@phdthesis{Tan2023, author = {Tan, Jing}, title = {Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning for Interactive Decision-Making}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-60700}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-607000}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {xii, 135}, year = {2023}, abstract = {Distributed decision-making studies the choices made among a group of interactive and self-interested agents. Specifically, this thesis is concerned with the optimal sequence of choices an agent makes as it tries to maximize its achievement on one or multiple objectives in the dynamic environment. The optimization of distributed decision-making is important in many real-life applications, e.g., resource allocation (of products, energy, bandwidth, computing power, etc.) and robotics (heterogeneous agent cooperation on games or tasks), in various fields such as vehicular network, Internet of Things, smart grid, etc. This thesis proposes three multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms combined with game-theoretic tools to study strategic interaction between decision makers, using resource allocation in vehicular network as an example. Specifically, the thesis designs an interaction mechanism based on second-price auction, incentivizes the agents to maximize multiple short-term and long-term, individual and system objectives, and simulates a dynamic environment with realistic mobility data to evaluate algorithm performance and study agent behavior. Theoretical results show that the mechanism has Nash equilibria, is a maximization of social welfare and Pareto optimal allocation of resources in a stationary environment. Empirical results show that in the dynamic environment, our proposed learning algorithms outperform state-of-the-art algorithms in single and multi-objective optimization, and demonstrate very good generalization property in significantly different environments. Specifically, with the long-term multi-objective learning algorithm, we demonstrate that by considering the long-term impact of decisions, as well as by incentivizing the agents with a system fairness reward, the agents achieve better results in both individual and system objectives, even when their objectives are private, randomized, and changing over time. Moreover, the agents show competitive behavior to maximize individual payoff when resource is scarce, and cooperative behavior in achieving a system objective when resource is abundant; they also learn the rules of the game, without prior knowledge, to overcome disadvantages in initial parameters (e.g., a lower budget). To address practicality concerns, the thesis also provides several computational performance improvement methods, and tests the algorithm in a single-board computer. Results show the feasibility of online training and inference in milliseconds. There are many potential future topics following this work. 1) The interaction mechanism can be modified into a double-auction, eliminating the auctioneer, resembling a completely distributed, ad hoc network; 2) the objectives are assumed to be independent in this thesis, there may be a more realistic assumption regarding correlation between objectives, such as a hierarchy of objectives; 3) current work limits information-sharing between agents, the setup befits applications with privacy requirements or sparse signaling; by allowing more information-sharing between the agents, the algorithms can be modified for more cooperative scenarios such as robotics.}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{Molitor2023, author = {Molitor, Louise}, title = {Strategic Residential Segregation}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-60135}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-601359}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {xi, 210}, year = {2023}, abstract = {Residential segregation is a widespread phenomenon that can be observed in almost every major city. In these urban areas, residents with different ethnical or socioeconomic backgrounds tend to form homogeneous clusters. In Schelling's classical segregation model two types of agents are placed on a grid. An agent is content with its location if the fraction of its neighbors, which have the same type as the agent, is at least 𝜏, for some 0 < 𝜏 ≤ 1. Discontent agents simply swap their location with a randomly chosen other discontent agent or jump to a random empty location. The model gives a coherent explanation of how clusters can form even if all agents are tolerant, i.e., if they agree to live in mixed neighborhoods. For segregation to occur, all it needs is a slight bias towards agents preferring similar neighbors. Although the model is well studied, previous research focused on a random process point of view. However, it is more realistic to assume instead that the agents strategically choose where to live. We close this gap by introducing and analyzing game-theoretic models of Schelling segregation, where rational agents strategically choose their locations. As the first step, we introduce and analyze a generalized game-theoretic model that allows more than two agent types and more general underlying graphs modeling the residential area. We introduce different versions of Swap and Jump Schelling Games. Swap Schelling Games assume that every vertex of the underlying graph serving as a residential area is occupied by an agent and pairs of discontent agents can swap their locations, i.e., their occupied vertices, to increase their utility. In contrast, for the Jump Schelling Game, we assume that there exist empty vertices in the graph and agents can jump to these vacant vertices if this increases their utility. We show that the number of agent types as well as the structure of underlying graph heavily influence the dynamic properties and the tractability of finding an optimal strategy profile. As a second step, we significantly deepen these investigations for the swap version with 𝜏 = 1 by studying the influence of the underlying topology modeling the residential area on the existence of equilibria, the Price of Anarchy, and the dynamic properties. Moreover, we restrict the movement of agents locally. As a main takeaway, we find that both aspects influence the existence and the quality of stable states. Furthermore, also for the swap model, we follow sociological surveys and study, asking the same core game-theoretic questions, non-monotone singlepeaked utility functions instead of monotone ones, i.e., utility functions that are not monotone in the fraction of same-type neighbors. Our results clearly show that moving from monotone to non-monotone utilities yields novel structural properties and different results in terms of existence and quality of stable states. In the last part, we introduce an agent-based saturated open-city variant, the Flip Schelling Process, in which agents, based on the predominant type in their neighborhood, decide whether to change their types. We provide a general framework for analyzing the influence of the underlying topology on residential segregation and investigate the probability that an edge is monochrome, i.e., that both incident vertices have the same type, on random geometric and Erdős-R{\´e}nyi graphs. For random geometric graphs, we prove the existence of a constant c > 0 such that the expected fraction of monochrome edges after the Flip Schelling Process is at least 1/2 + c. For Erdős-R{\´e}nyi graphs, we show the expected fraction of monochrome edges after the Flip Schelling Process is at most 1/2 + o(1).}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{Discher2023, author = {Discher, S{\"o}ren}, title = {Real-Time Rendering Techniques for Massive 3D Point Clouds}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-60164}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-601641}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {ix, 123}, year = {2023}, abstract = {Today, point clouds are among the most important categories of spatial data, as they constitute digital 3D models of the as-is reality that can be created at unprecedented speed and precision. However, their unique properties, i.e., lack of structure, order, or connectivity information, necessitate specialized data structures and algorithms to leverage their full precision. In particular, this holds true for the interactive visualization of point clouds, which requires to balance hardware limitations regarding GPU memory and bandwidth against a naturally high susceptibility to visual artifacts. This thesis focuses on concepts, techniques, and implementations of robust, scalable, and portable 3D visualization systems for massive point clouds. To that end, a number of rendering, visualization, and interaction techniques are introduced, that extend several basic strategies to decouple rendering efforts and data management: First, a novel visualization technique that facilitates context-aware filtering, highlighting, and interaction within point cloud depictions. Second, hardware-specific optimization techniques that improve rendering performance and image quality in an increasingly diversified hardware landscape. Third, natural and artificial locomotion techniques for nausea-free exploration in the context of state-of-the-art virtual reality devices. Fourth, a framework for web-based rendering that enables collaborative exploration of point clouds across device ecosystems and facilitates the integration into established workflows and software systems. In cooperation with partners from industry and academia, the practicability and robustness of the presented techniques are showcased via several case studies using representative application scenarios and point cloud data sets. In summary, the work shows that the interactive visualization of point clouds can be implemented by a multi-tier software architecture with a number of domain-independent, generic system components that rely on optimization strategies specific to large point clouds. It demonstrates the feasibility of interactive, scalable point cloud visualization as a key component for distributed IT solutions that operate with spatial digital twins, providing arguments in favor of using point clouds as a universal type of spatial base data usable directly for visualization purposes.}, language = {en} }