@article{SchoelerSanner1998,
  author    = {Sch{\"o}ler, Klaus and Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Spatial price discrimination in two-dimensional competitive markets},
  year      = {1998},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{SchoelerSanner1998,
  author    = {Sch{\"o}ler, Klaus and Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Spatial Price Discrimination in Two-Dimensional Competitive Markets},
  year      = {1998},
  language  = {en}
}
@book{SannerSchoeler1996,
  author    = {Sanner, Helge and Sch{\"o}ler, Klaus},
  title     = {Competition, price discrimination and two-dimensional distribution of demand},
  series = {Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeitr{\"a}ge},
  volume    = {12},
  journal   = {Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeitr{\"a}ge},
  publisher = {Univ.},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  pages     = {22 Bl.},
  year      = {1996},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Sanner2005,
  author    = {Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Bertrand Wettbewerb im Raum kann zu h{\"o}heren Preisen f{\"u}hren als ein Monopol},
  year      = {2005},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Sanner2003,
  author    = {Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Self-financing unemployment insurance and bargaining structure},
  year      = {2003},
  abstract  = {This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the labor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self- financing unemployment insurance (UI) for workers, firms, and with reference to an efficiency criterion. For this purpose, we respectively numerically compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether effciency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Sanner2003,
  author    = {Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Optimal unemployment insurance in a federation},
  isbn      = {3-540-44004-6},
  year      = {2003},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Sanner2002,
  author    = {Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Regionalisierung der Arbeitslosenversicherung : eine Theorie unter Einbezug von Lohnverhandlungen und Migration},
  publisher = {Shaker},
  address   = {Aachen},
  isbn      = {3-8265-9756-7},
  issn      = {0945-1048},
  pages     = {198 S.},
  year      = {2002},
  language  = {de}
}
@techreport{Sanner2005,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Price responses to market entry with and without endogenous product choice},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14399},
  year      = {2005},
  abstract  = {Textbook wisdom says that competition yields lower prices and higher consumer surplus than monopoly. We show in two versions of a simple location-product differentiation model with and without endogenous choice of products that these two results have to be qualified. In both models, more than half of the reasonable parameter values lead to higher prices with duopoly than with monopoly. If the product characteristics are exogenous to the firms, consumers may even be be better off with monopoly in average.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{Sanner2005,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Instability in competition},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14299},
  year      = {2005},
  abstract  = {In this paper we show that Puu (2002) does not provide a stable solution to the location game, according to his own definition of stability. If the usual two-stage game is considered, where in the first stage a location is chosen once and forever, and in the second stage prices are determined, the equilibrium proves stable for a sizeable interval of parameters, however. Even though this procedure is most common in analyzing Hotelling's location problem, it is not satisfying because it exhibits an inconsistent informational structure. The search for a better concept of stability is imperative.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{Sanner2005,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Bertrand Wettbewerb im Raum kann zu h{\"o}heren Preisen f{\"u}hren als ein Monopol},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14251},
  year      = {2005},
  abstract  = {In Mikro- und Industrie{\"o}konomik ist scheinbar gewiss, dassWettbewerb zu niedrigeren Preisen f{\"u}hrt und dass Konsumenten von Wettbewerb profitieren, w{\"a}hrend die etablierten Unternehmen einen Nachteil erleiden. Dieser Beitrag verwendet ein raumwirtschaftliches Standardmodell, um zu zeigen, dass dies nicht immer so sein muss. Der Grund ist, dass durch den Marktzutritt gerade die Konsumenten, deren Preiselastizit{\"a}t am gr{\"o}ßten ist, von dem Unternehmen bei der Preisbildung nicht ber{\"u}cksichtigt werden.},
  language  = {de}
}