@misc{GenazzanoMompo2022,
  author    = {Genazzano Mompo, Pablo Adrian},
  title     = {Elettra Stimilli 'Jacob Taubes: Soberan{\´i}a y tiempo mesi{\´a}nico'. [Trad. Martino Sacchi. Revisi{\´o}n de Francisco Caja y Volker Herrmann. Barcelona: Los Libros del T{\´a}bano, 2020, 360 p., ISBN: 9788409263097]},
  series = {Convivium - Revista de Filosofia},
  journal   = {Convivium - Revista de Filosofia},
  number    = {35},
  publisher = {Universitat de Barcelona},
  address   = {Barcelona},
  issn      = {0010-8235},
  pages     = {245 -- 249},
  year      = {2022},
  language  = {es}
}
@article{Krueger2022,
  author    = {Kr{\"u}ger, Hans-Peter},
  title     = {Critical anthropology? On the relation between philosophical anthropology and critical theory},
  series = {Iride : filosofia e discussione pubblica},
  volume    = {35},
  journal   = {Iride : filosofia e discussione pubblica},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Societ{\`a} editrice il Mulino},
  address   = {Bologna},
  isbn      = {978-88-15-38060-9},
  issn      = {1122-7893},
  doi       = {10.1414/106105},
  pages     = {313 -- 331},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {This article compares Max Horkheimer's and Theodor W. Adorno's foundation of the Frankfurt Critical Theory with Helmuth Plessner's foundation of Philosophical Anthropology. While Horkheimer's and Plessner's paradigms are mutually incompatible, Adorno's << negative dialectics >> and Plessner's << negative anthropology >> (G. Gamm) can be seen as complementing one another. Jurgen Habermas at one point sketched a complementary relationship between his own publicly communicative theory of modern society and Plessner's philosophy of nature and human expressivity, and though he then came to doubt this, he later reaffirmed it. Faced with the << life power >> in << high capitalism >> (Plessner), the ambitions for a public democracy in a pluralistic society have to be broadened from an argumentative focus (Habermas) to include the human condition and the expressive modes of our experience as essentially embodied persons. The article discusses some possible aspects of this complementarity under the title of a << critical anthropology >> (H. Schn{\"a}delbach).},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Russell2022,
  author    = {Russell, Eric-John},
  title     = {Nada es ya lo contrario de nada : la sociedad del espect{\´a}culo de Guy Debord hoy},
  series = {Constelaciones : Revista de Teor{\´i}a Cr{\´i}tica},
  volume    = {14},
  journal   = {Constelaciones : Revista de Teor{\´i}a Cr{\´i}tica},
  publisher = {Departament de Filosof{\´i}a, Universitat de les Illes Balears},
  address   = {Palma, Spanien},
  issn      = {2172-9506},
  pages     = {426 -- 434},
  year      = {2022},
  language  = {es}
}
@article{Gunnarsson2022,
  author    = {Gunnarsson, Logi},
  title     = {Transforming philosophy. Ein Manifest und weitere Erkl{\"a}rungen},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  volume    = {70},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  number    = {5},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {0012-1045},
  doi       = {10.1515/dzph-2022-0056},
  pages     = {823 -- 836},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {The aim of the paper is to defend the project of transforming philosophy carried out in my book 'Vernunft und Temperament. Eine Philosophie der Philosophie'. In section 1, I distinguish between five philosophical genres in which transformation plays a role: 1. academic texts in which transformation is simply a topic; 2. texts meant to adequately articulate through their form the transformative experiences of their authors; 3. texts aiming to enable the reader to transform herself; 4. texts on other texts; 5. manifestos defending the project of transforming philosophy. Section 2 is such a manifesto. Its main thesis is: "What makes somebody - anybody - a good philosopher is that she is a real human being. " Many of the remaining 16 theses of the manifesto are elaborations on this main thesis. One example is the thesis that the philosophical activity is essentially a becoming - the development of an individual human being.},
  language  = {de}
}
@misc{Sickenberger2022,
  author    = {Sickenberger, Isabel},
  title     = {Marina F. Bykova (Hg.), Hegel's philosophy of spirit. A critical guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 266 S.},
  series = {Hegel-Studien},
  volume    = {56},
  journal   = {Hegel-Studien},
  publisher = {Felix Meiner Verlag},
  address   = {Hamburg},
  issn      = {0073-1587},
  doi       = {10.28937/978-3-7873-4368-3},
  pages     = {159 -- 161},
  year      = {2022},
  language  = {de}
}
@phdthesis{Ranaee2022,
  author    = {Ranaee, Mahdi},
  title     = {Skepticism},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-64565},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-645652},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {164},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {This dissertation offers new and original readings of three major texts in the history of Western philosophy: Descartes's "First Meditation," Kant's "Transcendental Deduction," and his "Refutation of Idealism." The book argues that each text addresses the problem of skepticism and posits that they have a hitherto underappreciated, organic relationship to one another. The dissertation begins with an analysis of Descartes' "First Meditation," which I argue offers two distinct and independent skeptical arguments that differ in both aim and scope. I call these arguments the "veil of ideas" argument and the "author of my origin" argument. My reading counters the standard interpretation of the text, which sees it as offering three stages of doubt, namely the occasional fallibility of the senses, the dream hypothesis, and the evil demon hypothesis. Building on this, the central argument of the dissertation is that Kant's "Transcendental Deduction" actually transforms and radicalizes Descartes's Author of My Origin argument, reconceiving its meaning within the framework of Kant's own transcendental idealist philosophy. Finally, I argue that the Refutation of Idealism offers a similarly radicalized version of Descartes's Veil of Ideas argument, albeit translated into the framework of transcendental idealism.},
  language  = {en}
}
@inproceedings{Schneider2006,
  author    = {Schneider, Hans Julius},
  title     = {Was heißt "einer Regel nicht folgen"?},
  series = {Kreativit{\"a}t},
  booktitle = {Kreativit{\"a}t},
  publisher = {Meiner},
  address   = {Hamburg},
  isbn      = {978-3-7873-1766-0},
  pages     = {785 -- 799},
  year      = {2006},
  language  = {de}
}
@techreport{FaberTipold,
  author    = {Faber, Eike and Tipold, Marc},
  title     = {Justice carved into the body},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Khurana2022,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {Ein Recht gegen das Recht},
  series = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe},
  journal   = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe},
  editor    = {Berger, Christian and Frey, Michael and Priesemuth, Florian},
  isbn      = {978-3-11-078466-4},
