@phdthesis{Yos2016, author = {Yos, Roman}, title = {Der junge Habermas}, series = {Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft ; 2278}, journal = {Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft ; 2278}, publisher = {Suhrkamp}, address = {Berlin}, isbn = {978-3-518-29878-7}, pages = {521}, year = {2016}, abstract = {Roman Yos' Untersuchung {\"u}ber die Urspr{\"u}nge eines der einflussreichsten Werke der j{\"u}ngeren Geistesgeschichte zeigt auf originelle Weise, wie J{\"u}rgen Habermas seine bereits in jungen Jahren ausgepr{\"a}gten philosophisch-politischen Denkmotive allm{\"a}hlich in die Bahnen eines tragf{\"a}higen Systems {\"u}berf{\"u}hrte. Diese Entwicklung l{\"a}sst sich als ein Lernprozess begreifen, in dessen Verlauf kontr{\"a}re intellektuelle Einfl{\"u}sse aufeinandertrafen und der aufw{\"a}ndigen Vermittlung bedurften. Yos rekonstruiert die spannungsreiche Entstehung von Habermas' Denken aus dem Zusammenhang fr{\"u}hester Schriften und gibt zugleich einen Einblick in deren zeit- und ideengeschichtliche Hintergr{\"u}nde.}, language = {de} } @article{vanBuuren2016, author = {van Buuren, Jasper}, title = {The Difference between Moral Sources and Hypergoods}, series = {International philosophical quarterly}, volume = {56}, journal = {International philosophical quarterly}, publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center}, address = {Charlottesville}, issn = {0019-0365}, doi = {10.5840/ipq201641259}, pages = {171 -- 186}, year = {2016}, abstract = {In Sources of the Self Charles Taylor makes clear that both hypergoods and moral sources are essential to the moral life. Although hypergoods and moral sources are not the same thing, Taylor's descriptions of these concepts are quite similar, and so their distinction requires interpretation. I propose that we interpret the difference on the basis of another distinction that is central to Taylor's thinking: that between immanence and transcendence. Whereas a moral source transcends us, a hypergood is the value of our immanent way of relating to that moral source. This interpretation requires that we first differentiate between a narrow and a wide sense of "moral source."}, language = {en} } @article{vanBuuren2016, author = {van Buuren, Jasper}, title = {critique of neuroscience}, series = {Continental philosophy review}, volume = {49}, journal = {Continental philosophy review}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, issn = {1387-2842}, doi = {10.1007/s11007-015-9318-4}, pages = {223 -- 241}, year = {2016}, abstract = {Bennett and Hacker criticize a number of neuroscientists and philosophers for attributing capacities which belong to the human being as a whole, like perceiving or deciding, to a "part" of the human being, viz. the brain. They call this type of mistake the "mereological fallacy". Interestingly, the authors say that these capacities cannot be ascribed to the mind either. They reject not only materialistic monism but also Cartesian dualism, arguing that many predicates describing human life do not refer to physical or mental properties, nor to the sum of such properties. I agree with this important principle and with the critique of the mereological fallacy which it underpins, but I have two objections to the authors' view. Firstly, I think that the brain is not literally a part of the human being, as suggested. Secondly, Bennett and Hacker do not offer an account of body and mind which explains in a systematic way how the domain of phenomena which transcends the mental and the physical relates to the mental and the physical. I first argue that Helmuth Plessner's philosophical anthropology provides the kind of account we need. Then, drawing on Plessner, I present an alternative view of the mereological relationships between brain and human being. My criticism does not undercut Bennett and Hacker's diagnosis of the mereological fallacy but rather gives it a more solid philosophical-anthropological foundation.