@techreport{Andres2024,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Andres, Maximilian},
  title     = {Equilibrium selection in infinitely repeated games with communication},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {75},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-63180},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-631800},
  pages     = {38},
  year      = {2024},
  abstract  = {The present paper proposes a novel approach for equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma where players can communicate before choosing their strategies. This approach yields a critical discount factor that makes different predictions for cooperation than the usually considered sub-game perfect or risk dominance critical discount factors. In laboratory experiments, we find that our factor is useful for predicting cooperation. For payoff changes where the usually considered factors and our factor make different predictions, the observed cooperation is consistent with the predictions based on our factor.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{BruttelFelgendreherGuethetal.2019,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Felgendreher, Simon and G{\"u}th, Werner and Hertwig, Ralph},
  title     = {Strategic ignorance in repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments and its effects on the dynamics of voluntary cooperation},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {10},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-43188},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-431881},
  pages     = {30},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Being ignorant of key aspects of a strategic interaction can represent an advantage rather than a handicap. We study one particular context in which ignorance can be beneficial: iterated strategic interactions in which voluntary cooperation may be sustained into the final round if players voluntarily forego knowledge about the time horizon. We experimentally examine this option to remain ignorant about the time horizon in a finitely repeated two-person prisoners' dilemma game. We confirm that pairs without horizon knowledge avoid the drop in cooperation that otherwise occurs toward the end of the game. However, this effect is superposed by cooperation declining more rapidly in pairs without horizon knowledge during the middle phase of the game, especially if players do not know that the other player also wanted to remain ignorant of the time horizon.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{BruttelGuethNithammeretal.2020,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Nithammer, Juri and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Inefficient Cooperation under Stochastic and Strategic Uncertainty},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {20},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-47550},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-475500},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods).},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelGuethNithammeretal.2022,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Nithammer, Juri and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Inefficient cooperation under stochastic and strategic uncertainty},
  series = {Conflict resolution},
  volume    = {66},
  journal   = {Conflict resolution},
  number    = {4-5},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {Thousand Oaks},
  issn      = {0022-0027},
  doi       = {10.1177/00220027211066614},
  pages     = {755 -- 782},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Boehme2011,
  author    = {B{\"o}hme, Dimo},
  title     = {EU-Russia energy relations: What chance for solutions? : A focus on the natural gas sector},
  publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  isbn      = {978-3-86956-120-2},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-50210},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {xix, 322},
  year      = {2011},
  abstract  = {Public debate about energy relations between the EU and Russia is distorted. These distortions present considerable obstacles to the development of true partnership. At the core of the conflict is a struggle for resource rents between energy producing, energy consuming and transit countries. Supposed secondary aspects, however, are also of great importance. They comprise of geopolitics, market access, economic development and state sovereignty. The European Union, having engaged in energy market liberalisation, faces a widening gap between declining domestic resources and continuously growing energy demand. Diverse interests inside the EU prevent the definition of a coherent and respected energy policy. Russia, for its part, is no longer willing to subsidise its neighbouring economies by cheap energy exports. The Russian government engages in assertive policies pursuing Russian interests. In so far, it opts for a different globalisation approach, refusing the role of mere energy exporter. In view of the intensifying struggle for global resources, Russia, with its large energy potential, appears to be a very favourable option for European energy supplies, if not the best one. However, several outcomes of the strategic game between the two partners can be imagined. Engaging in non-cooperative strategies will in the end leave all stakeholders worse-off. The European Union should therefore concentrate on securing its partnership with Russia instead of damaging it. Stable cooperation would need the acceptance that the partner may pursue his own goals, which might be different from one's own interests. The question is, how can a sustainable compromise be found? This thesis finds that a mix of continued dialogue, a tit for tat approach bolstered by an international institutional framework and increased integration efforts appears as a preferable solution.},
  language  = {en}
}
@book{Boehme2013,
  author    = {B{\"o}hme, Dimo},
  title     = {EU-Russia energy relations: What chance for solutions? : A focus on the natural gas sector},
  isbn      = {978-3-86956-278-0},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-63022},
  publisher      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  year      = {2013},