  issn      = {1866-8380},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-60006},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-600060},
  pages     = {18},
  year      = {2022},
  language  = {de}
}
@incollection{Khurana2023,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {True right against formal right: The body of right and the limits of property},
  series = {Hegel's philosophy of right: critical perspectives on freedom and history},
  booktitle = {Hegel's philosophy of right: critical perspectives on freedom and history},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {London},
  isbn      = {9781003081036},
  doi       = {10.4324/9781003081036-10},
  pages     = {147 -- 168},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {The conception of property at the basis of Hegel's conception of abstract right seems committed to a problematic form of "possessive individualism." It seems to conceive of right as the expression of human mastery over nature and as based upon an irreducible opposition of person and nature, rightful will, and rightless thing. However, this chapter argues that Hegel starts with a form of possessive individualism only to show that it undermines itself. This is evident in the way Hegel unfolds the nature of property as it applies to external things as well as in the way he explains our self-ownership of our own bodies and lives. Hegel develops the idea of property to a point where it reaches a critical limit and encounters the "true right" that life possesses against the "formal" and "abstract right" of property. Ultimately, Hegel's account suggests that nature should precisely not be treated as a rightless object at our arbitrary disposal but acknowledged as the inorganic body of right.},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{Khurana2023,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {The stage of difference: On the second nature of civil society in Kant and Hegel},
  series = {Naturalism and social philosophy},
  booktitle = {Naturalism and social philosophy},
  publisher = {Rowman \& Littlefield},
  address   = {Lanham},
  isbn      = {978-1-5381-7492-0},
  pages     = {35 -- 64},
  year      = {2023},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{Khurana2022,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {Genus-being: On Marx's dialectical naturalism},
  series = {Nature and naturalism in classical German philosophy},
  booktitle = {Nature and naturalism in classical German philosophy},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {New York},
  isbn      = {978-0-367-54172-9},
  doi       = {10.4324/9781003092056-13},
  pages     = {246 -- 278},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {In his 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx famously claims that the human being is or has a 'Gattungswesen.' This is often understood to mean that the human being is a 'species-being' and is determined by a given 'species-essence.' In this chapter, I argue that this reading is mistaken. What Marx calls Gattungswesen is precisely not a 'species-being,' but a being that, in a very specific sense, transcends the limits of its own given species. This different understanding of the genus- character of the human being opens up a new perspective on the naturalism of the early Marx. He is not informed by a problematic speciesist and essentialist naturalism, as is often assumed, but by a different form of naturalism which I propose to call 'dialectical naturalism.' The chapter starts (I) by developing Hegel's account of genus which provides us with a useful background for (II) understanding Marx's original notion of a genus-being and its practical, social, developmental character. In the last section, I show that (III) the actualization of our genus-being thus depends on the production of a specific type of 'second nature' that is at the heart of Marx's dialectical naturalism.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Khurana2023,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {Dialektische Anthropologie - oder romantischer Idealismus?},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie},
  volume    = {71},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {0012-1045},
  doi       = {10.1515/dzph-2023-0026},
  pages     = {304 -- 311},
  year      = {2023},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Khurana2023,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {Die "europ{\"a}ischen Wilden"},
  series = {Historische Urteilskraft},
  volume    = {5},
  journal   = {Historische Urteilskraft},
  publisher = {Stiftung Deutsches Historisches Museum},
  address   = {Berlin},
  isbn      = {978-3-86102-231-2},
  issn      = {2626-8094},
  pages     = {15 -- 18},
  year      = {2023},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Khurana2022,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {The art of second nature},
  series = {Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal},
  volume    = {43},
  journal   = {Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {0093-4240},
  doi       = {10.5840/gfpj20224312},
  pages     = {33 -- 69},
  year      = {2022},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Khurana2023,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {Altera Natura: Das Anthropoz{\"a}n als {\"a}sthetisches Problem},
  series = {Dritte Natur},
  volume    = {6},
  journal   = {Dritte Natur},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Matthes \& Seitz},
  address   = {Berlin},
  isbn      = {978-3-7518-0704-3},
  issn      = {2625-9885},
  pages     = {175 -- 190},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {Der Kunst wird seit langem nachgesagt, dem Subjekt ein anderes Verh{\"a}ltnis zur Natur zu er{\"o}ffnen, als dies die gew{\"o}hnliche theoretische oder praktische Erkenntnis erm{\"o}glicht. Statt die Natur zum distanzierten Objekt unserer Betrachtung zu machen oder zum bloßen Material und Mittel unserer praktischen Konstruktionen, erschließt sich uns in der Kunst eine Intelligibilit{\"a}t der Natur, die weiter reicht als unsere Begriffe, und eine Nat{\"u}rlichkeit unserer selbst, die uns mit dem verbindet, was uns sonst bloß gegen{\"u}bersteht. Vor diesem Hintergrund scheint es nicht verwunderlich, dass die j{\"u}ngeren Diskussionen um das problematische Verh{\"a}ltnis zur Natur, die das Anthropoz{\"a}n gepr{\"a}gt haben, immer wieder den Blick auf die Kunst richten und ihr Verm{\"o}gen hervorheben, den problematischen modernen Gegensatz von Subjekt und Objekt, Geist und Natur zu {\"u}berwinden, der uns in diese missliche Lage gebracht hat. Wenn die Kunst hier aber weiterf{\"u}hren soll, dann muss sie {\"u}ber die klassischen {\"a}sthetischen Paradigmen des Sch{\"o}nen und des Erhabenen hinausf{\"u}hren. Das Sch{\"o}ne tr{\"a}umt von einer Passung von Subjekt und Natur, die im Anthropoz{\"a}n gerade in Frage steht, und das Erhabene verwendet die {\"U}bermacht der Natur als Vehikel, um eine Macht im intelligiblen Subjekt zu markieren, die von der nat{\"u}rlichen {\"U}bermacht unber{\"u}hrt bleibt. Diese klassischen Figuren {\"a}sthetischer Erfahrung verstellen so, wie tiefgreifend wir das Naturverh{\"a}ltnis neu bestimmen m{\"u}ssen, um auf das Anthropoz{\"a}n zu antworten.},