}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{Schoellner2016, author = {Schoellner, Karsten}, title = {Towards a Wittgensteinian metaethics}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-409288}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {309}, year = {2016}, abstract = {This doctoral thesis seeks to elaborate how Wittgenstein's very sparse writings on ethics and ethical thought, together with his later work on the more general problem of normativity and his approach to philosophical problems as a whole, can be applied to contemporary meta-ethical debates about the nature of moral thought and language and the sources of moral obligation. I begin with a discussion of Wittgenstein's early "Lecture on Ethics", distinguishing the thesis of a strict fact/value dichotomy that Wittgenstein defends there from the related thesis that all ethical discourse is essentially and intentionally nonsensical, an attempt to go beyond the limits of sense. The first chapter discusses and defends Wittgenstein's argument that moral valuation always goes beyond any ascertaining of fact; the second chapter seeks to draw out the valuable insights from Wittgenstein's (early) insistence that value discourse is nonsensical while also arguing that this thesis is ultimately untenable and also incompatible with later Wittgensteinian understanding of language. On the basis of this discussion I then take up the writings of the American philosopher Cora Diamond, who has worked out an ethical approach in a very closely Wittgensteinian spirit, and show how this approach shares many of the valuable insights of the moral expressivism and constructivism of contemporary authors such as Blackburn and Korsgaard while suggesting a way to avoid some of the problems and limitations of their approaches. Subsequently I turn to a criticism of the attempts by Lovibond and McDowell to enlist Wittgenstein in the support for a non-naturalist moral realism. A concluding chapter treats the ways that a broadly Wittgensteinian conception expands the subject of metaethics itself by questioning the primacy of discursive argument in moral thought and of moral propositions as the basic units of moral belief.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Proeve2016, author = {Pr{\"o}ve, Ralf}, title = {Grenzen best{\"a}tigen und Grenzen {\"u}berwinden}, series = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, booktitle = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, publisher = {Trafo}, address = {Berlin}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {153 -- 170}, year = {2016}, language = {de} } @incollection{Petsche2016, author = {Petsche, Hans-Joachim}, title = {Einf{\"u}hrung}, series = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, booktitle = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, publisher = {Trafo}, address = {Berlin}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {9 -- 21}, year = {2016}, language = {de} } @incollection{Petsche2016, author = {Petsche, Hans-Joachim}, title = {Grenzen als philosophisches Problem}, series = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, booktitle = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, publisher = {Trafo}, address = {Berlin}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {23 -- 67}, year = {2016}, language = {de} } @misc{Omerbasic2016, author = {Omerbasic, Alina}, title = {The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People}, series = {Ethical theory and moral practice}, volume = {19}, journal = {Ethical theory and moral practice}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, issn = {1386-2820}, doi = {10.1007/s10677-015-9614-4}, pages = {273 -- 275}, year = {2016}, language = {en} } @incollection{Mackert2016, author = {Mackert, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {Zur Bedeutung und Analyse von Grenzen in der Soziologie}, series = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, booktitle = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, publisher = {Trafo}, address = {Berlin}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {171 -- 196}, year = {2016}, language = {de} } @incollection{Kunow2016, author = {Kunow, R{\"u}diger}, title = {Spiel ohne Grenzen}, series = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, booktitle = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, publisher = {Trafo}, address = {Berlin}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {69 -- 83}, year = {2016}, language = {de} } @misc{KruegerDemmerlingHabermas2016, author = {Kr{\"u}ger, Hans-Peter and Demmerling, Christoph and Habermas, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {Kommunikative Vernunft}, series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe}, journal = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe}, number = {125}, issn = {1866-8380}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-397848}, pages = {22}, year = {2016}, abstract = {J{\"u}rgen Habermas explicates the concept of communicative reason. He explains the key assumptions of the philosophy of language and social theory associated with this concept. Also discussed is the category of life-world and the role of the body-mind difference for the consciousness of exclusivity in our access to subjective experience. as well as the role of emotions and perceptions in the context of a theory of communicative action. The question of the redemption of the various validity claims as they are associated with the performance of speech acts is related to processes of social learning and to the role of negative experiences. Finally the interview deals with the relationship between religion and reason and the importance of religion in modern, post-secular societies. Questions about the philosophical culture of our present times are discussed at the end of the conversation.}, language = {de} } @incollection{Krueger2016, author = {Kr{\"u}ger, Hans-Peter}, title = {Grenzen aus Sicht der Philosophischen Anthropologie Helmuth Plessners}, series = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, booktitle = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, publisher = {Trafo}, address = {Berlin}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {101 -- 120}, year = {2016}, language = {de} } @article{Krueger2016, author = {Kr{\"u}ger, Hans-Peter}, title = {Critical Anthropology? To the Relationship between Philosophical Anthropology and Critical Theory}, series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\~A}¼r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, volume = {64}, journal = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\~A}¼r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, address = {Berlin}, issn = {0012-1045}, doi = {10.1515/dzph-2016-0041}, pages = {553 -- 580}, year = {2016}, abstract = {This article compares Max Horkheimer's and Theodor W. Adorno's foundation of the Frankfurt Critical Theory with Helmuth Plessner's foundation of Philosophical Anthropology. While Horkheimer's and Plessner's paradigms are mutually incompatible, Adorno's „negative dialectics" and Plessner's „negative anthropology" (G. Gamm) can be seen as complementing one another. J{\"u}rgen Habermas at one point sketched a complementary relationship between his own publicly communicative theory of modern society and Plessner's philosophy of nature and human expressivity, and though he then came to doubt this, he later reaffirmed it. Faced with the „life power" in „high capitalism" (Plessner), the ambitions for a public democracy in a pluralistic society have to be broadened from an argumentative focus (Habermas) to include the human condition and the expressive modes of our experience as essentially embodied persons. The article discusses some possible aspects of this complementarity under the title of a „critical anthropology" (H. Schn{\"a}delbach).}, language = {de} } @misc{Krueger2016, author = {Kr{\"u}ger, Hans-Peter}, title = {Kritische Anthropologie?}, series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe}, journal = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe}, number = {127}, issn = {1866-8380}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-398024}, pages = {28}, year = {2016}, abstract = {This article compares Max Horkheimer's and Theodor W. Adorno's foundation of the Frankfurt Critical Theory with Helmuth Plessner's foundation of Philosophical Anthropology. While Horkheimer's and Plessner's paradigms are mutually incompatible, Adorno's „negative dialectics" and Plessner's „negative anthropology" (G. Gamm) can be seen as complementing one another. J{\"u}rgen Habermas at one point sketched a complementary relationship between his own publicly communicative theory of modern society and Plessner's philosophy of nature and human expressivity, and though he then came to doubt this, he later reaffirmed it. Faced with the „life power" in „high capitalism" (Plessner), the ambitions for a public democracy in a pluralistic society have to be broadened from an argumentative focus (Habermas) to include the human condition and the expressive modes of our experience as essentially embodied persons. The article discusses some possible aspects of this complementarity under the title of a „critical anthropology" (H. Schn{\"a}delbach)}, language = {de} } @incollection{Kraemer2016, author = {Kr{\"a}mer, Raimund}, title = {Grenzen im Politischen}, series = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, booktitle = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, publisher = {Trafo}, address = {Berlin}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {213 -- 237}, year = {2016}, language = {de} } @phdthesis{Heybl2016, author = {Heybl, Christine}, title = {Der Klimawandel}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-102442}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {293}, year = {2016}, abstract = {Was ist Gerechtigkeit? Wie k{\"o}nnten gerechte Regelungen aussehen f{\"u}r die Katastrophen und Leiden, die der Klimawandel ausl{\"o}st bzw. ausl{\"o}sen wird? Diese sind h{\"a}ufig ungerecht, weil sie oft deutlich st{\"a}rker diejenigen treffen, die am wenigsten zur Klimaver{\"a}nderung beigetragen haben. Doch was genau verstehen wir unter dem Schlagwort: ‚Klimawandel'? Und kann dieser wirklich den Menschen direkt treffen? Ein kurzer naturwissenschaftlicher Abriss kl{\"a}rt hier die wichtigsten Fragen. Da es sich hierbei um eine philosophische Arbeit handelt, muss zun{\"a}chst gekl{\"a}rt werden, ob der Mensch {\"u}berhaupt die Ursache von so etwas sein kann wie z.B. der Klimaerw{\"a}rmung. Robert Spaemanns These dazu ist, dass der Mensch durch seinen freien Willen mit seinen Einzelhandlungen das Weltgeschehen ver{\"a}ndern kann. Hans Jonas f{\"u}gt dem hinzu, dass wir durch diese F{\"a}higkeit, verantwortlich sind f{\"u}r die gewollten und ungewollten Folgen unserer Handlungen. Damit w{\"a}re aus naturwissenschaftlicher Sicht (1. Teil der Arbeit) und aus philosophischer Sicht (Anfang 2. Teil) gekl{\"a}rt, dass der Mensch mit gr{\"o}ßter Wahrscheinlichkeit die Ursache des Klimawandels ist und diese Verursachung moralische Konsequenzen f{\"u}r ihn hat. Ein philosophischer Gerechtigkeitsbegriff wird aus der Kantischen Rechts- und Moralphilosophie entwickelt, weil diese die einzige ist, die dem Menschen {\"u}berhaupt ein Recht auf Rechte zusprechen kann. Diese entspringt der transzendentalen Freiheitsf{\"a}higkeit des Menschen, weshalb jedem das Recht auf Rechte absolut und immer zukommt. Gleichzeitig m{\"u}ndet Kants Philosophie wiederum in dem Freiheitsgedanken, indem Gerechtigkeit nur existiert, wenn alle Menschen gleichermaßen frei sein k{\"o}nnen. Was heißt das konkret? Wie k{\"o}nnte Gerechtigkeit in der Realit{\"a}t wirklich umgesetzt werden? Die Realisierung schl{\"a}gt zwei Grundrichtungen ein. John Rawls und Stefan Gosepath besch{\"a}ftigen sich u.a. eingehend mit der prozeduralen Gerechtigkeit, was bedeutet, dass gerechte Verfahren gefunden werden, die das gesellschaftliche Zusammenleben regeln. Das leitende Prinzip hierf{\"u}r ist vor allem: ein Mitbestimmungsrecht aller, so dass sich im Prinzip alle B{\"u}rger ihre Gesetze selbst geben und damit frei handeln. In Bezug auf den Klimawandel steht die zweite Ausrichtung im Vordergrund - die distributive oder auch Verteilungs-Gerechtigkeit. Materielle G{\"u}ter m{\"u}ssen so aufgeteilt werden, dass auch trotz empirischer Unterschiede alle Menschen als moralische Subjekte anerkannt werden und frei sein k{\"o}nnen. Doch sind diese philosophischen Schlussfolgerungen nicht viel zu abstrakt, um auf ein ebenso schwer fassbares und globales Problem wie den Klimawandel angewendet zu werden? Was k{\"o}nnte daher eine Klimagerechtigkeit sein? Es gibt viele Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien, die vorgeben, eine gerechte Grundlage f{\"u}r die Klimaprobleme zu bieten wie z.B. das Verursacherprinzip, das F{\"a}higkeitsprinzip oder das Grandfathering-Prinzip, bei dem die Hauptverursacher nach wie vor am meisten emittieren d{\"u}rfen (dieses Prinzip leitete die bisherigen internationalen Verhandlungen). Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist, herauszufinden, wie die Klimaprobleme gel{\"o}st werden k{\"o}nnen, so dass f{\"u}r alle Menschen unter allen Umst{\"a}nden die universellen Menschenrechte her- und sichergestellt werden und diese frei und moralisch handeln k{\"o}nnen. Die Schlussfolgerung dieser Arbeit ist, dass Kants Gerechtigkeitsbegriff durch eine Kombination des Subsistenzemissions-Rechts, des Greenhouse-Development-Rights-Principles (GDR-Prinzip) und einer internationalen Staatlichkeit durchgesetzt werden k{\"o}nnte. Durch das Subsistenzemissions-Recht hat jeder Mensch das Recht, so viel Energie zu verbrauchen und damit zusammenh{\"a}ngende