@article{BruttelFriehe2014,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friehe, Tim},
  title     = {Can short-term incentives induce long-lasting cooperation? Results from a public-goods experiment},
  series = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  volume    = {53},
  journal   = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {2214-8043},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.socec.2014.09.001},
  pages     = {120 -- 130},
  year      = {2014},
  abstract  = {This paper investigates whether providing strong cooperation incentives only at the outset of a group interaction spills over to later periods to ensure cooperation in the long run. We study a repeated linear public-good game with punishment opportunities and a parameter change after the first ten (of twenty) rounds. Our data shows that cooperation among subjects who had experienced a higher marginal return on public-good contributions or low punishment costs in rounds 1-10 rapidly deteriorated in rounds 11-20 once these incentives were removed, eventually trending below the level of cooperation in the control group. This suggests the possibility of temporary incentives backfiring in the long run. This paper ties in with the literature highlighting the potentially adverse effects of the use of incentives. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelFriehe2015,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friehe, Tim},
  title     = {A note on making humans randomize},
  series = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  volume    = {58},
  journal   = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {2214-8043},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.socec.2015.06.008},
  pages     = {40 -- 45},
  year      = {2015},
  abstract  = {This note presents results from an experiment studying a two person 4 4 pure coordination game. We explore different strategy labels in an attempt to implement the mixed strategy equilibrium that selects all four strategies with equal probability. Such strategy labels must be free from salient properties that might be used by participants to coordinate. Testing 23 different sets of strategy labels, we identify two sets that produce a distribution of subjects' choices which approximate the uniform distribution quite well. Our results are relevant for studies intending to compare the behavior of subjects who play against a random mechanism with that of participants who play against human counterparts.},
  language  = {en}
}