thus, in this paper I discuss the theoretical implications of a constitutional revolution under autocracy without a regime transition and provide empirical evidence from various constitutional amendments and de facto reforms in Russia. I show that a constitutional revolution is not always the most important or most discussed constitutional change—at least, not in an autocratic context. This discussion has important implications for understanding constitutionalism and autocratic stability and the largely overlooked relationship between substance and process in nondemocratic settings.}, language = {en} } @article{FruhstorferHudson2022, author = {Fruhstorfer, Anna and Hudson, Alexander}, title = {Majorities for minorities}, series = {Political research quarterly : PRQ ; official journal of Western Political Science Association, Pacific Northwest Political Science Association, Southern California Political Science Association, Northern California Political Science Association}, volume = {75}, journal = {Political research quarterly : PRQ ; official journal of Western Political Science Association, Pacific Northwest Political Science Association, Southern California Political Science Association, Northern California Political Science Association}, number = {1}, publisher = {Sage Publ.}, address = {Thousand Oaks}, issn = {1065-9129}, doi = {10.1177/1065912920984246}, pages = {103 -- 117}, year = {2022}, abstract = {Does the process of making a constitution affect the expansiveness of rights protections in the constitution? In particular, is more participation in constitution-making processes better for minority rights protections? While the process of constitution making and its impact on various outcomes have received significant attention, little is known about the impact public participation or deliberation in this process has on the scope and content of minority rights. Using a wide variety of data to empirically assess the relationship between constitution-making processes and the protection of rights for minorities, we find a positive relationship between participatory drafting processes and the inclusion of minority protections in constitutions under some conditions. The article's findings have important implications for understanding political representation and lend support to core arguments about the role of the public in constitutional design.}, language = {en} } @article{FruhstorferHudson2022, author = {Fruhstorfer, Anna and Hudson, Alexander}, title = {Costs and benefits of accepting presidential term limits}, series = {Democratization}, volume = {29}, journal = {Democratization}, number = {1}, publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {Abingdon}, issn = {1351-0347}, doi = {10.1080/13510347.2021.1960314}, pages = {93 -- 112}, year = {2022}, abstract = {As presidents approach the end of their constitutionally defined term in office, they face a number of difficulties, most importantly the deprivation of sources of power, personal enrichment, and protection from prosecution. This leads many of them to attempt to circumvent their term limits. Recent studies explain both the reasons for the extension or full abolition of term limits, and failed attempts to do so. Key explanations include electoral competition and the post-term fate of previous post holders. What we do not know yet is how compliance with term limits may be tied to the current president's expectations for their post-term fate. In particular, we do not know whether leaders who attempt to remove term limits and fail to do so jeopardize their post-term career as a result, and conversely, whether leaders who comply will have better outcomes in terms of security, prestige, and economic gain. Hence, we ask how the decision of a leader to comply or not comply with term limits is conditioned by the expectation of their post-term fate. To address this question, this article introduces new data on the career trajectories of term-limited presidents and its systematic effect on term limit compliance.}, language = {en} }