Emissionen zu produzieren, dass er ein menschenw{\"u}rdiges Leben f{\"u}hren kann. Das GDR-Prinzip errechnet den Anteil an der weltweiten Gesamtverantwortung zum Klimaschutz eines jeden Landes oder sogar eines jeden Weltb{\"u}rgers, indem es die historischen Emissionen (Klimaschuld) zu der jetzigen finanziellen Kapazit{\"a}t des Landes/ des Individuums (Verantwortungsf{\"a}higkeit) hinzuaddiert. Die Implementierung von internationalen Gremien wird verteidigt, weil es ein globales, grenz{\"u}berschreitendes Problem ist, dessen Effekte und dessen Verantwortung globale Ausmaße haben. Ein schlagendes Argument f{\"u}r fast alle Klimaschutzmaßnahmen ist, dass sie Synergien aufweisen zu anderen gesellschaftlichen Bereichen aufweisen wie z.B. Gesundheit und Armutsbek{\"a}mpfung, in denen auch noch um die Durchsetzung unserer Menschenrechte gerungen wird. Ist dieser L{\"o}sungsansatz nicht v{\"o}llig utopisch? Dieser Vorschlag stellt f{\"u}r die internationale Gemeinschaft eine große Herausforderung dar, w{\"a}re jedoch die einzig gerechte L{\"o}sung unserer Klimaprobleme. Des Weiteren wird an dem Kantischen Handlungsgrundsatz festgehalten, dass das ewige Streben auf ideale Ziele hin, die beste Verwirklichung dieser durch menschliche, fehlbare Wesen ist.}, language = {de} } @incollection{Guenther2016, author = {G{\"u}nther, Oliver}, title = {Aus dem Geleitwort des Pr{\"a}sidenten der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam zum Er{\"o}ffnungsband der Reihe "studieren++"}, series = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, booktitle = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, publisher = {Trafo}, address = {Berlin}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {7 -- 7}, year = {2016}, language = {de} } @misc{Gruene2016, author = {Gr{\"u}ne, Stefanie}, title = {Allais on Intuitions and the Objective Reality of the Categories}, series = {European journal of philosophy}, volume = {24}, journal = {European journal of philosophy}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, address = {Hoboken}, issn = {0966-8373}, doi = {10.1111/ejop.12139}, pages = {241 -- 252}, year = {2016}, language = {en} } @incollection{FischerMatheja2016, author = {Fischer, Martin H. and Matheja, Anna}, title = {Grenz{\"u}berschreitungen in der Kognition}, series = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, booktitle = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, publisher = {Trafo}, address = {Berlin}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {197 -- 212}, year = {2016}, language = {de} } @misc{DemmerlingKruegerHabermas2016, author = {Demmerling, Christoph and Kr{\"u}ger, Hans-Peter and Habermas, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {Communicative Reason Juergen Habermas, interviewed by Christoph Demmerling and Hans-Peter Krueger}, series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\~A}¼r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, volume = {64}, journal = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\~A}¼r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, address = {Berlin}, issn = {0012-1045}, doi = {10.1515/dzph-2016-0061}, pages = {806 -- 827}, year = {2016}, abstract = {Jurgen Habermas explicates the concept of communicative reason. He explains the key assumptions of the philosophy of language and social theory associated with this concept. Also discussed is the category of life-world and the role of the body-mind difference for the consciousness of exclusivity in our access to subjective experience. as well as the role of emotions and perceptions in the context of a theory of communicative action. The question of the redemption of the various validity claims as they are associated with the performance of speech acts is related to processes of social learning and to the role of negative experiences. Finally the interview deals with the relationship between religion and reason and the importance of religion in modern, post-secular societies. Questions about the philosophical culture of our present times are discussed at the end of the conversation.}, language = {de} } @book{OPUS4-9406, title = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, series = {Studieren ++ ; 3}, journal = {Studieren ++ ; 3}, editor = {Petsche, Hans-Joachim}, publisher = {Trafo}, address = {Berlin}, isbn = {978-3-86464-118-3}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {240}, year = {2016}, language = {de} }