  abstract  = {Public debate about energy relations between the EU and Russia is distorted. These distortions present considerable obstacles to the development of true partnership. At the core of the conflict is a struggle for resource rents between energy producing, energy consuming and transit countries. Supposed secondary aspects, however, are also of great importance. They comprise of geopolitics, market access, economic development and state sovereignty. The European Union, having engaged in energy market liberalisation, faces a widening gap between declining domestic resources and continuously growing energy demand. Diverse interests inside the EU prevent the definition of a coherent and respected energy policy. Russia, for its part, is no longer willing to subsidise its neighbouring economies by cheap energy exports. The Russian government engages in assertive policies pursuing Russian interests. In so far, it opts for a different globalisation approach, refusing the role of mere energy exporter. In view of the intensifying struggle for global resources, Russia, with its large energy potential, appears to be a very favourable option for European energy supplies, if not the best one. However, several outcomes of the strategic game between the two partners can be imagined. Engaging in non-cooperative strategies will in the end leave all stakeholders worse-off. The European Union should therefore concentrate on securing its partnership with Russia instead of damaging it. Stable cooperation would need the acceptance that the partner may pursue his own goals, which might be different from one's own interests. The question is, how can a sustainable compromise be found? This thesis finds that a mix of continued dialogue, a tit for tat approach bolstered by an international institutional framework and increased integration efforts appears as a preferable solution.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{ErcanHartmannRichteretal.2021,
  author    = {Ercan, Habibe and Hartmann, Ulrike and Richter, Dirk and Kuschel, Jenny and Gr{\"a}sel, Cornelia},
  title     = {Effekte von integrativer F{\"u}hrung auf die Datennutzung von Lehrkr{\"a}ften},
  series = {Die deutsche Schule : DDS : Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Erziehungswissenschaft, Bildungspolitik und p{\"a}dagogische Praxis},
  volume    = {113},
  journal   = {Die deutsche Schule : DDS : Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Erziehungswissenschaft, Bildungspolitik und p{\"a}dagogische Praxis},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Waxmann},
  address   = {M{\"u}nster},
  issn      = {0012-0731},
  doi       = {10.31244/dds.2021.01.08},
  pages     = {85 -- 100},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {The present article reports the effects of school principals' integrative leadership behavior, including transformational and instructional components, on teachers' data use. Results of a structural equation model indicate significant positive direct and indirect effects on teachers' use of various data. Total effects seem to be mainly mediated by teachers' cooperation activities.},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Ette2018,
  author    = {Ette, Ottmar},
  title     = {Languages about Languages},
  series = {HiN : Alexander von Humboldt im Netz ; International Review for Humboldtian Studies},
  volume    = {XIX},
  journal   = {HiN : Alexander von Humboldt im Netz ; International Review for Humboldtian Studies},
  number    = {36},
  publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  issn      = {1617-5239},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-419414},
  pages     = {47 -- 61},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {In the history of Humboldt research both brothers have been traditionally seen as representing the dichotomy between the humanities and the natural sciences. Today however, their similar approach to using and forming scientific language could be used as a starting point for conceiving a university, museum and even forum under one single Humboldtian science.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Franzmann2011,
  author    = {Franzmann, Simon T.},
  title     = {Competition, contest, and cooperation the analytic framework of the issue market},
  series = {Journal of theoretical politics},
  volume    = {23},
  journal   = {Journal of theoretical politics},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {0951-6298},
  doi       = {10.1177/0951629811411747},
  pages     = {317 -- 343},
  year      = {2011},
  abstract  = {Although party competition is widely regarded as an important part of a working democracy, it is rarely analysed in political science literature. This article discusses the basic properties of party competition, especially the patterns of interaction in contemporary party systems. Competition as a phenomenon at the macro level has to be carefully distinguished from contest and cooperation as the forms of interaction at the micro level. The article gives special attention to the creation of issue innovations. Contrary to existing approaches, I argue that not only responsiveness but also innovation are necessary to guarantee a workable democratic competition. Competition takes place on an issue market, where parties can discover voters' demands. Combined with the concept of institutional veto points, the article presents hypotheses on how institutions shape the possibility for programmatic innovations.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Franzmann2017,
  author    = {Franzmann, Simon T.},
  title     = {Competition, contest, and cooperation},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-402961},
  pages     = {27},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {Although party competition is widely regarded as an important part of a working democracy, it is rarely analysed in political science literature. This article discusses the basic properties of party competition, especially the patterns of interaction in contemporary party systems. Competition as a phenomenon at the macro level has to be carefully distinguished from contest and cooperation as the forms of interaction at the micro level. The article gives special attention to the creation of issue innovations. Contrary to existing approaches, I argue that not only responsiveness but also innovation are necessary to guarantee a workable democratic competition. Competition takes place on an issue market, where parties can discover voters' demands. Combined with the concept of institutional veto points, the article presents hypotheses on how institutions shape the possibility for programmatic innovations.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{HeuerOrland2019,
