@article{Spiegel2020,
  author    = {Spiegel, Thomas J.},
  title     = {Ist der Naturalismus eine Ideologie?},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  volume    = {68},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {0012-1045},
  doi       = {10.1515/dzph-2020-0003},
  pages     = {51 -- 71},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Naturalism is the current orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Naturalism is the conjunction of the (ontological) claim that all that truly exists are the entities countenanced by the natural sciences and the (epistemological) claim that the only true knowledge is natural-scientific knowledge. Drawing on some recent work in Critical Theory, this article argues that naturalism qualifies as an ideology. This is the case because naturalism meets three key aspects shared by paradigmatic cases of ideology: (i) naturalism has practical consequences and implications of a specific kind, (ii) those endorsing naturalism fall prey to a dual deception: having false meta-level beliefs about naturalism as being without alternative, and (iii) naturalism has a tendency towards self-immunisation. The article ends by suggesting we pull naturalism out of our collective cognitive backgrounds onto the main stage of critical discourse, making it a proper topic for philosophical critique again.},
  language  = {de}
}
@misc{Spiegel2021,
  author    = {Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf},
  title     = {The Scientific Weltanschauung},
  series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe},
  journal   = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe},
  number    = {2},
  issn      = {1866-8380},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-54291},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-542910},
  pages     = {259 -- 276},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Different forms of methodological and ontological naturalism constitute the current near-orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Many prominent figures have called naturalism a (scientific) image (Sellars, W. 1962. "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man." In Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, Reality, 1-40. Ridgeview Publishing), a Weltanschauung (Loewer, B. 2001. "From Physics to Physicalism." In Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by C. Gillett, and B. Loewer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Stoljar, D. 2010. Physicalism. Routledge), or even a "philosophical ideology" (Kim, J. 2003. "The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism." Journal of Philosophical Research 28: 83-98). This suggests that naturalism is indeed something over-and-above an ordinary philosophical thesis (e.g. in contrast to the justified true belief-theory of knowledge). However, these thinkers fail to tease out the host of implications this idea - naturalism being a worldview - presents. This paper draws on (somewhat underappreciated) remarks of Dilthey and Jaspers on the concept of worldviews (Weltanschauung, Weltbild) in order to demonstrate that naturalism as a worldview is a presuppositional background assumption which is left untouched by arguments against naturalism as a thesis. The concluding plea is (in order to make dialectical progress) to re-organize the existing debate on naturalism in a way that treats naturalism not as a first-order philosophical claim, but rather shifts its focus on naturalism's status as a worldview.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Spiegel2021,
  author    = {Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf},
  title     = {The Scientific Weltanschauung},
  series = {Journal of Transcendental Philosophy},
  volume    = {2},
  journal   = {Journal of Transcendental Philosophy},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin ; Boston},
  issn      = {2626-8329},
  doi       = {10.1515/jtph-2021-0016},
  pages     = {259 -- 276},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Different forms of methodological and ontological naturalism constitute the current near-orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Many prominent figures have called naturalism a (scientific) image (Sellars, W. 1962. "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man." In Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, Reality, 1-40. Ridgeview Publishing), a Weltanschauung (Loewer, B. 2001. "From Physics to Physicalism." In Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by C. Gillett, and B. Loewer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Stoljar, D. 2010. Physicalism. Routledge), or even a "philosophical ideology" (Kim, J. 2003. "The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism." Journal of Philosophical Research 28: 83-98). This suggests that naturalism is indeed something over-and-above an ordinary philosophical thesis (e.g. in contrast to the justified true belief-theory of knowledge). However, these thinkers fail to tease out the host of implications this idea - naturalism being a worldview - presents. This paper draws on (somewhat underappreciated) remarks of Dilthey and Jaspers on the concept of worldviews (Weltanschauung, Weltbild) in order to demonstrate that naturalism as a worldview is a presuppositional background assumption which is left untouched by arguments against naturalism as a thesis. The concluding plea is (in order to make dialectical progress) to re-organize the existing debate on naturalism in a way that treats naturalism not as a first-order philosophical claim, but rather shifts its focus on naturalism's status as a worldview.},
  language  = {en}
}