@article{BersalliTroendleHeckmannetal.2024,
  author    = {Bersalli, Germ{\´a}n and Tr{\"o}ndle, Tim and Heckmann, Leon and Lilliestam, Johan},
  title     = {Economic crises as critical junctures for policy and structural changes towards decarbonization},
  series = {Climate policy},
  volume    = {24},
  journal   = {Climate policy},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Taylor \& Francis},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {1469-3062},
  doi       = {10.1080/14693062.2024.2301750},
  pages     = {410 -- 427},
  year      = {2024},
  abstract  = {Crises may act as tipping points for decarbonization pathways by triggering structural economic change or offering windows of opportunity for policy change. We investigate both types of effects of the global financial and COVID-19 crises on decarbonization in Spain and Germany through a quantitative Kaya-decomposition analysis of CO2 emissions and through a qualitative review of climate and energy policy changes. We show that the global financial crisis resulted in a critical juncture for Spanish CO2 emissions due to the combined effects of the deep economic recession and crisis-induced structural change, resulting in reductions in carbon and energy intensities and shifts in the economic structure. However, the crisis also resulted in a rollback of renewable energy policy, halting progress in the transition to green electricity. The impacts were less pronounced in Germany, where pre-existing decarbonization and policy trends continued after the crisis. Recovery packages had modest effects, primarily due to their temporary nature and the limited share of climate-related spending. The direct short-term impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on CO2 emissions were more substantial in Spain than in Germany. The policy responses in both countries sought to align short-term economic recovery with the long-term climate change goals of decarbonization, but it is too soon to observe their lasting effects. Our findings show that crises can affect structural change and support decarbonization but suggest that such effects depend on pre-existing trends, the severity of the crisis and political manoeuvring during the crisis.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Streck2023,
  author    = {Streck, Charlotte},
  title     = {Synergies between the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and the Paris Agreement},
  series = {Climate policy},
  volume    = {23},
  journal   = {Climate policy},
  number    = {6},
  publisher = {Taylor \& Francis},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {1469-3062},
  doi       = {10.1080/14693062.2023.2230940},
  pages     = {800 -- 811},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {The 2022 Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) and Paris Agreement (PA) are highly complementary agreements where each depends on the other's success to be effective. The GBF offers a very specific framework of interim goals and targets that break down the objective of the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) into a decade-spanning work plan. Comprised of 10 sections - including a 2050 vision and a 2030 mission, four overarching goals and 23 specific targets - the GBF is expected to guide biodiversity policy around the world in the coming years to decades. A similar set of global interim climate policy targets could translate the global temperature goal into concrete policy milestones that would provide policy makers and civil society with reference points for policy making and efforts to hold governments accountable. Beyond inspiring climate policy experts to convert temperature goals into policy milestones, GBF has the potential to strengthen the implementation of the PA at the nexus of biodiversity and climate (adaptation and mitigation) action. For example, the GBF can help to ensure that nature-based climate solutions are implemented with full consideration of biodiversity concerns, of the rights and interests of Indigenous Peoples and local communities, and with fair and transparent benefit sharing arrangements. In sum, the GBF should be mandatory reading for all climate policy makers.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{ThonigDelRioKieferetal.2020,
  author    = {Thonig, Richard and Del Rio, Pablo and Kiefer, Christoph and Lazaro Touza, Lara and Escribano, Gonzalo and Lechon, Yolanda and Spaeth, Leonhard and Wolf, Ingo and Lilliestam, Johan},
  title     = {Does ideology influence the ambition level of climate and renewable energy policy?},
  series = {Energy sources, part B: economics, planning, and policy},
  volume    = {16},
  journal   = {Energy sources, part B: economics, planning, and policy},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Philadelphia},
  issn      = {1556-7249},
  doi       = {10.1080/15567249.2020.1811806},
  pages     = {4 -- 22},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {We investigate whether political ideology has an observable effect on decarbonization ambition, renewable power aims, and preferences for power system balancing technologies in four European countries. Based on the Energy Logics framework, we identify ideologically different transition strategies (state-centered, market-centered, grassroots-centered) contained in government policies and opposition party programs valid in 2019. We compare these policies and programs with citizen poll data. We find that ideology has a small effect: governments and political parties across the spectrum have similar, and relatively ambitious, decarbonization and renewables targets. This mirrors citizens' strong support for ambitious action regardless of their ideological self-description. However, whereas political positions on phasing out fossil fuel power are clear across the policy space, positions on phasing in new flexibility options to balance intermittent renewables are vague or non-existent. As parties and citizens agree on strong climate and renewable power aims, the policy ambition is likely to remain high, even if governments change.},
  language  = {en}
}