@article{Schneider2020,
  author    = {Schneider, Hans Julius},
  title     = {What is it that Wittgenstein denies in his philosophy of psychology?},
  series = {Wittgenstein-Studien},
  volume    = {11},
  journal   = {Wittgenstein-Studien},
  number    = {Heft 1},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin ; New York, NY},
  issn      = {1868-7431},
  doi       = {10.1515/witt-2020-0006},
  pages     = {105 -- 131},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Taking up some of W.'s paradoxical remarks about the existence of 'mental things' the paper investigates, what exactly he is criticizing. After a discussion of the mistaken idea of a private baptizing of one's own 'mental events' W.'s general criticism of the 'object-and-name model' is treated with a view on the consequences it has for our understanding of the mental. This treatment includes a discussion of figurative kinds of language use as well as a discussion of the difference between 'things' and 'objects of reference': With respect to figurative uses of language it often makes no sense to treat constituent expressions as names of objects, and not all objects of reference are things in an unproblematic ordinary-life sense. So what at first sight appears to be a limitation of our understanding of the nature of an object and consequently seems to ask for more empirical research often turns out to be a limitation of our understanding of how we use our language. The paper concludes that one important aspect of what the later W. opposes is dualism: The mental cannot be conceived of as an additional 'something' a description of which could be just added to a description of a person as a physical being. Thus W.'s anti-dualism can also be read as turning against a dualism in his Tractatus: The mental realm as well as other provinces of `the higher' are no longer seen as areas of entities about which we have to be silent.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Schneider1997,
  author    = {Schneider, Hans Julius},
  title     = {The situatedness of thinking, knowing and speaking : Wittgenstein and Gendlin ; mit einer Antwort von Gendlin},
  year      = {1997},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Schneider2005,
  author    = {Schneider, Hans Julius},
  title     = {Speaking about the interior : a look at Gerhard Roth with Ludwig Wittgestein},
  year      = {2005},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Schneider1999,
  author    = {Schneider, Hans Julius},
  title     = {Mind, matter, and our longing for the "One World"},
  year      = {1999},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Schneider2000,
  author    = {Schneider, Hans Julius},
  title     = {Metaphors and theoretical terms : problems in referring to the mental},
  year      = {2000},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Schneider1997,
  author    = {Schneider, Hans Julius},
  title     = {Metaphorically created objects : 'real' or 'only linguistic'?},
  year      = {1997},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{SchneiderSellmann2003,
  author    = {Schneider, Hans Julius and Sellmann, James D.},
  title     = {Liberating Language in Linji and Wittgenstein},
  year      = {2003},
  abstract  = {Our aim in this paper is to explicate some unexpected and striking similarities and equally important differences, which have not been discussed in the literature, between Wittgenstein's methodology and the approach of Chinese Chan or Japanese Zen Buddhism. We say 'unexpected' similarities because it is not a common practice, especially in the analytic tradition, to invest very much in comparative philosophy. The peculiarity of this study will be further accentuated in the view of those of the 'old school' who see Wittgenstein as a logical positivist, and Zen as a religious excuse for militarism or sadomasochism. If the second claim were true, the following investigation would not only be futile but also impossible. That the first claim, concerning the 'old school' perspective on Wittgenstein, si incorrect, we will demonstrate in the ensuing discussion. By now more experts have come to accept hits claim and we hope that our comparative perspective will add even more momentum},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Schneider1997,
  author    = {Schneider, Hans Julius},
  title     = {From actions to symbols : Wittgenstein's method and the pragmatic turn},
  year      = {1997},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Schneider1999,
  author    = {Schneider, Hans Julius},
  title     = {Creation and re-creation : the interplay of activity and structure in language},
  year      = {1999},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Schneider2017,
  author    = {Schneider, Hans Julius},
  title     = {Buddhist Meditation as a Mystical Practice},
  series = {Philosophia : philosophical quarterly of Israel},
  volume    = {45},
  journal   = {Philosophia : philosophical quarterly of Israel},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {0048-3893},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11406-017-9925-x},
  pages     = {1621 -- 1622},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation (Zazen, Vipassanā) as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts (longing, suffering, and love) in Buddhism, William James' concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between (on the one hand) a craving for pleasant 'mental events' in the sense of short-term moods, and (on the other) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one's attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Schneider2017,
  author    = {Schneider, Hans Julius},
  title     = {Buddhist Meditation as a Mystical Practice},
  series = {Philosophia},
  volume    = {45},
  journal   = {Philosophia},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {0048-3893},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11406-016-9783-y},
  pages     = {773 -- 787},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation (Zazen, Vipassanā) as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts (longing, suffering, and love) in Buddhism, William James' concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between (on the one hand) a craving for pleasant 'mental events' in the sense of short-term moods, and (on the other) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one's attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Schneider2010,
  author    = {Schneider, Hans Julius},
  title     = {"Higher rates may not be expressed" : the "Ethical" and the limits of language in the early? Wittgenstein},
  issn      = {0012-1045},
  year      = {2010},
  language  = {en}
}