  language  = {de}
}
@incollection{Khurana2024,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {Die Unheimlichkeit des Gew{\"o}hnlichen},
  series = {Trouble Every Day : Zum Schrecken des Allt{\"a}glichen},
  booktitle = {Trouble Every Day : Zum Schrecken des Allt{\"a}glichen},
  publisher = {Brill Fink},
  address   = {Paderborn},
  isbn      = {978-3-8467-6721-4},
  doi       = {10.30965/9783846767214_006},
  pages     = {91 -- 105},
  year      = {2024},
  language  = {de}
}
@phdthesis{Schmidt2023,
  author    = {Schmidt, Christian},
  title     = {Vom Trauma zum bedeutungsvollen Ersterlebnis},
  publisher = {Karl Alber},
  address   = {Baden-Baden},
  isbn      = {978-3-4959-9450-4},
  doi       = {10.5771/9783495994511},
  pages     = {342},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {Ausgehend von {\"U}berlegungen des anthropologisch orientierten Psychiaters Erwin Straus geht dieses Buch der Frage nach, welche Bedingungen vorliegen, wenn bestimmte Ereignisse von Personen als bedeutsam erlebt werden. Des Weiteren wird ausf{\"u}hrlich er{\"o}rtert, wie sich Personalit{\"a}t im Menschen ausbildet und inwieweit sie von der gelingenden Integration bedeutungsvoller Ersterlebnisse abh{\"a}ngt. Das dabei zugrundeliegende Person-Konzept stellt einen eigenst{\"a}ndigen Syntheseversuch der vier Konzepte von Erwin Straus, Viktor Emil von Gebsattel, Helmuth Plessner und Max Scheler dar. Der Autor arbeitet in ober{\"a}rztlicher Funktion am Klinikum Schloss L{\"u}tgenhof in Dassow, einer Akutklinik f{\"u}r Personale Medizin, integrierte Psychosomatik, Innere Medizin und Psychotherapie},
  language  = {de}
}
@incollection{Gentry2021,
  author    = {Gentry, Gerad},
  title     = {Hegel's logic of purposiveness},
  series = {Kantian legacies in German idealism},
  booktitle = {Kantian legacies in German idealism},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {New York ; London},
  isbn      = {978-1-032-00160-9},
  doi       = {10.4324/9780429429828},
  pages     = {36 -- 70},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {I argue that Hegel's Logic traces an emergent-purposive, logical method that entails two key identities in reason. These identities are (1) between a logic of freedom and necessity, and (2) between the possibilities of a priori and a posteriori reasoning in a purposive method. The purposive method of the Logic is the basis for these identities and, in Hegel's view, facilitates the transition from Kant's transcendental idealism to absolute idealism. I suggest that this method is Hegel's attempt to rework a critique of philosophy according to Kant's insight about the principle grounding the formal purposiveness of the faculties, what Hegel calls, "one of Kant's greatest services to philosophy."},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{Gentry2021,
  author    = {Gentry, Gerad},
  title     = {Introduction},
  series = {Kantian legacies in German Idealism},
  booktitle = {Kantian legacies in German Idealism},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {New York},
  isbn      = {978-0-42942-982-8},
  doi       = {10.4324/9780429429828},
  pages     = {1 -- 12},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Kant wrote in the Critique of Pure Reason, "For the law of reason to seek unity is necessary, since without it we would have no reason, and without that, no coherent use of the understanding, and, lacking that, no sufficient mark of empirical truth." This unity of reason, taken as a holistic condition, was central to the convictions of the idealists. To them, Kant layed bare the right path forward, but also fundamental failings in his execution of a critique of reason which needed to be overcome in order for reason to secure its own, internal end. In this chapter, I discuss key themes in the positive inheritance of Kant's thought in classical German philosophy and offer an overview of the arguments and significances of each contribution to this volume. The aim is not to minimize important differences between Kant and post-Kantian Idealists, but rather to emphasize core retentions of Kant's thought.},
  language  = {en}
}
@book{OPUS4-62242,
  title     = {Kantian legacies in German idealism},
  series = {Routledge studies in nineteenth-century philosophy},
  journal   = {Routledge studies in nineteenth-century philosophy},
  editor    = {Gentry, Gerad},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {New York ; London},
  isbn      = {978-1-032-00160-9},
  issn      = {978-0-429-42982-8},
  doi       = {10.4324/9780429429828},
  pages     = {298},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Scholarship on German Idealism typically couches the systems of Idealism in terms of a rejection of or departure from Kant's critical philosophy. The few accounts that do look to the positive influence of Kant on the Idealists typically focus on the perceived need among the Idealists to revise Kant's system due to various shortcomings arising from his dualism. This volume seeks to reverse this norm. It does this by bringing together an original set of critical reflections on the ways in which the German Idealists maintain specific and fundamental Kantian qualities in their own systems. At the same time, the aim of this volume is not a reduction of German Idealism to Kant's thought. Instead, this volume highlights a set of core ways in which the German Idealists retain specific, fundamentally Kantian principles and qualities. To that extent, this volume paves the way for new interpretations by laying the ground for identifying those significant components of German Idealism that can defensibly be called "Kantian.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Brenner2021,
  author    = {Brenner, Leon S.},
  title     = {The autistic mirror in the real},
  series = {Theory \& psychology},
  volume    = {31},
  journal   = {Theory \& psychology},
  number    = {6},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {0959-3543},
  doi       = {10.1177/09593543211034569},
  pages     = {950 -- 972},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {The mirror stage is one of Jacques Lacan's most well-received metapsychological models in the English-speaking world. In its many renditions Lacan elucidates the different forms of identification that lead to the construction of the Freudian ego. This article utilizes Lacan's mirror stage to provide a novel perspective on autistic embodiment. It develops an integrative model that accounts for the progression of four distinct forms of autistic identification in the mirror stage; these forms provide the basis for the development of four different clinical trajectories in the treatment of autism. This model is posed as an alternative to the clinical and diagnostic framework associated with the autistic spectrum disorder.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{SalaKabeshkin2022,
  author    = {Sala, Lorenzo and Kabeshkin, Anton},
  title     = {A priori philosophy of nature in Hegel and German rationalism},
  series = {British journal for the history of philosophy : Bjhp},
  volume    = {30},
  journal   = {British journal for the history of philosophy : Bjhp},
  number    = {5},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {0960-8788},
