@book{Ganghof2021, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, address = {Oxford}, isbn = {978-0-19-289714-5}, doi = {10.1093/oso/9780192897145.001.0001}, pages = {1 -- 199}, year = {2021}, abstract = {In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores 'semi-parliamentary government' as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers.}, language = {en} } @misc{Ganghof2021, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism}, series = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, journal = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, isbn = {978-0-19-289714-5}, issn = {1867-5808}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-53783}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-537839}, pages = {199}, year = {2021}, abstract = {In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores 'semi-parliamentary government' as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers.}, language = {en} } @article{TsebelisThiesCheibubetal.2023, author = {Tsebelis, George and Thies, Michael and Cheibub, Jos{\´e} Antonio and Dixon, Rosalind and Bog{\´e}a, Daniel and Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Review symposium}, series = {European political science}, journal = {European political science}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, address = {Basingstoke}, issn = {1680-4333}, doi = {10.1057/s41304-023-00426-9}, pages = {20}, year = {2023}, abstract = {Steffen Ganghof's Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: Democratic Design and the Separation of Powers (Oxford University Press, 2021) posits that "in a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not" (Ganghof, 2021). To consider, examine and theorise about this, Ganghof urges engagement with semi-parliamentarism. As explained by Ganghof, legislative power is shared between two democratically legitimate sections of parliament in a semi-parliamentary system, but only one of those sections selects the government and can remove it in a no-confidence vote. Consequently, power is dispersed and not concentrated in the hands of any one person, which, Ganghof argues, can lead to an enhanced form of parliamentary democracy. In this book review symposium, George Tsebelis, Michael Thies, Jos{\´e} Antonio Cheibub, Rosalind Dixon and Daniel Bog{\´e}a review Steffen Ganghof's book and engage with the author about aspects of research design, case selection and theoretical argument. This symposium arose from an engaging and constructive discussion of the book at a seminar hosted by Texas A\&M University in 2022. We thank Prof Jos{\´e} Cheibub (Texas A\&M) for organising that seminar and Dr Anna Fruhstorfer (University of Potsdam) for initiating this book review symposium.}, language = {en} }