@phdthesis{Vu2012,
  author    = {Vu, Thi Thanh Van},
  title     = {Local government on the way to good governance},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-93943},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {vii, 254},
  year      = {2012},
  abstract  = {Bad governance causes economic, social, developmental and environmental problems in many developing countries. Developing countries have adopted a number of reforms that have assisted in achieving good governance. The success of governance reform depends on the starting point of each country - what institutional arrangements exist at the out-set and who the people implementing reforms within the existing institutional framework are. This dissertation focuses on how formal institutions (laws and regulations) and informal institutions (culture, habit and conception) impact on good governance. Three characteristics central to good governance - transparency, participation and accountability are studied in the research. A number of key findings were: Good governance in Hanoi and Berlin represent the two extremes of the scale, while governance in Berlin is almost at the top of the scale, governance in Hanoi is at the bottom. Good governance in Hanoi is still far from achieved. In Berlin, information about public policies, administrative services and public finance is available, reliable and understandable. People do not encounter any problems accessing public information. In Hanoi, however, public information is not easy to access. There are big differences between Hanoi and Berlin in the three forms of participation. While voting in Hanoi to elect local deputies is formal and forced, elections in Berlin are fair and free. The candidates in local elections in Berlin come from different parties, whereas the candidacy of local deputies in Hanoi is thoroughly controlled by the Fatherland Front. Even though the turnout of voters in local deputy elections is close to 90 percent in Hanoi, the legitimacy of both the elections and the process of representation is non-existent because the local deputy candidates are decided by the Communist Party. The involvement of people in solving local problems is encouraged by the government in Berlin. The different initiatives include citizenry budget, citizen activity, citizen initiatives, etc. Individual citizens are free to participate either individually or through an association. Lacking transparency and participation, the quality of public service in Hanoi is poor. Citizens seldom get their services on time as required by the regulations. Citizens who want to receive public services can bribe officials directly, use the power of relationships, or pay a third person - the mediator ("C{\`o}" - in Vietnamese). In contrast, public service delivery in Berlin follows the customer-orientated principle. The quality of service is high in relation to time and cost. Paying speed money, bribery and using relationships to gain preferential public service do not exist in Berlin. Using the examples of Berlin and Hanoi, it is clear to see how transparency, participation and accountability are interconnected and influence each other. Without a free and fair election as well as participation of non-governmental organisations, civil organisations, and the media in political decision-making and public actions, it is hard to hold the Hanoi local government accountable. The key differences in formal institutions (regulative and cognitive) between Berlin and Hanoi reflect the three main principles: rule of law vs. rule by law, pluralism vs. monopoly Party in politics and social market economy vs. market economy with socialist orientation. In Berlin the logic of appropriateness and codes of conduct are respect for laws, respect of individual freedom and ideas and awareness of community development. People in Berlin take for granted that public services are delivered to them fairly. Ideas such as using money or relationships to shorten public administrative procedures do not exist in the mind of either public officials or citizens. In Hanoi, under a weak formal framework of good governance, new values and norms (prosperity, achievement) generated in the economic transition interact with the habits of the centrally-planned economy (lying, dependence, passivity) and traditional values (hierarchy, harmony, family, collectivism) influence behaviours of those involved. In Hanoi "doing the right thing" such as compliance with law doesn't become "the way it is". The unintended consequence of the deliberate reform actions of the Party is the prevalence of corruption. The socialist orientation seems not to have been achieved as the gap between the rich and the poor has widened. Good governance is not achievable if citizens and officials are concerned only with their self-interest. State and society depend on each other. Theoretically to achieve good governance in Hanoi, institutions (formal and informal) able to create good citizens, officials and deputies should be generated. Good citizens are good by habit rather than by nature. The rule of law principle is necessary for the professional performance of local administrations and People's Councils. When the rule of law is applied consistently, the room for informal institutions to function will be reduced. Promoting good governance in Hanoi is dependent on the need and desire to change the government and people themselves. Good governance in Berlin can be seen to be the result of the efforts of the local government and citizens after a long period of development and continuous adjustment. Institutional transformation is always a long and complicated process because the change in formal regulations as well as in the way they are implemented may meet strong resistance from the established practice. This study has attempted to point out the weaknesses of the institutions of Hanoi and has identified factors affecting future development towards good governance. But it is not easy to determine how long it will take to change the institutional setting of Hanoi in order to achieve good governance.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Kuenn2012,
  author    = {K{\"u}nn, Steffen},
  title     = {Unemployment and active labor market policy : new evidence on start-up subsidies, marginal employment and programs for youth unemployed},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-62718},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  year      = {2012},
  abstract  = {In industrialized economies such as the European countries unemployment rates are very responsive to the business cycle and significant shares stay unemployed for more than one year. To fight cyclical and long-term unemployment countries spend significant shares of their budget on Active Labor Market Policies (ALMP). To improve the allocation and design of ALMP it is essential for policy makers to have reliable evidence on the effectiveness of such programs available. Although the number of studies has been increased during the last decades, policy makers still lack evidence on innovative programs and for specific subgroups of the labor market. Using Germany as a case study, the dissertation aims at contributing in this way by providing new evidence on start-up subsidies, marginal employment and programs for youth unemployed. The idea behind start-up subsidies is to encourage unemployed individuals to exit unemployment by starting their own business. Those programs have compared to traditional programs of ALMP the advantage that not only the participant escapes unemployment but also might generate additional jobs for other individuals. Considering two distinct start-up subsidy programs, the dissertation adds three substantial aspects to the literature: First, the programs are effective in improving the employment and income situation of participants compared to non-participants in the long-run. Second, the analysis on effect heterogeneity reveals that the programs are particularly effective for disadvantaged groups in the labor market like low educated or low qualified individuals, and in regions with unfavorable economic conditions. Third, the analysis considers the effectiveness of start-up programs for women. Due to higher preferences for flexible working hours and limited part-time jobs, unemployed women often face more difficulties to integrate in dependent employment. It can be shown that start-up subsidy programs are very promising as unemployed women become self-employed which gives them more flexibility to reconcile work and family. Overall, the results suggest that the promotion of self-employment among the unemployed is a sensible strategy to fight unemployment by abolishing labor market barriers for disadvantaged groups and sustainably integrating those into the labor market. The next chapter of the dissertation considers the impact of marginal employment on labor market outcomes of the unemployed. Unemployed individuals in Germany are allowed to earn additional income during unemployment without suffering a reduction in their unemployment benefits. Those additional earnings are usually earned by taking up so-called marginal employment that is employment below a certain income level subject to reduced payroll taxes (also known as "mini-job"). The dissertation provides an empirical evaluation of the impact of marginal employment on unemployment duration and subsequent job quality. The results suggest that being marginal employed during unemployment has no significant effect on unemployment duration but extends employment duration. Moreover, it can be shown that taking up marginal employment is particularly effective for long-term unemployed, leading to higher job-finding probabilities and stronger job stability. It seems that mini-jobs can be an effective instrument to help