  doi       = {10.1080/09608788.2022.2044753},
  pages     = {797 -- 817},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Hegel's many remarks that seem to imply that philosophy should proceed completely a priori pose a problem for his philosophy of nature since, on this reading, Hegel offers an a priori derivation of empirical results of natural sciences. We show how this perception can be mitigated by interpreting Hegel's remarks as broadly in line with the pre-Kantian rationalist notion of a priori and offer reasons for doing so. We show that, rather than being a peculiarity of Hegel's philosophy, the practice of demonstrating a priori the results of empirical sciences was widespread in the pre-Kantian rationalist tradition. We argue that this practice was intelligible in light of the notion of a priori that was still quite prominent during Hegel's life. This notion of a priori differs from Kant's in that, while the latter's notion concerns propositions, the former concerned only their demonstration. According to it, the same proposition could be demonstrated both a posteriori and a priori. Post-Kantian idealists likewise developed projects of demonstrating specific scientific contents a priori. We then make our discussion more concrete by examining a particular case of an a priori derivation of a natural law, namely the law of fall, by both Leibniz and Hegel.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bruno2022,
  author    = {Bruno, Daniele},
  title     = {Being fully excused for wrongdoing},
  series = {Pacific philosophical quarterly},
  volume    = {104},
  journal   = {Pacific philosophical quarterly},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address   = {Hoboken, NJ},
  issn      = {0279-0750},
  doi       = {10.1111/papq.12425},
  pages     = {324 -- 347},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {On the classical understanding, an agent is fully excused for an action if and only if performing this action was a case of faultless wrongdoing. A major motivation for this view is the apparent existence of paradigmatic types of excusing considerations, affecting fault but not wrongness. I show that three such considerations, ignorance, duress and compulsion, can be shown to have direct bearing on the permissibility of actions. The appeal to distinctly identifiable excusing considerations thus does not stand up to closer scrutiny, undermining the classical view and giving us reason to seek alternative ways of drawing the justification/excuse distinction.},
  language  = {en}
}
@book{OPUS4-61497,
  title     = {20 Jahre MenschenRechtsZentrum},
  editor    = {Gunnarsson, Logi and Zimmermann, Andreas},
  publisher = {BWV Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag},
  address   = {Berlin},
  pages     = {38},
  year      = {2015},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{FuchsKoenigGerstenberg2021,
  author    = {Fuchs, Susanne and Koenig, Laura L. and Gerstenberg, Annette},
  title     = {A longitudinal study of speech acoustics in older French females},
  series = {Languages : open access journal},
  volume    = {6},
  journal   = {Languages : open access journal},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {MDPI},
  address   = {Basel},
  issn      = {2226-471X},
  doi       = {10.3390/languages6040211},
  pages     = {24},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Aging in speech production is a multidimensional process. Biological, cognitive, social, and communicative factors can change over time, stay relatively stable, or may even compensate for each other. In this longitudinal work, we focus on stability and change at the laryngeal and supralaryngeal levels in the discourse particle euh produced by 10 older French-speaking females at two times, 10 years apart. Recognizing the multiple discourse roles of euh, we divided out occurrences according to utterance position. We quantified the frequency of euh, and evaluated acoustic changes in formants, fundamental frequency, and voice quality across time and utterance position. Results showed that euh frequency was stable with age. The only acoustic measure that revealed an age effect was harmonics-to-noise ratio, showing less noise at older ages. Other measures mostly varied with utterance position, sometimes in interaction with age. Some voice quality changes could reflect laryngeal adjustments that provide for airflow conservation utterance-finally. The data suggest that aging effects may be evident in some prosodic positions (e.g., utterance-final position), but not others (utterance-initial position). Thus, it is essential to consider the interactions among these factors in future work and not assume that vocal aging is evident throughout the signal.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Batti2023,
  author    = {Batti, Anil Dominic},
  title     = {Schopenhauer's doctrine of salvation in relation to his critique of religion and philosophical teachings},
  publisher = {Logos},
  address   = {Berlin},
  isbn      = {978-3-83255-735-5},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {319},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was perhaps the last polymath among the great Germanic philosophers. Switching with ease and elegance between epistemic positions and fields as diverse as idealism and empiricism, fideism and rationalism, realism and nominalism, art and religion, jurisprudence and politics, psychology and occultism, Schopenhauer erected an imposing edifice bearing testimony to his universal learning. This study is an investigation into the very conclusion of Schopenhauer's philosophy and endeavours to answer the following question: did Schopenhauer's doctrine of salvation issue forth organically from his intellectual output or was it annexed to his philosophy as a result of his critical engagement with religion? The labyrinthine paths through which Schopenhauer arrives at the soteriological culmination of his philosophy are subjected to critical assessment; the picture that emerges is of a philosopher who seemed convinced that he had solved some of the most pressing cosmic riddles to have tormented mankind through the ages.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Wallage2023,
  author    = {Wallage, Martijn},
  title     = {Dotting the "I think"},
  series = {Reading R{\"o}dl : On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity},
  journal   = {Reading R{\"o}dl : On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity},
  publisher = {Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Milton},
  isbn      = {978-1-03-234951-0},
  doi       = {/10.4324/9781003324638},
