@misc{Boegel2011,
  type      = {Master Thesis},
  author    = {B{\"o}gel, Simon},
  title     = {Anreize bei der Budgetierung : Welche dysfunktionalen Verhaltensweisen der Manager resultieren aus der Berliner Median-Budgetierung?},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-58124},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  year      = {2011},
  abstract  = {Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht das Zusammenspiel von Motiven und Anreizen sowie beobachtbaren dysfunktionalen Verhaltensweisen von Managern bei der Berliner Median-Budgetierung. Von einer Literaturrecherche ausgehend wird zun{\"a}chst das theoretische Konzept der Dysfunktionen n{\"a}her gehend erl{\"a}utert und erkl{\"a}rt. Um den Aussagegehalt der theoretischen Annahmen zu {\"u}berpr{\"u}fen und somit eine Verbindung zwischen Einzelfallstudie und generellem theoretischem Kontext zu erhalten, werden hierzu Hypothesen aufgestellt. Darauf aufbauend folgt eine Einzelfallstudie der Berliner Median-Budgetierung mit Fokus auf die Amtsleiter der Leistungs- und Verantwortungszentren. Auf der fallbezogenen Ebene zeigt sich, dass die urspr{\"u}nglich in der Berliner Median-Budgetierung intendierten Anreizfunktionen bei den Amtsleitern weitest gehend nicht verfangen. Vielmehr produziert das Verfahren Anreize, die dysfunktionale Verhaltensweisen f{\"o}rdern. Auf der generellen Ebene kann hierzu ein Zusammenhang zwischen theoretischen Annahmen zu Dysfunktionen und den Beobachtungen der Einzelfallstudie hergestellt werden. Somit lassen sich dysfunktionale Handlungsmuster innerhalb der Berliner Median-Budgetierung mittels Erkl{\"a}rungsmodellen der theoretischen Konzeption begr{\"u}nden.},
  language  = {de}
}
@phdthesis{Hoxtell2016,
  author    = {Hoxtell, Annette},
  title     = {Entscheidungsgr{\"u}nde f{\"u}r den Ausbildungsbetrieb},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-93377},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {XIV, 215, XXVII},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {Die schulische Berufswahlvorbereitung vers{\"a}umt es, Jugendliche auf die Wahl des Ausbildungsbetriebs vorzubereiten. Sie thematisiert nur die Berufswahl, obwohl die Entscheidung f{\"u}r eine betriebliche Ausbildung immer auch die Entscheidung f{\"u}r einen Ausbildungsbetrieb voraussetzt. F{\"u}r die Ausbildungszufriedenheit und den -erfolg ist diese Betriebswahl zentral. Angesichts des Mismatchs am Ausbildungsmarkt ist das Thema hochrelevant. Aus welchen Gr{\"u}nden entscheiden sich Jugendliche f{\"u}r einen Ausbildungsbetrieb? Diese Frage untersucht die vorliegende Arbeit aus prospektiver Sicht in narrativen Einzelinterviews mit 52 Sch{\"u}lerinnen und Sch{\"u}lern der 9. und 10. Klassenstufen verschiedener Schultypen und aus retrospektiver Sicht in vier multipel eingebetteten Mehrfallstudien mit 17 Auszubildenden aus vier Betrieben und in acht Berufen - jeweils in Brandenburg und Berlin. Theoretisch n{\"a}hert sich diese Arbeit dem Thema {\"u}ber psychologische, soziologische und wirtschaftswissenschaftliche sowie interdisziplin{\"a}re Berufswahltheorien an, dem operativen Modell der Betriebswahl sowie dem hier neu entwickelten Modell der Ausbildungswahl als Entscheidungsprozess, das die beiden Wahlkomponenten Betrieb und Beruf vereint. Drei zentrale Erkenntnisse kennzeichnen das Ergebnis der vorliegenden Arbeit: 1. Jugendliche besch{\"a}ftigen sich mit der Wahl des Ausbildungsbetriebs und ber{\"u}cksichtigen vor allem emotionale Gr{\"u}nde. Diese variieren von Person zu Person. 2. Wichtigste Entscheidungsgr{\"u}nde f{\"u}r den Ausbildungsbetrieb sind der pers{\"o}nliche Eindruck, die inhaltliche Solidit{\"a}t, der Ort, das Betriebsklima, Kontakte ins Unternehmen, Perspektiven und die Bezahlung. 3. Jugendliche mit Mittlerem Schulabschluss achten besonders auf die Perspektiven nach Ausbildungsende. Die wenigen anderen Studien zur Entscheidung f{\"u}r den Ausbildungsbetrieb gehen auf den am h{\"a}ufigsten genannten Entscheidungsgrund pers{\"o}nlicher Eindruck nicht ein. Auch kommen sie zu uneinheitlichen Schl{\"u}ssen, f{\"u}r welche Personengruppe der Entscheidungsgrund Perspektiven besonders relevant ist. Es bedarf zus{\"a}tzlicher Studien, um die Ergebnisse zu {\"u}berpr{\"u}fen und ihre statistische Verteilung in gr{\"o}ßeren Bev{\"o}lkerungsgruppen zu untersuchen sowie eine belastbare, ganzheitliche Theorie zur Ausbildungswahl zu entwickeln.},
  language  = {de}
}
@techreport{Kauffmann2008,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Kauffmann, Albrecht},
  title     = {Im Zentrum Europas},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-27381},
  year      = {2008},
  abstract  = {European integration provokes competition between the European metropolitan areas. At the same time, the question at which locations services of highest centrality are produced remains open. The paper analyses how far the German capital Berlin accepts the challenge to accomodate headquarters of multinational firms. Our investigation shows that Berlin's qualifications to attract headquarters are quite well. The number of headquarters residing in Berlin has increased subtly but contiuous during the last 15 years. One advantage could be the spatial proximity to the Eastern European markets.},
  language  = {de}
}
@phdthesis{Vu2012,
  author    = {Vu, Thi Thanh Van},
  title     = {Local government on the way to good governance},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-93943},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {vii, 254},
  year      = {2012},
