@article{EdenhoferFranksKalkuhl2021,
  author    = {Edenhofer, Ottmar and Franks, Max and Kalkuhl, Matthias},
  title     = {Pigou in the 21st century},
  series = {International tax and public finance},
  volume    = {28},
  journal   = {International tax and public finance},
  number    = {5},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {0927-5940},
  doi       = {10.1007/s10797-020-09653-y},
  pages     = {1090 -- 1121},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {The year 2020 marks the centennial of the publication of Arthur Cecil Pigou's magnum opus The Economics of Welfare. Pigou's pricing principles have had an enduring influence on the academic debate, with a widespread consensus having emerged among economists that Pigouvian taxes or subsidies are theoretically desirable, but politically infeasible. In this article, we revisit Pigou's contribution and argue that this consensus is somewhat spurious, particularly in two ways: (1) Economists are too quick to ignore the theoretical problems and subtleties that Pigouvian pricing still faces; (2) The wholesale skepticism concerning the political viability of Pigouvian pricing is at odds with its recent practical achievements. These two points are made by, first, outlining the theoretical and political challenges that include uncertainty about the social cost of carbon, the unclear relationship between the cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness approaches, distributional concerns, fragmented ministerial responsibilities, an unstable tax base, commitment problems, lack of acceptance and trust between government and citizens as well as incomplete international cooperation. Secondly, we discuss the recent political success of Pigouvian pricing, as evidenced by the German government's 2019 climate policy reform and the EU's Green Deal. We conclude by presenting a research agenda for addressing the remaining barriers that need to be overcome to make Pigouvian pricing a common political practice.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Schmidt2018,
  author    = {Schmidt, Peter},
  title     = {Market failure vs. system failure as a rationale for economic policy?},
  series = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics},
  volume    = {28},
  journal   = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {0936-9937},
  doi       = {10.1007/s00191-018-0564-6},
  pages     = {785 -- 803},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {This paper reconsiders the explanation of economic policy from an evolutionary economics perspective. It contrasts the neoclassical equilibrium notions of market and government failure with the dominant evolutionary neo-Schumpeterian and Austrian-Hayekian perceptions. Based on this comparison, the paper criticizes the fact that neoclassical reasoning still prevails in non-equilibrium evolutionary economics when economic policy issues are examined. This is more than surprising, since proponents of evolutionary economics usually view their approach as incompatible with its neoclassical counterpart. In addition, it is shown that this "fallacy of failure thinking" even finds its continuation in the alternative concept of "system failure" with which some evolutionary economists try to explain and legitimate policy interventions in local, regional or national innovation systems. The paper argues that in order to prevent the otherwise fruitful and more realistic evolutionary approach from undermining its own criticism of neoclassical economics and to create a consistent as well as objective evolutionary policy framework, it is necessary to eliminate the equilibrium spirit. Finally, the paper delivers an alternative evolutionary explanation of economic policy which is able to overcome the theory-immanent contradiction of the hitherto evolutionary view on this subject.},
  language  = {en}
}