  pages     = {316 -- 333},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {This chapter discusses a central problem in Sebastian R{\"o}dl's Self-Consciousness and Objectivity and in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. In a statement of the form "I think p", the words "I think" do not contribute to the content, and yet they are not redundant. In other words, a thinking subject is not something and yet not nothing. But then in what sense is a thinking subject a part of the world? The problem is intractable on a merely negative understanding of "I think", like Anscombe's merely negative thesis, endorsed by R{\"o}dl, that "I" is not a referring expression. In search of a positive understanding, this chapter proposes to understand "I think" by comparison to "hello". A speaking subject is the expression of mutual presence in conversation - in that sense a limit of the world. Such expression may be compared to facial expression, with the crucial difference that a verbal expression can be taken up - i.e., repeated - in the third person. A speaking subject, then, is potentially absent from conversation, and in that sense a part of the world.},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{Khurana2023,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {Self-knowledge and knowledge of nature},
  series = {Reading R{\"o}dl : On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity},
  booktitle = {Reading R{\"o}dl : On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity},
  publisher = {Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Milton},
  isbn      = {978-1-03-234951-0},
  doi       = {10.4324/9781003324638},
  pages     = {195 -- 223},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {In this chapter, I consider the unity of self-consciousness and objectivity. Starting from the notion that the objective character and the self-conscious character of thought seem in tension, I discuss Sebastian R{\"o}dl's Self-Consciousness and Objectivity and his thesis that this tension is merely apparent. This resolution suggests an immediate route to absolute idealism. I recall two Hegelian objections against such an immediate route. Against this background, it transpires that the dissolution of the apparent opposition of objectivity and self-consciousness can only be a preliminary step, opening our eyes to an actual opposition animating the pursuit of knowledge: the opposition of knowledge of nature and self-knowledge. This actual opposition cannot be removed as merely apparent and instead has to be sublated through articulation of its speculative unity. I consider two paradigms for the exposition of such a speculative unity: Kant's account of judgments of beauty, and Hegel's account of the speculative unity of life and self-consciousness. I close by contrasting these two approaches with R{\"o}dl's characterization, which strikes me as one-sided. Absolute idealism, properly understood, requires us to develop the speculative unity of knowledge of nature and self-knowledge from both sides, showing us that knowledge of nature is self-knowledge, but equally: that self-knowledge requires knowledge of ourselves as nature.},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{Khurana2022,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {Ein Recht gegen das Recht},
  series = {Rechte des K{\"o}rpers},
  booktitle = {Rechte des K{\"o}rpers},
  editor    = {Berger, Christian and Frey, Michael and Priesemuth, Florian},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin, Boston},
  isbn      = {978-3-11-078466-4},
  doi       = {10.1515/9783110784985-004},
  pages     = {45 -- 60},
  year      = {2022},
  language  = {de}
}
@incollection{KayaKopshteyn2020,
  author    = {Kaya, Gizem and Kopshteyn, Georgy},
  title     = {Dispersing the fog},
  series = {Corruption and informal practices in the Middle East and North Africa},
  booktitle = {Corruption and informal practices in the Middle East and North Africa},
  editor    = {Kubbe, Ina and Varraich, Aiysha},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {London},
  isbn      = {978-0-367-82285-9},
  doi       = {10.4324/9780367822859-2},
  pages     = {23 -- 42},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Countries in the Middle East generally fare poorly in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. One of the biggest challenges for the anti-corruption-regime in the Middle East are the many forms of corruption that are not being recognised as such on the local level, if assessed against a culturally relativistic benchmark. Our paper seeks to establish a unifying ground by providing a functional analysis of corruption which is both, normatively guiding and culturally sensitive. We demarcate our work as follows: (1) our reference point will be the phenomenon of institutional corruption, whereas (2) our working definition of corruption will conceive of corruption as a violation of role-specific norms that is motivated by the role-occupier's private motives. In an attempt to offer a comprehensive approach, corruption will be viewed on two differing levels. On the external level, we will begin with an investigation of features within a norm-order that typically instantiate corruption. We will argue that corruption is externally conditioned by an authority's inability to enforce and (re)establish the norms of conduct that ought to be action-guiding in office. This changes the expectation-structure within a norm-order and erodes public trust in the authorities, giving rise to willing perpetrators. Complementing this, the internal level of our framework will emphasize the motivational deficits of corrupt acts. It will be argued that this deficit can typically be found in societies that lack civic virtues. This, we suspect, is the functional reason why corrupt societies have such a hard time to overcome the problem: they lack both features and are, as a consequence, caught in a vicious circle as they struggle to strengthen civil society and consolidate institutional structures - whereas corruption increasingly disappears from the radar as it becomes accepted reality.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Troeger2023,
  type      = {Master Thesis},
  author    = {Tr{\"o}ger, Hannah},
  title     = {Zeitreisen erkl{\"a}ren},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-59303},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-593039},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {77},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {Die vorliegende Arbeit dreht sich um die Frage, wie sich schl{\"u}ssig und im Einklang mit g{\"a}ngigen philosophischen Modellen von Zeit und Identit{\"a}t {\"u}ber Zeitreisen sprechen l{\"a}sst. Dabei l{\"a}uft die Darstellung nicht auf einen einzelnen theoretischen Ansatz hinaus, sondern zeigt verschiedene Implikationen von Zeitreisen angesichts unterschiedlicher Konzepte von Zeit und Persistenz auf. Gearbeitet wird mit den Zeitreise-Modellen von Jack Meiland (1974), Geoffrey Goddu (2003) und Peter van Inwagen (2010) und insbesondere {\"U}berlegungen zu growing block-Universen und vierdimensionaler Identit{\"a}t werden weitergef{\"u}hrt. Schwerpunkte der Arbeit liegen einerseits auf Erkl{\"a}rungen zu Ver{\"a}nderungen der Vergangenheit und andererseits auf dem Problem der Bilokation durch Zeitreisen in Zeiten, zu denen die Zeitreisende bereits existiert. Nicholas J. J. Smith (2015) hat als notwendige Voraussetzung f{\"u}r die Erkl{\"a}rbarkeit von Ver{\"a}nderungen der Vergangenheit dia-hyper-chrone Identit{\"a}tsbedingungen f{\"u}r Jahre gefordert. Ich zeige, dass es sich hierbei um eine zu starke Forderung handelt. Demnach ist die Erkl{\"a}rung von Ver{\"a}nderungen der Vergangenheit durch Annihilation