  author    = {Heuer, Leonie and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma},
  series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  journal   = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  number    = {107},
  issn      = {1867-5808},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-43592},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-435929},
  pages     = {9},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts' level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects' level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HeuerOrland2019,
  author    = {Heuer, Leonie and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma},
  series = {Royal Society Open Science},
  volume    = {6},
  journal   = {Royal Society Open Science},
  publisher = {Royal Soc. Publ.},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {2054-5703},
  doi       = {10.1098/rsos.182142},
  pages     = {9},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts' level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects' level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{PaesslerAndressDuranCasasetal.2018,
  author    = {P{\"a}ßler, Ulrich and Andress, Reinhard and Dur{\´a}n Casas, Vicente and Ette, Ottmar and H{\"u}lsenberg, Dagmar and Schmuck, Thomas and Sundermann, Werner},
  title     = {HiN : Alexander von Humboldt im Netz},
  series = {HIN : Alexander von Humboldt im Netz ; international review for Humboldtian studies},
  volume    = {XIX},
  journal   = {HIN : Alexander von Humboldt im Netz ; international review for Humboldtian studies},
  number    = {36},
  editor    = {Ette, Ottmar and Knobloch, Eberhard},
  publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  issn      = {2568-3543},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-410919},
  pages     = {109},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {Inhalt: -Ulrich P{\"a}ßler: Die edition humboldt digital. Dokumente zur Neuausgabe der Ideen zu einer Geographie der Pflanzen (1825-1826) -Reinhard Andress: Eduard Dorsch and his unpublished poem on the occasion of Humboldt's 100th birthday -Vicente Dur{\´a}n Casas: Immanuel Kant, Alexander von Humboldt and the Tequendama Fall. Two Prussians linked by Geography -Ottmar Ette: Languages about Languages: Two Brothers and one Humboldtian Science -Dagmar H{\"u}lsenberg: Alexander von Humboldts Erl{\"a}uterungen zu {\"O}fen f{\"u}r die Herstellung von Keramik- und Glaserzeugnissen -Thomas Schmuck: Missgl{\"u}ckte Begegnung. Der kurze Briefwechsel zwischen Leopold von Buch und Goethe -Werner Sundermann: Alexander von Humboldt und das Persische},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{TeerlingBernholtAsseburgetal.2019,
  author    = {Teerling, Annika and Bernholt, Andrea and Asseburg, Regine and Hasl, Andrea and Igler, Jennifer and Schlitter, Theresa and Ohle-Peters, Annika and McElvany, Nele and K{\"o}ller, Olaf},
  title     = {Affektiv-kognitive Auseinandersetzung mit einer Innovation im Implementationsprozess},
  series = {Psychologie in Erziehung und Unterricht : Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Forschung und Praxis},
  volume    = {66},
  journal   = {Psychologie in Erziehung und Unterricht : Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Forschung und Praxis},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Reinhardt},
  address   = {M{\"u}nchen},
  issn      = {0342-183X},
  doi       = {10.2378/peu2018.art21d},
  pages     = {33 -- 50},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Schulische und vor allem unterrichtliche Implementationsprozesse zielen zumeist auf die Professionalisierung der Lehrkr{\"a}fte ab. Die intendierte Ver{\"a}nderung des Unterrichts beginnt dabei mit einer gew{\"u}nschten Ver{\"a}nderung von Einstellungen und Verhaltensweisen der Lehrkr{\"a}fte, welche erst zu einer ver{\"a}nderten Handlungsroutine in der Arbeitspraxis f{\"u}hren kann. Das Modell der Stages of Concern von Hall und Hord (2006) stellt eine der wenigen M{\"o}glichkeiten dar, die individuelle Perspektive der Lehrkr{\"a}fte im Implementationsprozess modellbasiert und standardisiert zu untersuchen. Der vorliegende Beitrag betrachtet anhand dieses Modells die affektiv-kognitive Auseinandersetzung der Beteiligten im Implementationsprozess sowie deren Zusammenh{\"a}nge mit verschiedenen Aspekten der Kommunikation und der wahrgenommenen Entwicklung. Auf Basis einer Stichprobe von N = 66 Lehrkr{\"a}ften kann dabei gezeigt werden, dass insbesondere die Aspekte H{\"a}ufigkeit der Kooperation, Kommunikation im Kollegium und Erfahrungen im Team die affektiv-kognitive Auseinandersetzung vorhersagen. Diese Auseinandersetzung - insbesondere mit den Konsequenzen der Neuerung - bedingt wiederum die wahrgenommene Entwicklung im Implementationsprozess.},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{TroendleLilliestamMarellietal.2020,
  author    = {Tr{\"o}ndle, Tim and Lilliestam, Johan and Marelli, Stefano and Pfenninger, Stefan},
  title     = {Trade-offs between geographic scale, cost, and infrastructure requirements for fully renewable electricity in Europe},
  series = {Joule},
  volume    = {4},
  journal   = {Joule},
  number    = {9},
  publisher = {Cell Press},
  address   = {Cambridge , Mass.},
  issn      = {2542-4351},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.joule.2020.07.018},
  pages     = {1929 -- 1948},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {The European potential for renewable electricity is sufficient to enable fully renewable supply on different scales, from self-sufficient, subnational regions to an interconnected continent. We not only show that a continental-scale system is the cheapest, but also that systems on the national scale and below are possible at cost penalties of 20\% or less. Transmission is key to low cost, but it is not necessary to vastly expand the transmission system. When electricity is transmitted only to balance fluctuations, the transmission grid size is comparable to today's, albeit with expanded cross-border capacities. The largest differences across scales concern land use and thus social acceptance: in the continental system, generation capacity is concentrated on the European periphery, where the best resources are. Regional systems, in contrast, have more dispersed generation. The key trade-off is therefore not between geographic scale and cost, but between scale and the spatial distribution of required generation and transmission infrastructure.},
  language  = {en}
}