@article{BersalliTroendleHeckmannetal.2024, author = {Bersalli, Germ{\´a}n and Tr{\"o}ndle, Tim and Heckmann, Leon and Lilliestam, Johan}, title = {Economic crises as critical junctures for policy and structural changes towards decarbonization}, series = {Climate policy}, volume = {24}, journal = {Climate policy}, number = {3}, publisher = {Taylor \& Francis}, address = {London}, issn = {1469-3062}, doi = {10.1080/14693062.2024.2301750}, pages = {410 -- 427}, year = {2024}, abstract = {Crises may act as tipping points for decarbonization pathways by triggering structural economic change or offering windows of opportunity for policy change. We investigate both types of effects of the global financial and COVID-19 crises on decarbonization in Spain and Germany through a quantitative Kaya-decomposition analysis of CO2 emissions and through a qualitative review of climate and energy policy changes. We show that the global financial crisis resulted in a critical juncture for Spanish CO2 emissions due to the combined effects of the deep economic recession and crisis-induced structural change, resulting in reductions in carbon and energy intensities and shifts in the economic structure. However, the crisis also resulted in a rollback of renewable energy policy, halting progress in the transition to green electricity. The impacts were less pronounced in Germany, where pre-existing decarbonization and policy trends continued after the crisis. Recovery packages had modest effects, primarily due to their temporary nature and the limited share of climate-related spending. The direct short-term impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on CO2 emissions were more substantial in Spain than in Germany. The policy responses in both countries sought to align short-term economic recovery with the long-term climate change goals of decarbonization, but it is too soon to observe their lasting effects. Our findings show that crises can affect structural change and support decarbonization but suggest that such effects depend on pre-existing trends, the severity of the crisis and political manoeuvring during the crisis.}, language = {en} } @article{Streck2023, author = {Streck, Charlotte}, title = {Synergies between the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and the Paris Agreement}, series = {Climate policy}, volume = {23}, journal = {Climate policy}, number = {6}, publisher = {Taylor \& Francis}, address = {London}, issn = {1469-3062}, doi = {10.1080/14693062.2023.2230940}, pages = {800 -- 811}, year = {2023}, abstract = {The 2022 Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) and Paris Agreement (PA) are highly complementary agreements where each depends on the other's success to be effective. The GBF offers a very specific framework of interim goals and targets that break down the objective of the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) into a decade-spanning work plan. Comprised of 10 sections - including a 2050 vision and a 2030 mission, four overarching goals and 23 specific targets - the GBF is expected to guide biodiversity policy around the world in the coming years to decades. A similar set of global interim climate policy targets could translate the global temperature goal into concrete policy milestones that would provide policy makers and civil society with reference points for policy making and efforts to hold governments accountable. Beyond inspiring climate policy experts to convert temperature goals into policy milestones, GBF has the potential to strengthen the implementation of the PA at the nexus of biodiversity and climate (adaptation and mitigation) action. For example, the GBF can help to ensure that nature-based climate solutions are implemented with full consideration of biodiversity concerns, of the rights and interests of Indigenous Peoples and local communities, and with fair and transparent benefit sharing arrangements. In sum, the GBF should be mandatory reading for all climate policy makers.}, language = {en} } @misc{ThonigDelRioKieferetal.2020, author = {Thonig, Richard and Del Rio, Pablo and Kiefer, Christoph and Lazaro Touza, Lara and Escribano, Gonzalo and Lechon, Yolanda and Spaeth, Leonhard and Wolf, Ingo and Lilliestam, Johan}, title = {Does ideology influence the ambition level of climate and renewable energy policy?}, series = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, journal = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, number = {1}, issn = {1867-5808}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-57798}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-577981}, pages = {19}, year = {2020}, abstract = {We investigate whether political ideology has an observable effect on decarbonization ambition, renewable power aims, and preferences for power system balancing technologies in four European countries. Based on the Energy Logics framework, we identify ideologically different transition strategies (state-centered, market-centered, grassroots-centered) contained in government policies and opposition party programs valid in 2019. We compare these policies and programs with citizen poll data. We find that ideology has a small effect: governments and political parties across the spectrum have similar, and relatively ambitious, decarbonization and renewables targets. This mirrors citizens' strong support for ambitious action regardless of their ideological self-description. However, whereas political positions on phasing out fossil fuel power are clear across the policy space, positions on phasing in new flexibility options to balance intermittent renewables are vague or non-existent. As parties and citizens agree on strong climate and renewable power aims, the policy ambition is likely to remain high, even if governments change.}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{CamposdeAndrade2023, author = {Campos de Andrade, Andr{\´e} Luiz}, title = {Governing climate change in Brazil}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-58733}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-587336}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {xxvii, 272}, year = {2023}, abstract = {Enacted in 2009, the National Policy on Climate Change (PNMC) is a milestone in the institutionalisation of climate action in Brazil. It sets greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets and a set of principles and directives that are intended to lay the foundations for a cross-sectoral and multilevel climate policy in the country. However, after more than a decade since its establishment, the PNMC has experienced several obstacles related to its governance, such as coordination, planning and implementation issues. All of these issues pose threats to the effectiveness of GHG mitigation actions in the country. By looking at the intragovernmental and intergovernmental relationships that have taken place during the lifetime of the PNMC and its sectoral plans on agriculture (the Sectoral Plan for Mitigation and Adaptation to Climate Change for the Consolidation of a Low-Carbon Economy in Agriculture [ABC Plan]), transport and urban