in growing block-Universen, wie Goddu und van Inwagen sie einf{\"u}hren, legitim. Bilokation stellt eine Herausforderung f{\"u}r personale Identit{\"a}t dar. Ich schlage eine {\"u}berarbeitete Definition von gegenw{\"a}rtigen zeitlichen Teilen vor, die es zul{\"a}sst, dass mehr als ein zeitlicher Teil einer diachron identischen Person synchron pr{\"a}sent sein kann. Auf diese Weise muss nicht zwischen zeitlichen Teilen und Personenstadien differenziert werden, wie Ted Sider (2001) es tut. Ich komme im Rahmen dieser Arbeit zu den Ergebnissen, dass erstens bisher kein Modell von Zeit oder Persistenz bekannt ist, f{\"u}r das Zeitreisen grunds{\"a}tzlich auszuschließen sind. Eine umfangreiche Systematik {\"u}ber M{\"o}glichkeiten und Implikationen von Zeitreisen bleibt jedoch l{\"u}ckenhaft, solange keine pr{\"a}sentistischen Modelle von Zeitreisen vorliegen. Zweitens erweisen sich Zeitreisen, die keine Ver{\"a}nderungen verursachen, nicht als weniger problematisch als Zeitreisen, die Ver{\"a}nderungen verursachen. Erstere werfen eigene Probleme auf, wie das Motivationsproblem und die Frage nach der Determination durch Zukunftsfakten. Drittens lassen sich trotz all der geleisteten Erkl{\"a}rungen weiterhin Szenarien entwickeln, die suspekt bleiben. Dies verweist auf die weiterf{\"u}hrende Frage, inwiefern Chronologie wesentlich und unverzichtbar ist f{\"u}r die Intelligibilit{\"a}t beispielsweise sozialer Interaktionen und Institutionen.},
  language  = {de}
}
@misc{Khurana2021,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {This other life that knows itself as life},
  series = {European journal of philosophy},
  volume    = {29},
  journal   = {European journal of philosophy},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address   = {Oxford},
  isbn      = {978-0-19-094761-3},
  issn      = {0966-8373},
  doi       = {10.1111/ejop.12745},
  pages     = {1136 -- 1144},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {In this paper, I discuss Karen Ng's reconstruction of Hegel's concept of life. On Ng's account, Hegel's conception of life has a remarkable double role to play: Life is both the proper object of judgment as well as a fundamental characterization of the activity of the judging subject. In a first step, I highlight the insight that Ng's account sheds on the internal connection of life and self-consciousness and the peculiar normativity of life. In a second step, I raise three concerns about Ng's strong focus on the logical notion of life which she characterizes as non-empirical and a priori. I argue that in order to uncover the full significance of the notion of life for Hegel we have to turn to his Philosophy of Nature and Spirit.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Ginev2021,
  author    = {Ginev, Dimitri},
  title     = {Die Idee einer Sprachhermeneutik},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  volume    = {69},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {0012-1045},
  doi       = {10.1515/dzph-2021-0049},
  pages     = {576 -- 602},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Any conception in linguistics and linguistic philosophy that prioritizes the world-disclosing function over the world-representing function of language can be regarded as a kind of linguistic hermeneutics. The paper tries to specify this general thesis by picking up and analysing historical trends in the philosophy of language. It spells out the relationship between the situatedness of locutors in the medium of linguistic practices and the way in which they (through their speech acts) articulate this medium by actualizing possibilities for personal expressivity and interpersonal communication. It is argued that the starting point from the medium that always already transcends the particular speech acts offers an alternative to inferential semantics. From the perspective of linguistic hermeneutics, the world is disclosed and exposed to ongoing articulation in characteristic hermeneutic situations of language use. The concepts of linguistic medium and discursive articulation of the world are treated in terms of hermeneutic trans- subjectivity as enabling all forms of communicative intersubjectivity. If one ignores the fore-structuring role of the former, one would hypostatise the latter. With regard to this claim, the theory of formal pragmatics is critically discussed.},
  language  = {de}
}
@misc{Spiegel2021,
  author    = {Spiegel, Thomas J.},
  title     = {Das Wesen des Menschen in der Philosophischen Anthropologie},
  series = {Allgemeine Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : AZP},
  volume    = {46},
  journal   = {Allgemeine Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : AZP},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Frommann-Holzboog},
  address   = {Stuttgart},
  issn      = {0340-7969},
  doi       = {10.12857/AZP.910460120.},
  pages     = {121 -- 126},
  year      = {2021},
  language  = {de}
}
@misc{Spiegel2020,
  author    = {Spiegel, Thomas J.},
  title     = {Errata zu: Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf: Ist der Naturalismus eine Ideologie? - (Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung. -68 (2020), 1. - S. 51 -71. - DOI: 10.1515/dzph-2020-0003)},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  volume    = {68},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {0012-1045},
  doi       = {10.1515/dzph-2020-8888},
  pages     = {492 -- 493},
  year      = {2020},
  language  = {de}
}
@misc{Ranaee2021,
  author    = {Ranaee, Mahdi},
  title     = {Rezension zu: Pasnau, Robert: After certainty: a history of our epistemic ideals and illusions. - Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. - 384 pp. - ISBN: 978-0-19-885218-6},
  series = {Archiv f{\"u}r Geschichte der Philosophie},
  volume    = {103},
  journal   = {Archiv f{\"u}r Geschichte der Philosophie},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {0003-9101},
  doi       = {10.1515/agph-2020-2013},
  pages     = {189 -- 194},
  year      = {2021},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Haag2020,
  author    = {Haag, Johannes},
  title     = {Rezension zu: Willascheck, Marcus: Kant on the sources of metaphysics: the dialectic of pure reason. - New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018, 298pp. - ISBN: 978-1-108-47263-0},
  series = {European journal of philosophy},
  volume    = {28},
  journal   = {European journal of philosophy},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Wiley},
  address   = {Hoboken},
  issn      = {0966-8373},
  doi       = {10.1111/ejop.12555},
  pages     = {524 -- 528},
  year      = {2020},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Krueger2021,
  author    = {Kr{\"u}ger, Hans-Peter},
  title     = {Der geistig-kulturelle Umgang mit der Covid-19-Pandemie und ihrer Wirtschaftskrise als Testfall},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  volume    = {69},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {0012-1045},
  doi       = {10.1515/dzph-2021-0004},