long-term unemployed individuals to find (stable) jobs which is particularly interesting given the persistently high shares of long-term unemployed in European countries. Finally, the dissertation provides an empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of ALMP programs to improve labor market prospects of unemployed youth. Youth are generally considered a population at risk as they have lower search skills and little work experience compared to adults. This results in above-average turnover rates between jobs and unemployment for youth which is particularly sensitive to economic fluctuations. Therefore, countries spend significant resources on ALMP programs to fight youth unemployment. However, so far only little is known about the effectiveness of ALMP for unemployed youth and with respect to Germany no comprehensive quantitative analysis exists at all. Considering seven different ALMP programs, the results show an overall positive picture with respect to post-treatment employment probabilities for all measures under scrutiny except for job creation schemes. With respect to effect heterogeneity, it can be shown that almost all programs particularly improve the labor market prospects of youths with high levels of pretreatment schooling. Furthermore, youths who are assigned to the most successful employment measures have much better characteristics in terms of their pre-treatment employment chances compared to non-participants. Therefore, the program assignment process seems to favor individuals for whom the measures are most beneficial, indicating a lack of ALMP alternatives that could benefit low-educated youths.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Kroll2012,
  author    = {Kroll, Alexander},
  title     = {Why public managers use performance information : concepts, theory, and empirical analysis},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-59795},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  year      = {2012},
  abstract  = {Diese Dissertation untersucht die Verwendung von Performance-Informationen („Kennzahlen") durch F{\"u}hrungskr{\"a}fte in der {\"o}ffentlichen Verwaltung. Unter „Verwendung" wird dabei die zweckorientierte Nutzung der Daten verstanden, um zu steuern, zu lernen und {\"o}ffentliche Leistungen zu verbessern. Die zentrale Frage der Arbeit lautet: Wie k{\"o}nnen Unterschiede bei der Verwendung von Performance-Informationen erkl{\"a}rt werden? Um diese Frage zu beantworten, wird die bereits existierende Literatur strukturiert ausgewertet. Forschungsl{\"u}cken werden aufgezeigt und eigene Ans{\"a}tze vorgestellt, wie diese geschlossen werden k{\"o}nnen. Der erste Teil der Dissertation untersucht den Einfluss von Manager-bezogenen Faktoren auf die Nutzung von Performance-Daten, die bislang in der Forschung noch keine Ber{\"u}cksichtigung gefunden haben. Der zweite Abschnitt testet ein modifiziertes Modell aus der Psychologie, das auf der Annahme basiert, dass die Verwendung von Performance-Informationen ein bewusstes und durchdachtes Verhalten darstellt. Der dritte Teil untersucht, inwieweit sich die Erkl{\"a}rungen f{\"u}r die Nutzung von Performance-Informationen unterscheiden, wenn wir diese nicht nur als Kennzahlen definieren, sondern ebenfalls andere Quellen von „unsystematischem" Feedback ber{\"u}cksichtigen. Die empirischen Ergebnisse der Arbeit basieren auf einer Umfrage aus dem Jahr 2011. Im Rahmen dieses Surveys habe ich die mittleren Manager (Amtsleiter und Fachbereichsleiter) aus acht ausgew{\"a}hlten Bereichen aller kreisfreien St{\"a}dte in Deutschland befragt (n=954). Zur Auswertung der Daten wurden die Verfahren Faktorenanalyse, Multiple Regressionsanalyse und Strukturgleichungsmodellierung eingesetzt. Meine Forschung f{\"o}rderte unter anderem vier Erkenntnisse zu Tage, die durch {\"a}hnliche Befunde der verschiedenen Teile der Dissertation abgesichert sind: 1) Die Verwendung von Performance-Daten kann als bewusstes Verhalten von F{\"u}hrungskr{\"a}ften modelliert werden, das durch deren Einstellung sowie durch die Einstellung ihres sozialen Umfeldes bestimmt wird. 2) H{\"a}ufige Nutzer von Performance-Informationen zeigen {\"u}berraschenderweise keine generelle Pr{\"a}ferenz f{\"u}r das abstrakt-analytische Verarbeiten von Informationen. Stattdessen bevorzugen sie, Informationen durch pers{\"o}nliche Interaktionen aufzunehmen. 3) Manager, die sich fr{\"u}h im Rahmen der Ermittlung von Performance-Informationen engagieren, nutzen diese sp{\"a}ter auch h{\"a}ufiger, um Entscheidungen zu treffen. 4) Performance-Berichte sind nur eine Informationsquelle unter vielen. Verwaltungsmanager pr{\"a}ferieren verbales Feedback von Insidern sowie das Feedback von wichtigen externen Stakeholdern gegen{\"u}ber systematischen Performance-Daten. Die Dissertation erkl{\"a}rt diese Befunde theoretisch und verdeutlicht deren Implikationen f{\"u}r Theorie und Praxis.},
  language  = {en}
}