mobility (the Sectoral Plan for Transportation and Urban Mobility for Mitigation and Adaption of Climate Change [PSTM]), this exploratory qualitative research investigates the Brazilian climate change governance guided by the following relevant questions: how are climate policy arrangements organised and coordinated among governmental actors to mitigate GHG emissions in Brazil? What might be the reasons behind how such arrangements are established? What are the predominant governance gaps of the different GHG mitigation actions examined? Why do these governance gaps occur? Theoretically grounded in the literature on multilevel governance and coordination of public policies, this study employs a novel analytical framework that aims to identify and discuss the occurrence of four types of governance gaps (i.e. politics, institutions and processes, resources and information) in the three GHG mitigation actions (cases) examined (i.e. the PNMC, ABC Plan and PSTM). The research results are twofold. First, they reveal that Brazil has struggled to organise and coordinate governmental actors from different policy constituencies and different levels of government in the implementation of the GHG mitigation actions examined. Moreover, climate policymaking has mostly been influenced by the Ministry of Environment (MMA) overlooking the multilevel and cross-sectoral approaches required for a country's climate policy to mitigate and adapt to climate change, especially if it is considered an economy-wide Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), as the Brazilian one is. Second, the study identifies a greater manifestation of gaps in politics (e.g. lack of political will in supporting climate action), institutions and processes (e.g. failures in the design of institutions and policy instruments, coordination and monitoring flaws, and difficulties in building climate federalism) in all cases studied. It also identifies that there have been important advances in the production of data and information for decision-making and, to a lesser extent, in the allocation of technical and financial resources in the cases studied; however, it is necessary to highlight the limitation of these improvements due to turf wars, a low willingness to share information among federal government players, a reduced volume of financial resources and an unequal distribution of capacities among the federal ministries and among the three levels of government. A relevant finding is that these gaps tend to be explained by a combination of general and sectoral set aspects. Regarding the general aspects, which are common to all cases examined, the following can be mentioned: i) unbalanced policy capabilities existing among the different levels of government, ii) a limited (bureaucratic) practice to produce a positive coordination mode within cross-sectoral policies, iii) the socioeconomic inequalities that affect the way different governments and economic sectors perceive the climate issue (selective perception) and iv) the reduced dialogue between national and subnational governments on the climate agenda (poor climate federalism). The following sectoral aspects can be mentioned: i) the presence of path dependencies that make the adoption of transformative actions harder and ii) the absence of perceived co-benefits that the climate agenda can bring to each economic sector (e.g. reputational gains, climate protection and access to climate financial markets). By addressing the theoretical and practical implications of the results, this research provides key insights to tackle the governance gaps identified and to help Brazil pave the way to achieving its NDCs and net-zero targets. At the theoretical level, this research and the current country's GHG emissions profile suggest that the Brazilian climate policy is embedded in a cross-sectoral and multilevel arena, which requires the effective involvement of different levels of political and bureaucratic powers and the consideration of the country's socioeconomic differences. Thus, the research argues that future improvements of the Brazilian climate policy and its governance setting must frame climate policy as an economic development agenda, the ramifications of which go beyond the environmental sector. An initial consequence of this new perspective may be a shift in the political and technical leadership from the MMA to the institutions of the centre of government (Executive Office of the President of Brazil) and those in charge of the country's economic policy (Ministry of Economy). This change could provide greater capacity for coordination, integration and enforcement as well as for addressing certain expected gaps (e.g. financial and technical resources). It could also lead to greater political prioritisation of the agenda at the highest levels of government. Moreover, this shift of the institutional locus could contribute to greater harmonisation between domestic development priorities and international climate politics. Finally, the research also suggests that this approach would reduce bureaucratic elitism currently in place due to climate policy being managed by Brazilian governmental institutions, which is still a theme of a few ministries and a reason for the occurrence of turf wars.}, language = {en} } @article{ThonigDelRioKieferetal.2020, author = {Thonig, Richard and Del Rio, Pablo and Kiefer, Christoph and Lazaro Touza, Lara and Escribano, Gonzalo and Lechon, Yolanda and Spaeth, Leonhard and Wolf, Ingo and Lilliestam, Johan}, title = {Does ideology influence the ambition level of climate and renewable energy policy?}, series = {Energy sources, part B: economics, planning, and policy}, volume = {16}, journal = {Energy sources, part B: economics, planning, and policy}, number = {1}, publisher = {Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {Philadelphia}, issn = {1556-7249}, doi = {10.1080/15567249.2020.1811806}, pages = {4 -- 22}, year = {2020}, abstract = {We investigate whether political ideology has an observable effect on decarbonization ambition, renewable power aims, and preferences for power system balancing technologies in four European countries. Based on the Energy Logics framework, we identify ideologically different transition strategies (state-centered, market-centered, grassroots-centered) contained in government policies and opposition party programs valid in 2019. We compare these policies and programs with citizen poll data. We find that ideology has a small effect: governments and political parties across the spectrum have similar, and relatively ambitious, decarbonization and renewables targets. This mirrors citizens' strong support for ambitious action regardless of their ideological self-description. However, whereas political positions on phasing out fossil fuel power are clear across the policy space, positions on phasing in new flexibility options to balance intermittent renewables are vague or non-existent. As parties and citizens agree on strong climate and renewable power aims, the policy ambition is likely to remain high, even if governments change.}, language = {en} }