  pages     = {67 -- 97},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Why has the global West (North America, Europe) handled the covid-19 pandemic and the corresponding economic crisis so much worse than the global East (East Asia)? The crises demonstrate the degree to which the West is shaped by its forms of competition and the East by its forms of cooperation. In the West, we have become habitualised to American neoliberalism over the last two generations. In the East, varieties of neo-Confucianism and neo-Buddhism have been transformed into national cultures. The way humans understand their position in the world intellectually and react to crises according to corresponding habit makes an effective difference. The present comparison between global East and West makes use of Hannah Arendt's conception of politics and the shared world as well as of Helmuth Plessner's conception of mediated immediacy in forms of modern biopower. The pandemic is a catalyst within the decline of the West and the rise of the East.},
  language  = {de}
}
@misc{GodessRiccitelli2020,
  author    = {Godess-Riccitelli, Moran},
  title     = {Rezension zu: Chaouli, Michel: Thinking with Kant's Critique of Judgment. - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017. - Pp. 315. - ISBN: 978-0-67497136-3},
  series = {Kantian review},
  volume    = {25},
  journal   = {Kantian review},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Cambridge Univ. Press},
  address   = {Cambridge},
  issn      = {1369-4154},
  doi       = {10.1017/S1369415420000102},
  pages     = {313 -- 317},
  year      = {2020},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Ranaee2021,
  author    = {Ranaee, Mahdi},
  title     = {Book review: de Boer, Karin: Kant's reform of metaphysics: the critique of pure reason reconsidered. - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. - 290 pp. - ISBN: 978-11-0889798-3},
  series = {International journal of philosophical studies},
  volume    = {29},
  journal   = {International journal of philosophical studies},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Abingdon},
  isbn      = {9781108897983},
  issn      = {0967-2559},
  doi       = {10.1080/09672559.2021.1873545},
  pages     = {121 -- 126},
  year      = {2021},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Schneider2020,
  author    = {Schneider, Hans Julius},
  title     = {What is it that Wittgenstein denies in his philosophy of psychology?},
  series = {Wittgenstein-Studien},
  volume    = {11},
  journal   = {Wittgenstein-Studien},
  number    = {Heft 1},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin ; New York, NY},
  issn      = {1868-7431},
  doi       = {10.1515/witt-2020-0006},
  pages     = {105 -- 131},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Taking up some of W.'s paradoxical remarks about the existence of 'mental things' the paper investigates, what exactly he is criticizing. After a discussion of the mistaken idea of a private baptizing of one's own 'mental events' W.'s general criticism of the 'object-and-name model' is treated with a view on the consequences it has for our understanding of the mental. This treatment includes a discussion of figurative kinds of language use as well as a discussion of the difference between 'things' and 'objects of reference': With respect to figurative uses of language it often makes no sense to treat constituent expressions as names of objects, and not all objects of reference are things in an unproblematic ordinary-life sense. So what at first sight appears to be a limitation of our understanding of the nature of an object and consequently seems to ask for more empirical research often turns out to be a limitation of our understanding of how we use our language. The paper concludes that one important aspect of what the later W. opposes is dualism: The mental cannot be conceived of as an additional 'something' a description of which could be just added to a description of a person as a physical being. Thus W.'s anti-dualism can also be read as turning against a dualism in his Tractatus: The mental realm as well as other provinces of `the higher' are no longer seen as areas of entities about which we have to be silent.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{GodessRiccitelli2020,
  author    = {Godess-Riccitelli, Moran},
  title     = {The cipher of nature in Kant's third Critique},
  series = {Con-Textos Kantianos : international journal of philosophy},
  journal   = {Con-Textos Kantianos : international journal of philosophy},
  number    = {12},
  publisher = {Instituto de Filosof{\´i}a del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cient{\´i}ficas},
  address   = {Madrid},
  issn      = {2386-7655},
  pages     = {338 -- 357},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {What is it that we encountered with in our aesthetic experience of natural beauty? Does nature "figuratively speaks to us in its beautiful forms", 2 to use Kant's phrasing in the third Critique, or is it merely our way of interpreting nature whether this be its purpose or not? Kant does not answer these questions directly. Rather, he leaves the ambiguity around them by his repeated use of terminology of ciphers when it comes to our aesthetic experience in nature. This paper examines Kant's terminology of ciphers in the Critique of Judgment and demonstrate through it the intimate link aesthetic experience in natural beauty has with human morality. A link whose culmination point is embodied in the representation of beauty as a symbol of morality.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Haag2020,
  author    = {Haag, Johannes},
  title     = {Transcendental Principles and Perceptual Warrant},
  series = {Wilfrid Sellars and twentieth-century philosophy},
  journal   = {Wilfrid Sellars and twentieth-century philosophy},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {Abingdon},
  isbn      = {978-1-351-20275-6},
  pages     = {130 -- 150},
  year      = {2020},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Khurana2021,
  author    = {Khurana, Thomas},
  title     = {The struggle for recognition and the authority of the second person},
  series = {European journal of philosophy},
  volume    = {29},
  journal   = {European journal of philosophy},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address   = {Oxford},
  issn      = {0966-8373},
  doi       = {10.1111/ejop.12675},
  pages     = {552 -- 561},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {In this introductory paper, I discuss the second-personal approach to ethics and the theory of recognition as two accounts of the fundamental sociality of the human form of life. The first section delineates the deep affinities between the two approaches. They both put a reciprocal social constellation front and center from which they derive the fundamental norms of moral and social life and a social conception of freedom. The second section discusses three points of contrast between the two approaches: The accounts differ in that the second-personal approach opts for a narrower conception of recognition focusing on mutual moral accountability, whereas recognition theory suggests a broader conception including relations of love, respect, and esteem. Secondly, the accounts differ as to how they conceive of the interrelation of the I-thou and the I-We relationship. Finally, they differ with regard to the way they think of struggles for recognition. Whereas the second-personal approach suggests that we can understand struggles on the basis of a transcendental infrastructure of second-personal address, the theory of recognition considers norms of recognition as themselves constituted by dialectical social struggles. The paper closes with a reflection on the ways in which both approaches can help us understand the social vulnerability of the human form of life.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Genazzano2020,