  abstract  = {Bad governance causes economic, social, developmental and environmental problems in many developing countries. Developing countries have adopted a number of reforms that have assisted in achieving good governance. The success of governance reform depends on the starting point of each country - what institutional arrangements exist at the out-set and who the people implementing reforms within the existing institutional framework are. This dissertation focuses on how formal institutions (laws and regulations) and informal institutions (culture, habit and conception) impact on good governance. Three characteristics central to good governance - transparency, participation and accountability are studied in the research. A number of key findings were: Good governance in Hanoi and Berlin represent the two extremes of the scale, while governance in Berlin is almost at the top of the scale, governance in Hanoi is at the bottom. Good governance in Hanoi is still far from achieved. In Berlin, information about public policies, administrative services and public finance is available, reliable and understandable. People do not encounter any problems accessing public information. In Hanoi, however, public information is not easy to access. There are big differences between Hanoi and Berlin in the three forms of participation. While voting in Hanoi to elect local deputies is formal and forced, elections in Berlin are fair and free. The candidates in local elections in Berlin come from different parties, whereas the candidacy of local deputies in Hanoi is thoroughly controlled by the Fatherland Front. Even though the turnout of voters in local deputy elections is close to 90 percent in Hanoi, the legitimacy of both the elections and the process of representation is non-existent because the local deputy candidates are decided by the Communist Party. The involvement of people in solving local problems is encouraged by the government in Berlin. The different initiatives include citizenry budget, citizen activity, citizen initiatives, etc. Individual citizens are free to participate either individually or through an association. Lacking transparency and participation, the quality of public service in Hanoi is poor. Citizens seldom get their services on time as required by the regulations. Citizens who want to receive public services can bribe officials directly, use the power of relationships, or pay a third person - the mediator ("C{\`o}" - in Vietnamese). In contrast, public service delivery in Berlin follows the customer-orientated principle. The quality of service is high in relation to time and cost. Paying speed money, bribery and using relationships to gain preferential public service do not exist in Berlin. Using the examples of Berlin and Hanoi, it is clear to see how transparency, participation and accountability are interconnected and influence each other. Without a free and fair election as well as participation of non-governmental organisations, civil organisations, and the media in political decision-making and public actions, it is hard to hold the Hanoi local government accountable. The key differences in formal institutions (regulative and cognitive) between Berlin and Hanoi reflect the three main principles: rule of law vs. rule by law, pluralism vs. monopoly Party in politics and social market economy vs. market economy with socialist orientation. In Berlin the logic of appropriateness and codes of conduct are respect for laws, respect of individual freedom and ideas and awareness of community development. People in Berlin take for granted that public services are delivered to them fairly. Ideas such as using money or relationships to shorten public administrative procedures do not exist in the mind of either public officials or citizens. In Hanoi, under a weak formal framework of good governance, new values and norms (prosperity, achievement) generated in the economic transition interact with the habits of the centrally-planned economy (lying, dependence, passivity) and traditional values (hierarchy, harmony, family, collectivism) influence behaviours of those involved. In Hanoi "doing the right thing" such as compliance with law doesn't become "the way it is". The unintended consequence of the deliberate reform actions of the Party is the prevalence of corruption. The socialist orientation seems not to have been achieved as the gap between the rich and the poor has widened. Good governance is not achievable if citizens and officials are concerned only with their self-interest. State and society depend on each other. Theoretically to achieve good governance in Hanoi, institutions (formal and informal) able to create good citizens, officials and deputies should be generated. Good citizens are good by habit rather than by nature. The rule of law principle is necessary for the professional performance of local administrations and People's Councils. When the rule of law is applied consistently, the room for informal institutions to function will be reduced. Promoting good governance in Hanoi is dependent on the need and desire to change the government and people themselves. Good governance in Berlin can be seen to be the result of the efforts of the local government and citizens after a long period of development and continuous adjustment. Institutional transformation is always a long and complicated process because the change in formal regulations as well as in the way they are implemented may meet strong resistance from the established practice. This study has attempted to point out the weaknesses of the institutions of Hanoi and has identified factors affecting future development towards good governance. But it is not easy to determine how long it will take to change the institutional setting of Hanoi in order to achieve good governance.},
  language  = {en}
}