@article{HaenelBratu2021,
  author    = {H{\"a}nel, Hilkje Charlotte and Bratu, Christine},
  title     = {Varieties of hermeneutical injustice},
  series = {Moral philosophy and politics},
  volume    = {8},
  journal   = {Moral philosophy and politics},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {de Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {2194-5616},
  doi       = {10.1515/mopp-2020-0007},
  pages     = {331 -- 350},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {In this paper, we have two goals. First, we argue for a blueprint for hermeneutical injustice that allows us to schematize existing and discover new varieties of hermeneutical injustices. The underlying insight is that Fricker provides both a general concept of hermeneutical injustice and a specific conception thereof. By distinguishing between the general concept and its specific conceptions, we gain a fruitful tool to detect such injustices in our everyday lives. Second, we use this blueprint to provide a further example of hermeneutical injustice that draws our attention to yet another distinction: Some hermeneutical injustices result from a lack or distortion in the collective conceptual resource and some are due to problems in the application of existing concepts. We argue that to combat hermeneutical injustices, we have to make sure not only that individuals have accurate concepts at their disposal but that they have the capabilities to use these concepts adequately.},
  language  = {en}
}