  author    = {Genazzano, Pablo},
  title     = {Rezension zu: Rogozinski, Jacob: Kanten. Esbozos kantianos Trad. Francisco Caja y Nemrod Carrasco. - Barcelona: Los Libros del T{\´a}bano, 2016. - 257 p. - ISBN: 978-84-615-4918-4},
  series = {Convivium : revista de filosof{\´i}a},
  volume    = {33},
  journal   = {Convivium : revista de filosof{\´i}a},
  number    = {33},
  publisher = {Universitat de Barcelona},
  address   = {Barcelona},
  issn      = {0010-8235},
  pages     = {201 -- 206},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Los Libros del T{\´a}bano estrena su carrera editorial con la traducci{\´o}n de Kanten. Esbozos kantianos , un conjunto de ensayos escritos por Jacob Ro - gozinski entre los a{\~n}os ochenta y noventa que se remontan a los aspectos menos estudiados, pero que, ir{\´o}nicamente, resultan ser los m{\´a}s problem{\´a} - ticos de la filosof{\´i}a de Kant. Rogozinski va a los Kanten (palabra alemana que designa los cantos, las esquinas o los bordes de un objeto) para elabo - rar el camino de un «retorno a Kant». Pero este retorno corre en direcci{\´o}n inversa a la de una cl{\´a}sica reconstrucci{\´o}n o estudio, siempre determinado por la intenci{\´o}n de dar una «imagen global» del pensamiento kantiano; lo que tenemos enfrente es una lectura a contrapelo.},
  language  = {es}
}
@incollection{Krueger2020,
  author    = {Kr{\"u}ger, Hans-Peter},
  title     = {Closed environment and open world},
  series = {Jakob von Uexk{\"u}ll and philosophy: life, environments, anthropology},
  booktitle = {Jakob von Uexk{\"u}ll and philosophy: life, environments, anthropology},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {London},
  isbn      = {978-0-429-27909-6},
  doi       = {10.4324/9780429279096},
  pages     = {89 -- 105},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {According to Plessner, both adaptation and selection can be conceived not just as requested by the environment but also as actively proceeding from the organism. In this respect, Plessner finds in Uexk{\"u}ll's new biology a powerful counterweight to the constraints of Darwinism. However, despite all the points in common in their respective understanding of the problem, Plessner reproaches to Uexk{\"u}ll to have entirely missed the intermediate layer of the lived body [Leib] between the organism and its environment. Unlike Uexk{\"u}ll, concerning the more developed animals, Plessner took up elements of animal psychology from Wolfgang K{\"o}hler and Frederik Jacobus Johannes Buytendijk. Finally, Plessner finds insufficiencies also in Uexk{\"u}ll's distinction between the notion of world and the notion of environment, which would lead to the parallel positing of different environments. In reaction to Uexk{\"u}ll's leveling of all environments, Plessner drafted a philosophical-anthropological spectrum between the intelligent way of living observed in the great apes, whose intelligence had been demonstrated, and the co-wordly life of the symbolic mind as seen in the personal sphere of human life.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Kabeshkin2022,
  author    = {Kabeshkin, Anton},
  title     = {Logical and natural life in Hegel},
  series = {European journal of philosophy},
  volume    = {30},
  journal   = {European journal of philosophy},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address   = {Oxford},
  issn      = {0966-8373},
  doi       = {10.1111/ejop.12647},
  pages     = {129 -- 147},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {In this article, I discuss the specific ways in which Hegel's account of life and organisms advances upon Kant's account of natural purposes in the third Critique. First of all, I argue that it is essential for Hegel's account that it contains two levels. The first level is that of logical life, the discussion of which does not depend on any empirical knowledge of natural organisms. I provide my reconstruction of this logical account of life that answers to the objection made by a number of Hegel scholars to the effect that Hegel does in fact rely on empirical knowledge at this place in the logic. The second level is that of natural organisms themselves. I argue that it is with the help of this separation of the logical and natural levels, as well as his doctrine of the impotence of nature, that Hegel, unlike Kant, (a) is able to claim that not everything in natural organisms is purposive, and (b) provide a philosophical, and not merely empirical, account of the distinction between plants and animals. In both of these respects, Hegel's position can be seen as a welcome advance over Kant.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{KayaKopshteyn2022,
  author    = {Kaya, Gizem and Kopshteyn, Georgy},
  title     = {Die Impfpflicht-Debatte auf dem philosophischen Pr{\"u}fstand},
  series = {MenschenRechtsMagazin : MRM ; Informationen, Meinungen, Analysen},
  volume    = {27},
  journal   = {MenschenRechtsMagazin : MRM ; Informationen, Meinungen, Analysen},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  issn      = {1434-2820},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-57154},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-571541},
  pages     = {94 -- 110},
  year      = {2022},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Spiegel2020,
  author    = {Spiegel, Thomas J.},
  title     = {Ist der Naturalismus eine Ideologie?},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  volume    = {68},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {0012-1045},
  doi       = {10.1515/dzph-2020-0003},
  pages     = {51 -- 71},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Naturalism is the current orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Naturalism is the conjunction of the (ontological) claim that all that truly exists are the entities countenanced by the natural sciences and the (epistemological) claim that the only true knowledge is natural-scientific knowledge. Drawing on some recent work in Critical Theory, this article argues that naturalism qualifies as an ideology. This is the case because naturalism meets three key aspects shared by paradigmatic cases of ideology: (i) naturalism has practical consequences and implications of a specific kind, (ii) those endorsing naturalism fall prey to a dual deception: having false meta-level beliefs about naturalism as being without alternative, and (iii) naturalism has a tendency towards self-immunisation. The article ends by suggesting we pull naturalism out of our collective cognitive backgrounds onto the main stage of critical discourse, making it a proper topic for philosophical critique again.},
  language  = {de}
}