@article{SommererSquatritoTallbergetal.2021,
  author    = {Sommerer, Thomas and Squatrito, Theresa and Tallberg, Jonas and Lundgren, Magnus},
  title     = {Decision-making in international organizations},
  series = {The review of international organizations},
  volume    = {17},
  journal   = {The review of international organizations},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Boston},
  issn      = {1559-7431},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11558-021-09445-x},
  pages     = {815 -- 845},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {International organizations (IOs) experience significant variation in their decision-making performance, or the extent to which they produce policy output. While some IOs are efficient decision-making machineries, others are plagued by deadlock. How can such variation be explained? Examining this question, the article makes three central contributions. First, we approach performance by looking at IO decision-making in terms of policy output and introduce an original measure of decision-making performance that captures annual growth rates in IO output. Second, we offer a novel theoretical explanation for decision-making performance. This account highlights the role of institutional design, pointing to how majoritarian decision rules, delegation of authority to supranational institutions, and access for transnational actors (TNAs) interact to affect decision-making. Third, we offer the first comparative assessment of the decision-making performance of IOs. While previous literature addresses single IOs, we explore decision-making across a broad spectrum of 30 IOs from 1980 to 2011. Our analysis indicates that IO decision-making performance varies across and within IOs. We find broad support for our theoretical account, showing the combined effect of institutional design features in shaping decision-making performance. Notably, TNA access has a positive effect on decision-making performance when pooling is greater, and delegation has a positive effect when TNA access is higher. We also find that pooling has an independent, positive effect on decision-making performance. All-in-all, these findings suggest that the institutional design of IOs matters for their decision-making performance, primarily in more complex ways than expected in earlier research.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Ganghof2023,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Justifying types of representative democracy},
  series = {Critical review of international social and political philosophy},
  journal   = {Critical review of international social and political philosophy},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {1369-8230},
  doi       = {10.1080/13698230.2022.2159665},
  pages     = {1 -- 12},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {This article responds to critical reflections on my Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism by Sarah Birch, Kevin J. Elliott, Claudia Landwehr and James L. Wilson. It discusses how different types of representative democracy, especially different forms of government (presidential, parliamentary or hybrid), can be justified. It clarifies, among other things, the distinction between procedural and process equality, the strengths of semi-parliamentary government, the potential instability of constitutional designs, and the difference that theories can make in actual processes of constitutional reform.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Ganghof2013,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Equality-based comparison how to justify democratic institutions in the Real World},
  series = {Politics},
  volume    = {33},
  journal   = {Politics},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address   = {Hoboken},
  issn      = {0263-3957},
  doi       = {10.1111/1467-9256.12002},
  pages     = {101 -- 111},
  year      = {2013},
  abstract  = {Political scientists regularly justify particular democratic institutions. This article explores two desiderata for such justifications. The first is a formal equality baseline which puts the burden of justification on those who favour more unequal institutions. This baseline is seen as an implication of the rule of law. The second desideratum, the comparison requirement, builds on the first: adequate justifications of particular institutions must compare them to the best alternative, and this comparison must consider the costs for political equality. The two desiderata are applied to political science debates about the proportionality of the electoral system and bicameral systems of legislative decision-making.},
  language  = {en}
}