@phdthesis{Obst2022, author = {Obst, Cosima}, title = {Essays in labor economics}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-56379}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-563794}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {272}, year = {2022}, abstract = {This thesis offers insights into the process of workers decisions to invest into work-related training. Specifically, the role of personality traits and attitudes is analysed. The aim is to understand whether such traits contribute to an under-investment into training. Importantly, general and specific training are distinguished, where the worker's productivity increases in many firms in the former and only in the current firm in the latter case. Additionally, this thesis contributes to the evaluation of the German minimum wage introduction in 2015, identifying causal effects on wages and working hours. Chapters two to four focus on the work-related training decision. First, individuals with an internal locus of control see a direct link between their own actions and their labor market success, while external individuals connect their outcomes to fate, luck, and other people. Consequently, it can be expected that internal individuals expect higher returns to training and are, thus, more willing to participate. The results reflect this hypothesis with internal individuals being more likely to participate in general (but not specific) training. Second, training can be viewed either as a risky investment or as an insurance against negative labor income shocks. In both cases, risk attitudes are expected to play a role in the decision process. The data point towards risk seeking individuals being more likely to participate in general (but not specific) training, and thus, training being viewed on average as a risky investment. Third, job satisfaction influences behavioral decisions in the job context, where dissatisfied workers may react by neglecting their duties, improving the situation or quitting the job. In the first case, dissatisfied workers are expected to invest less in training, while the latter two reactions could lead to higher participation rates amongst dissatisfied workers. The results suggest that on average dissatisfied workers are less likely to invest into training than satisfied workers. However, closer inspections of quit intentions and different sources of dissatisfaction paint less clear pictures, pointing towards the complexity of the job satisfaction construct. Chapters five and six evaluate the introduction of the minimum wage in Germany in 2015. First, in 2015 an increase in the growth of hourly wages can be identified as a causal effect of the minimum wage introduction. However, at the same time, a reduction in the weekly working hours results in an overall unchanged growth in monthly earnings. When considering the effects in 2016, the decrease in weekly working hours disappears, resulting in a significant increase in the growth of monthly earnings due to the minimum wage. Importantly, the analysis suggests that the increase in hourly wages was not sufficient to ensure all workers receiving the minimum wage. This points to non-compliance being an issue in the first years after the minimum wage introduction.}, language = {en} } @article{CaliendoCobbClarkPfeiferetal.2023, author = {Caliendo, Marco and Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. and Pfeifer, Harald and Uhlendorff, Arne and Wehner, Caroline}, title = {Managers' risk preferences and firm training investments}, series = {European economic review}, journal = {European economic review}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {Amsterdam}, issn = {0014-2921}, doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104616}, pages = {36}, year = {2023}, abstract = {This study analyses the impact of managers' risk preferences on their training allocation decisions. We begin by providing nationally representative evidence that managers' risk-aversion is negatively correlated with the likelihood that their firms engage in any worker training. Using a novel vignette study, we then demonstrate that risk-tolerant and risk-averse decision makers have significantly different training preferences. Risk aversion results in increased sensitivity to turnover risk. Managers who are risk-averse offer less general training and are more reluctant to train workers with a history of job mobility. Adopting a weighting approach to flexibly control for observed differences in the characteristics of risk-averse and risk-tolerant managers, we show that our findings cannot be explained by heterogeneity in either managers' observed characteristics or the type of firms where they work. All managers, irrespective of their risk preferences, are sensitive to the investment risk associated with training, avoiding training that is more costly or that targets those with less occupational expertise or nearing retirement. This provides suggestive evidence that the risks of training are primarily due to the risk that trained workers will leave the firm (turnover risk) rather than the risk that the benefits of training do not outweigh the costs (investment risk).}, language = {en} } @techreport{BruttelBulutayCornandetal.2022, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Bulutay, Muhammed and Cornand, Camille and Heinemann, Frank and Zylbersztejn, Adam}, title = {Measuring strategic-uncertainty attitudes}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {54}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-56234}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-562340}, pages = {40}, year = {2022}, abstract = {Strategic uncertainty is the uncertainty that players face with respect to the purposeful behavior of other players in an interactive decision situation. Our paper develops a new method for measuring strategic-uncertainty attitudes and distinguishing them from risk and ambiguity attitudes. We vary the source of uncertainty (whether strategic or not) across conditions in a ceteris paribus manner. We elicit certainty equivalents of participating in two strategic 2x2 games (a stag-hunt and a market-entry game) as well as certainty equivalents of related lotteries that yield the same possible payoffs with exogenously given probabilities (risk) and lotteries with unknown probabilities (ambiguity). We provide a structural model of uncertainty attitudes that allows us to measure a preference for or an aversion against the source of uncertainty, as well as optimism or pessimism regarding the desired outcome. We document systematic attitudes towards strategic uncertainty that vary across contexts. Under strategic complementarity [substitutability], the majority of participants tend to be pessimistic [optimistic] regarding the desired outcome. However, preferences for the source of uncertainty are distributed around zero.}, language = {en} }